

[] and on 14 August a written agreement was signed giving the latter's complete support. Word has been indirectly received that [] has withdrawn from any proposed revolutionary activities.

4. Organization inside Guatemala

a. Organization is intact except for two Colonels in jail.

These were charged with participation in the Salama revolt, although actually they did not support it. None of subject's organization aided Carlos Simmons at Salama.

b. There are 53,000 anti-Communist Guatemalans organized in cells of three to five men. These in turn are in groups of 25 to 100. There are 3,000 members in the capital, 4,000 to 5,000 in the suburbs, within an hour's radius of the City, the remainder throughout the interior. Those in the suburbs are rated superior to the City people. Part of the interior has not yet been organized, for two reasons: (1) The number already raised is considered sufficient; (2) When prospects of obtaining outside aid declined

attempts to organize were called off.

c. There are two intelligence nets: (1) A line into G-2

through two officers; (2) An extensive service headed by a former

[]

3

[], and for a short while

after his fall in the same position with the new Government.*

d. They have five clandestine radio stations.

e. Ample supplies of chemicals have been acquired and stored away, these to be used for sabotage and the construction of bombs.

Bombs are to be used to create alarm and confusion at the proper moment.

f. Plans exist for the control or cutting of communications, capture and control or destruction of radio stations, sabotage of the Air Force, capture and use of arms caches intended for Communist labor groups.

g. There are ten regional treasurers. Each was assigned a

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quota of \$50,000. One raised the full amount, a second, \$11,000.

The total to date subscribed ¹⁵ was \$133,000. All this has been spent

during the past year in the maintenance of the two nets and for

propaganda. The treasury is dry and funds impossible to raise

unless or until there is a general revival in the hope of success

of the movement. Other funds were raised for the Carlos Simmons

group, at least \$38,000 from [] and his associates, and

\$30,000 for []. The failure of these two and the

continual postponement of D-Day by RUFUS, has discouraged all

financial support.

5. Capabilities

Subject is positive that through his intelligence service he can obtain information on each officer of the armed forces in Guatemala City, and that a plan for their individual immobilization during the critical period is feasible. Subject mentioned that many of the officers are suspicious of one another because of the system installed whereby each is required to report on the other. This opens the way to

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excellent PW operations on our part. The Government is doing all it can to keep the support and loyalty of the key officers by paying good salaries and giving many special privileges, including the building of homes. Capture of Guatemala City at the ~~outset~~ ^{outset} of the movement will require the immobilization or assassination of the key civilian members of the Government as well as immobilization of a majority of the officers. Subject mentioned by name and locality officers in key positions in the interior who have committed themselves to his movement. Full details are available.

6. Economic measures

Oil stocks are estimated at between 30 and 60 days. Delays in shipments for one or two months prior to D-Day would have considerable effect. Since important quantities of oil come in [] and are shipped by rail, this source would have to be controlled, as well as entrance via Guatemalan ports. A second effective measure would be the delay or stoppage of shipping. The Government is in rather tight



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financial straits and depends heavily on its customs duties for revenue.

② Shipping Companies
If the []

[] could delay their

shipping for a period of several weeks, this would financially embarrass

the Guatemalan Government and likewise deny certain essential supplies.

② While

A falling off in the buying of coffee would hurt the Government, it would

have to be done in a way not to appear as an economic sanction taken

unilaterally by the U.S.

7. Political measures

A U.S. note replying to Ambassador Toriello's charges is much in order. Subject outlined the weaknesses in the Toriello statement. He showed several newspapers from Guatemala City dated 3 September, playing up in front page headlines the Toriello statements. In his opinion, this indicates full Government support and approval and probably encouragement to Toriello. Subject believes that the threat of an OAS Conference where charges would be brought against the Guatemalan Government and with the possibility of economic measures, particularly against coffee, would have a good psychological effect. The date selected for

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the Conference could be after D-Day.

B. ~~Financial Requirements~~

To make maximum use of all facilities, there are the following monthly requirements:

a. To RUFUS for maintenance and training of

military cadres	\$20,000
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b. For intelligence services and other

operations inside Guatemala	15,000
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c. For PW activities

15,000

TOTAL -	\$50,000
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PW activities will include the printing of a clandestine newspaper inside the country. One is now being published [] and distributed.

9. Recommendations

a. A detailed plan and time table be prepared based on the following assumptions: (1) Ample funds available; (2) Arms and munitions available.

b. A shipment of 8 to 10 tons of arms be made promptly to RUFUS for training purposes. These should come via the channels to be approved through [] and it will serve as a test of his


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sincerity as well as an excellent means of restoring the morale of the
RUFUS group.

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C/R #49

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CONTACT REPORT

DATE: Week 4-11 March 1954 is period covered by this report

PLACE: Central America was scene of meetings discussed herein.

PERSONS: [] and various individuals in the countries visited.
These latter are named as they enter into the discussion.

DISCUSSION:

1. []

Most of the problems have been settled by delaying the removal of the set up. Now overtime and per diem are the only problems. There are men there who quit their ordinary work and are working at [] as packers. The per diem and overtime situation must be provided for. The gear state of preparedness is very unusual and [] assured [] that [] [] were the best organizers in their field that he had seen. They will make the schedule that has been assigned for them.

2. []

Went and met with CALLIGERIS and talked to him about the deception plan. In any conversation involving time now it is "to be after the rainy season." We discussed how long we could operate in June and late May. Checks were made with other people in [] who are acquainted with the Guatemalan situation. In June the streams will not be swollen too much and the main roads will take the traffic we want to have them take in June. As long as the re-supply comes off in the morning, it is OK.

Discussed the factor of jumping the gun and gained assurance that no man in CALLIGERIS' organization would do so. CALLIGERIS assured that there would be no problems there; he has control and there will be no premature jump-off.

Subject of personnel was discussed with CALLIGERIS. Morale of the personnel in Guatemala suffered last month. There was no actual cash with which to operate in Guatemala for a long time. The men within Guatemala asked about support. Morale of the trainees was a little low because they have been busy in camp construction, movement, etc. CALLIGERIS was assured that that is always the problem with men who volunteer to fight.

There are 150 men in [] and this number was broken down for us. There are about 25 [] and he can have more at any time. He showed how he planned to pick them up. We set up a schedule of movement for him and we have decided to pull these movements to the staging sites - 15 days prior to D-day.

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[] figured that they could get by with a minimum of 13 R/Os, 7 resident and 6 tactical. CALLIGERIS has guaranteed to bring that number up to 15 by this week. CALLIGERIS picked up a couple of fellows from [] who are to be used as an emergency and they will be used as tactical R/Os. Tactical - one each to Puerto Barrios, Zacapa, Coban, Quetzaltenango, Jutiapa, CALLIGERIS' CP. The Quetzaltenango and Coban operators will be launched to defected groups, for arrival H-5.

[] said that the training was under way two days prior to the day of this particular meeting. There was no bilingual problem and as far as he knows there was no trouble with getting the lessons over to the men. [] however, is the man who knows if there is someone there who is bilingual and if the lessons are going over and has indicated inferiority in bilingual personnel.

[] volunteered the information that we could send a man in there tomorrow black and it was discussed that [] replacement could be expedited.

Twenty leaders are there, 10 on the way. There will be a total of 103 men at the camp. We have 37 men in PM training. Eighteen will be kept as saboteurs, 4 as cadre. The remainder to be assigned courier, finca-keeper, guard duty, etc. The 18 (on graduation in approximately one week) will join with 10 incoming potential sab team commanders for approximately 2 additional weeks and then when graduated will go to the staging sites to meet their recruited teams. We have already selected 22 sabotage targets to strike by outside teams plus one "special" team. This requires 23 sab team commanders plus those as-yet-unspotted targets. The expected 15-20 commo trainees and 10 overhead(bakers, cooks, carpenters, etc) makes approximately 100 personnel.

About the men in Guatemala City - his estimate is that they are only awaiting some indication that we are in operation. We discussed timing and the notification of key personnel. Nobody inside is to know that we are backing the operation until we notify these key members. That will be exactly the way it stands now, on 25 April. Otherwise, the people will only know through funds and because certain people are coming out. CALLIGERIS is getting a roster of all personnel to submit to us. It is to be poached to us. He has sent the identity of people I requested. We have the requested personnel identification. Couriers and persons from the outside are running checks on these people now.

The schedule, in addition to the people coming fix in, is:

20 April - 4 staff members, 8 shock troop members, 18 organizers are to be graduated and these are to be assigned to the staging sites to which they belong. Completion of materiel staging will be attempted.

Trainees in sabotage are to have graduated and will be assigned to staging sites to meet the teams who are also to report on this date to the staging site. This is at all staging sites.

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Starting to run the arms - facts were discussed. New breakdown of one particular kind of material, Pto. Barrios B kit. Because of the manner in which it is to be run it needs different packing. This info has been passed to the packers.

25 April - Organizers are launched. They are to be briefed and assigned and across the line. We have selected a D-day by this time, i.e., the Group and the Junta has. We have met-with CALLIGERIS with the complete military plan for finalization and agreement. We are in accord on the way this is to be run. CALLIGERIS took detailed notes on the way we are going to run it.

C [] stated that he is ready now to write up a plan with all the information which he has now gathered. He is ready to write "the plan."

C [] stated that so far pitifully little of our staff effort has leaked to the field. He feels that he spends lots of his time writing and he would like to get on an operations level.

On 25 April we are launching the resident R/Os advance party.

25 April - Set up the inner area so it is ready to receive the resident R/Os.

1 May - R/Os graduate. It is requested that resident R/Os proceed C [] The tactical R/Os are assigned to the staging sites to which they are to go. There are 6 of them, one to CALLIGERIS' one to Zacapa, one for Coban, one for Jutiapa, one for Quesaltenango and one to Pto. Barrios. Traffic to [] is to commence on arrival at staging site for practice.

D -20 This is deadline on launching resident R/Os with radios
D -15 Shock troops arrive at staging site

D -5 Assassination teams are to have been equipped by our man in Guatemala City

D -8 Sabotage teams move toward position across line

L -15 The assassination leaders receive their instructions
D -5 Signal men launched in order to set up signals so that leaders know that they are 72 hrs. away from active.

D -3 Tactical R/Os to Quesaltenango and Coban. Signal men act.
D -1 Zacapa, Jutiapa, Pto Barrios troops move to line of departure.

D -1 H hour Troops move across border 1 hour prior to dawn(H-hour)

C [] had not made his contact with the high level in [] and CALLIGERIS had been waiting for it.

C [] We located the strip 30 kms north [] C []
C [] cover will be provided once rapport is established and gas will be no problem.

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We talked with CALLIGERIS in the terms of the use of a staff in and in building up of his No. 2 man to where he understood what was going on, too. He said that No. 2 was not much of a military man. The next night he brought a military assistant with him who was an insignificant looking individual. There is no leader other than CALLIGERIS. The question of uniforms, insignia was raised and an insignia was drawn up. (Request for 5,000 of these insignia was made at this time.)

[] said he came away with the feeling that CALLIGERIS is a bit sharper than we have been giving him credit for being. He is well organized so far as the running of operations which are pretty smart for an untrained man. The only thing that impresses CALLIGERIS with our efficiency is what leaks down to him.

3. []

[] met with [] felt that rapport could not be established by CALLIGERIS alone but that it would take [] [] tried to determine what commitments [] had made to [] on our part. The second day he said that we were "pledged" to support [] although on the first day he said we had made no pledge of support.

[] brought up the fact that [] said ARENAS was a Commie, sewed up fincas on the border, etc. and as [] on what basis this had been done. [] pulled out [] para E as his authority and guide. [] felt that by the time we got there with the first cable on taking it easy, the door had been opened to [] and the thing had snowballed. [] is the type man who will act fast when he feels he's been given authority. [] feels [] accomplished the first paragraphs of the directive shortly after return and read nothing in the directive to warrant reporting in after completion each step or going slow. He thinks he is in a combat mission. [] said, "I think [] is dangerous to our plans."

[] is a dangerous politician. [] agreed that if we were to pull a deception plan on this fellow, even to the point of having a meeting with him, and if this meeting took place for 2 weeks and kept him busy, releasing him with the thought that he had not produced enough yet, that his danger of "blocking" any CALLIGERIS moves would be negated. Now [] believes that he is in full swing. When [] left [] was beginning to cast around for a way ^{out} of commitments which had been intensified by cutouts association with []

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The only man who believed [] indispensable was [] and by the second day [] was there it was a matter of having committed ourselves to the fact and by the third day he was willing to get out of the commitment if necessary, by plans which would negate [] and ease load off of [] cutout.

There are two possibilities on airports in []. We asked for 2 types of support. We selected one airport which is completely black. We know that we have to do to obtain it. If we get complete support we will use No. 2 airport, otherwise we use just the No. 1

There are nothing but American intelligence officers down there - everyone of them worked for us. [] met all the informant on a casual visit to the [] office.

talked to [] official who had been in Guatemala and who gave him information which he wanted. [] This man is an American, head of [].

A workable plan for contact of [] was set up.

There was a meeting with [] who sent word to [] CAL-LIGERIS wrote a letter to [] ambassador to []. The first report from the [] was "inagreement in spirit but [] assigned to find out the details." He stated that he wanted the members of the Group who were there to meet with [] and []. [] refused that meeting, putting it off on the grounds of security. [] did not know that [] was in [].

[] sent word that he wanted to see []. He wanted to assure himself that this was something positive. At this point he was dismayed by the delay in the requested meeting since it had been put off for several hours. [] even said he would arrange a meeting with the [] or anyone, for us to set the time and place. [] said that he was surprised that no one had been to see him yet. [] finally went to see him - met him at a private club.

[] first wanted to know who [] were; how much money backed them; what company owned the airplanes; how long this Group had worked with CALLIGERIS; what part [] played in it (this seemed important point). He was eager but he did not want to take false steps. He said he would take these details given him under consideration and give to CALLIGERIS in 3 days an indication of the degree of support which he could expect. [] specific question was: Will [] help us or not? The door was NOT closed.

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L D was told that we wanted cover for the operation(his government must be kept officially out of it) and we wanted them to ignore reports of reported moves. L Feels their answer will be favorable.

L D requested 3 days time before answering. L thinks that L wants to know what L is going to do.

4. As an afterthrough added that CALLIGRIS expressed his complete confidence in L and said he was pleased with what he has been doing.

pm
12 March 1951

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1 January 1954

LETTER OF INSTRUCTION #1

(Preparatory to 1 February meeting)

FROM: Chief of []

(Note: All words to be removed from copy to [] are marked by asterisk. This paper is to be discussed personally by [] to []

I. Operation

A. General

In your conversations with RUFUS* keep the following in mind:

1. The conduct of operations from this point forward will be based on an unconventional* warfare* program. This program consists of a tying together of [] legs, at the same time keeping them field-compartmented.
2. The [] and [] legs are being carried out independent of [] but each has the sole responsibility of servicing []. These ties are being made at Headquarters level. Your assignment once you have successfully established this concept, is to be in the field of [] only.
3. Insure that RUFUS* knows that his operational plan will be studied carefully in order to preserve full implementation of the indigenous slant as well as to fully utilize his planning to date. His plan as submitted will be built around, added to, unfeasible portions, if any, discarded, or will be completely discarded, the sole purpose of the final operational plans being to conduct the operation by unconventional* warfare* means. The term "unconventional* warfare* means" allows flexibility to the greatest degree. In the [] field it will behoove us to make RUFUS* acquainted with the general framework around which the [] field will be based so that his thinking and planning will coincide with ours and so that the reasoning behind our requests to him will be apparent and the final operational plan will be compatible with his intra-organizational coordination and planning.
4. Each item of this basic framework is subject to change as one, [] information; two, to pertinent information on the assets and former plans; and our further progress shows some items to be superfluous, some to be more easily accomplished by hitherto unrecognized or unconsidered assets. However, as stated above, it behooves us to assure that all concerned realize what this basic thing will be built around.

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B. At present it is considered RUFUS* has 9 key points with which he will be concerned in the target country:

1. Coban Garrison and Field*
2. Zacapa*
3. Jutiapa*
4. Mazatenango Garrison and Field*
5. Quetzaltenango Garrison and Field*
6. Quiche Garrison and Field*
7. Guatemala City and Central Zone, Garrisons and Fields and major commo points*
8. San Jose*
9. Puerto Barrios Garrison, Port and Field*

The operations against each separate target will be compartmented except at RUFUS*'s* staff level.

C. To maintain this compartmentation separate staging areas for each operation will be obtained. In each case the staging area would be just across the [] line from the target when feasible. Selection and obtaining of these sites in [] should be a priority job for you through RUFUS* during February. [] will arrange for sites within its jurisdiction at your request. [] will monitor your negotiations with []. As per our discussion, you should now be examining the problems to be encountered. These sites should be a rented isolated farm area but you may find such farms impossible to obtain in the interests of security, and a black isolated base on the border obtained instead. These observations should be clarified prior to our 1 February* meeting and action concerning same discussed at that time.

D. The [] training now being laid-on to commence 11 January* is to produce as discussed:

- 4 Staff men*
- 10 organizers*
- 10 shock troop leaders*
- 4 saboteur experts*
- 2 assassination specialists*

As discussed, the 4 staff men* will be returned to RUFUS* to assist in his planning. The 10 organizers* and 10 shock troop leaders* will be retained and, as two-man teams, provide the trained-specialist leadership and/or viewpoint for a specific target. These leader-organizer* teams may,

1. Send the organizer* to the target to conduct organization while the shock troop specialist* remains at safe site collecting personnel and training and preparing them for action; or

2. The organizer* might enter the target area only long enough to instruct the selected leader already within the target complex in organizing for partisan warfare* and to set up future actions of supplying the partisans* organized and conduct such courier-supply operations as necessary. The shock troop specialist* for that particular target might only instruct already-positioned leaders or possibly lead a shock troop* action in assistance of already-positioned forces or might be released to train and lead a reserve unit if such personnel becomes available. The actual employment of these organizers* and shock troop leaders* can only be determined after RUFUS's* evaluation of his assets and capabilities are thoroughly studied and assessed. Since it is necessary in order for RUFUS's* preparations to get the fullest attention to have the operational plans in his hands by 1 March* at the latest, you can readily see the necessity for making it a priority task to turn in the biographical data on RUFUS's* assets and RUFUS's* operational plans.

E. Sabotage experts* produced from the training will in turn conduct a three weeks' course at 4 appropriate safe areas just inside [] for approximately 16 selected team leaders. Where possible these 16 leaders will have been recruited from within the target area* and each will be responsible for a target nearby his natural habitat. When possible, an excuse for three weeks' absence from the target area will be formulated beforehand and a sabotage leader* reinstated immediately to recruit and train his team and commence his operation on signal. Again when evaluation and assessment of our present assets near each sabotage target* have been compiled and when [] requests have produced sufficient information from which specific targets have been selected, it may be considered more feasible to use the trained expert* as an instructor to persons on the spot in certain instances as well as melting back into the natural habitat and lying dormant until the time to strike. This flexibility in planning it must be maintained up until the final operational plan is forthcoming approximately 1 March*. However, positive sabotage targets* planning should be in your hands from this Headquarters 15 February* so that RUFUS* can recruit accordingly. It is tentatively the trend of planning that the sabotage* program will be in three stages:

Stage 1. Passive sabotage* which will be that produced through the effectiveness of psychological warfare* efforts. This will not be a directed sabotage* program nor will RUFUS*-[] personnel be responsible for any portion of it.

Stage 2 is an active stage which in any case will not be activated earlier than 2 to 3 days prior to the movement of target of the special units (tactical radio operators*, shock troops*, etc.) It is entirely possible that a completed study may show the feasibility of holding this second stage to merely hours short of H hour or even possibly to occur simultaneously with Stage 3.

Stage 3 will be D Day, H hour, overt sabotage* using demolitions* arson* and other overt means to coincide with the opening of overt[] action and aimed at cutting communication lines*, complete demolition of the main radio station* and blocking reinforcements by the active opposition*. As stated above, designation of these targets should be forthcoming by mid-February* and recruiting should commence accordingly. Again after a study of evaluation of existing assets it will be decided whether assets exist within the vicinity of the target or whether training specialists will return and recruit a team to conduct the mission or whether training specialists instruct the existing assets and provide for equipping them; or whether the mission is to be initiated in concurrence with the attack or whether it is only set up if needed during the attack and consolidation. This planning will come as a portion of the final operational plan due approximately 1 March*.

F. The assassination specialists will be utilized to return to RUFUS* K* teams for instructional purposes. These K* teams should be compartmented as soon as possible and EKI's on their targets will be compiled for them and their operational plans fitted into the overall plan.

G. The Commo* trainees will be turning out both resident* operators* (located near the target but compartmented from the activities at the target) and tactical* operators* (located at the staging site until just prior to operations) who will be the communications* link* during overt operations on D Day. In individual cases where the garget commander is now a part of the target garrison* the tactical radio operator* will be positioned with a protective unit and the marriage with the partisan* unit will be at H Hour. In individual cases where the target will be

attacked by shock troops* from the outside, the tactical radio operator* will travel with his unit. In combined situations the tactical radio operator* will travel with the shock troops*. The resident radio operator* will not enter into the overt phase but will provide intelligence* before and after the operation. Using proper clandestine procedures, we will effect a contact with the leader of the underground* and serve as message center* between the underground leader* and RUFUS*. When D Day operations commence, transmission of radio traffic* will go through the tactical radio operators*. During the entire proceeding, [] will be getting field messages direct from both tactical* and resident radio operators*. [] will stand as the message* center* during all operations. The first two and best two radio* operators* will be sent to RUFUS* to establish direct comad*, [] to RUFUS*. All incoming intelligence will be forwarded to RUFUS* immediately. All RUFUS* instruction will be passed to his target leaders via []. This will in no way affect the speed of transmission nor will RUFUS*'s control of the situation be lessened by the fact that the equipment* and signal plans* are at []. Until the D Day trigger is pulled, Headquarters will be utilizing this control to lend direction to all operations. During the overt action stage, Headquarters can only serve as a disseminator of messages* and will be set up to handle a heavy traffic quickly. It is now estimated that 5 hour round trip traffic can be expected—RUFUS*-to-Headquarters*-to-RUFUS* and RUFUS*-to-Headquarters*-to-target commander* and vice versa, allowing decoding*, answering* and recoding*. RUFUS* should personally conduct the principal city target* country* operation physically at the scene of action. It is realized tha increased value to be gained from instantaneous radio commo* with his individual units. However, there is little RUFUS* could do with instantaneous communication in this situation and the major job of conducting the principal city* operation will occupy his full time and attention. The 5 hour time lag will keep him well-informed as to events over the country before phone lines are re-established and inter-target consolidation is accomplished.

H. The operational planning will allow for three different stages of planning, the first being the one just discussed and the second to accomplish consolidation once Stage 1 has been completed successfully; the third being a guerilla warfare plan which would be put into operation in areas if the first plan is only partially successful. This thinking needs to be more thoroughly studied but tentatively it is planned for stand-by overflights with which these units can be resupplied and consolidated with successful segments of plan one.

II. Finance

A. The \$19,090 pouches to you, c/o [] is to be dispensed at the rates and within the limits we discussed at our last meeting. This breakdown will be accounted for as follows:

1. For [] Camp

Item	Minimum	Maximum
Food, 35 men and 15 guards	\$ 1,500	\$ 2,500
Pay, gd. force, 15 men	300	500
Medical Supplies	100	100
Clothing	500	750
POL	100	250
Land Rent	300	500
[] Office, 2 men & rent	200	500
Transportation facilities	200	500
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$ 3,200	\$ 5,600
Emergency Fund		840
TOTAL		\$ 6,440

2. For holding 220 men (Incl. selection SAB.* experts)	\$11,000
Emergency Fund	1,650
TOTAL	\$12,650

B. As per our discussion, the accountability for January expenditures will be your responsibility. For February expenditures, you will be responsible only for that portion allotted to HUFUS* for recruitment and [] operations. Finances for training camp expenditures will be pouches to [] who will be responsible for dispensing of and accounting for the February funds concerning training.

C. In addition, expenses for running the Commo* training camp will be pouches to, and dispensed by, and accounted for, by the Commo man* at the training camp.

D. As discussed, the other phases of project expenditures, namely [] and [], will be the responsibility of those officers in charge of the phase of that leg and will be of no concern to you.

E. Your February finances will be delivered at our 1 February* meeting and accounting of January expenditures insofar as possible made at that time.

III. Scope of responsibility

A. The entire project as discussed, has been broken into []
[] Commo* and [] [] consists of:

1. Training

2. Operations. [] has the responsibility for training which includes logistical support of the camp in addition to directing conduct of training and insuring that training meets project standards.

Your responsibility in operations is as [] case officer, which officer:

a. Directs the Principal Agent in all [] matters to see that [] standards are maintained in the fields of:

1) Recruitment

2) Disbursal of funds

3) Preparation for operations including all contacts made by the PA; commitments made in the project name by the PA; and the conduct of the preparations so that the [] operations can be carried out as project operational plans direct.

4) Conduct of [] operations in accord with project Headquarters directives.

5) Security in that the PA fully understands the necessity of confining development of operational plans to his immediate staff.

b. It is not expected that this direction must be in the form of commands to be followed "or else" but you are directed to employ methods of presentation so that the preparations for operations are carried out within the broad framework of the directive given you. Latitude will be considered in every case to allow for your advice and experience to be utilized and for EUFUS* advice and experience to be utilized but such latitude will be checked out through me when practicable and I will direct you within the framework of the directive given me. Every attempt will be made to give your advice complete consideration and you are to work within this directive which has been broadened as far as possible for your implementation.

c. Maintain a flow of information to project Headquarters through:

- 1) Monthly assessment of [] personnel as to their ability, morale and state of readiness.
- 2) Bi-weekly assessment of the training program as discussed.
- 3) Monthly accounting of expenditures.
- 4) Maintain a close bibliographical analysis on all recruited personnel and potential personnel being considered.

d. Add your advice on the practicality of the planning and form an indigenous perspective and from the active opposition perspective on all matters under consideration by project Headquarters.

e. You are to maintain compartmentation between training and operations. [] command channel is straight to this office. Your connections with the training camp will be limited to:

- 1) Setting up of the camp and camp procedures as discussed;
- 2) Presentation of [] to project personnel in the spirit necessary.
- 3) [] within the limits of our previous discussions.
- 4) Delivery of the bodies and assessments to the training area (all assessments to be known to the training chief by code number only).
- 5) Delivery of bodies from the training area to the staging areas.
- 6) [] contact and coordination with RUFUS* to insure that his personnel receive direction and motivation and preparation for coming up to [] standards of training.

- 7) Bi-weekly assessment to this office on training progress and standards.
- 8) Close coordination of your operational ideas with [] for the purpose of implementing them into training.
- 9) The reception of incoming equipment and training and disposal as discussed ([]) contact report 22, 23, 24 December and [] memorandum on black flight* preparations.

f. You are to operate independent of the [] [] except to keep it informed on matters which they need to know in order to cover up illegal operations connections with the U. S. Government*.

g. You are to discuss all problems within the jurisdiction of [] and [] with those [] [] and receive their approval before

- 1) Making contact with [] or indigenous personnel outside the RUFUS* organization.
- 2) Acquiring land within the jurisdiction of the station responsibility.

h. You are to receive [] approval before recruiting non-RUFUS* personnel for any visiting duty within the project.

i. Your reports verbal and written and your cables are to be addressed to [].

IV. Support

A. [] [], Commo* and [] have the sole function of making your [] activities a success.

B. The initial equipment is arriving as discussed (see [] [] contact reports and memorandum on black flight* arrangements)

C.- 1. A break down of equipment per target for placing at the safe site area for that target is being considered. Your sum total of equipment is as discussed (arms and equipment assay [] memo). This is designed to make all men during the short term active operational period self-sufficient as to weapons, equipment, medical and survival rations to operate with full efficiency and self-sufficiency for a ten day period. The method of getting the material into the target

area and the time for movement of equipment to the target area is yet to be firmed up except that it is contemplated moving into the staging sites will be by black flight* into nearest fields or pre-arranged airdropping and rearranged movement to the staging sites by means to be developed. Movement to the target area will be determined by the target area sites and will fit the individual case. It is contemplated by subject to [] and study that continuous black trips* by courier transport utilizing surplus personnel as couriers and subsequent stashing and cashing will permit a build-up for assets-in-position while the 50 pound self-sufficiency equipment kit will enable the shock troop and radio operators* and incoming sabotage teams* to be self sufficient for the ten day maximum expected period. More research will be forthcoming along this line of thought.

2. Support requirements during the second phase of overt [] operations will be limited to possible replacement of key instruments and items necessarily destroyed by sabotage*, consolidation requirements, operational funds, special consolidation items.

3. Support equipment for the third phase of the overt [] operations will have been arranged, gathered, packaged, and were marked for emergency black flight* so that if any of the units finds it necessary to go into this third phase, re-supply can be arranged through their tactical radio*. This third phase operational plane will of necessity be limited to a short number of weeks due to the topography of the target country and the nature of the expected consolidation of those units successful in the first stage.

V. The purpose of this letter of instruction was to define the scope of your responsibilities and acquaint you with the path of thinking now prevalent in your project headquarters. The implementation of this contemplated program are subject to constant change as the situation develops and you will be notified immediately on any changes.

VI. Yours and [] ability to implement the massive scale of planning and preparation that is going into this project is the determining factor in the amount of success achieved. The conversion of this plan into actual fact is a heavy responsibility and that fact is recognized in this project Headquarters. Take advantage of the excellent support that I feel is behind you.

45

ATH

РУССКАЯ УЧАТ

26 MAY 1954

Acting Chief of Station, Guatemala City INFO: PBSUCCESS, Headquarters

LINCOLN

Pactical Instructions (Part II)

REF# ()

1. Request that you hand the attached notes to () with the usual warning that he should either return them to your files or destroy them as soon as he has finished with them.
2. Expect the order to start Operation "A", as described in paragraph 6 of the attached notes, to be given on/or about June 3-5, with "B" following very shortly thereafter. Have () time () preparations accordingly.
3. Frequent and fast reporting on the progress of these tactical preparations will be greatly appreciated.

Attachment

25 May 1954

distinction:

2. अन्त (संतु)

2. **विवरण (व/स्त्री)**

3 = LINC (w/att)

WISDOM / NYMAT

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE AS SANITISED BY
CSE/HAC ON 11 JULY 2013

24 May 1954

For ()

1. This is the second instalment of the "Emergency Instructions" for () which we began in our letter #751, dated 12 May. We were gratified to learn from your wire #643 that the chiefs for all city teams except one have already been selected and that the other preparations, indicated in our first set of instructions, are making quick progress.

2. The first tasks of each City Chief — apart from assembling the personnel specified in paragraph 5 of #751 — include particularly:

- a) Establishing secure communications with () underground headquarters. There should be at least one courier between each Chief and Headquarters; this courier should preferably not know the Chief, but should be dispatched from, and return to, some other point. Most definitely, he must not know the location of () Headquarters, but must deliver and receive his messages elsewhere (safe house, live drop). In addition, there should be an emergency procedure for fast communications, telephone or telegram messages to a safe address, using a simple open code for instructions like "Start operation X immediately" or "expect new police measures today" or the like. There should be different codes for each team so that, if one code will be compromised, the others can be continued in use.
- b) Procuring and storing the equipment described in paragraph 6, #751.
- c) Giving his deputy all the necessary instructions as to how to carry on in case he, the Chief, should get arrested or should have to disappear in order to avoid arrest or other enemy measures.

3. Activities of each team (other than the preparatory measures described here and in #751) must under no circumstances begin before we give the word. Members of the teams should therefore withdraw from any overt oppositional activities in which they may have engaged — or, better still, should be chosen from among people who had not been especially active or at least are not known to the local police (or to the local communists) for such activities. Strict compliance with this rule — at () underground Headquarters as well as in each of the nine teams — is imperative to conserve our forces for the critical phase. On the other hand, once the signal is given, all teams should become fully active at once. It is therefore necessary that you can pass the signal at all times to () or to his deputy and that he can alert his City Chiefs without delay, as suggested in paragraph 2, a above.

4. Each City Chief must get in touch with the commander of the Liberation Forces in his city. The commander will tell him when and where to take specific local action within the general framework of the instructions which we are giving you. This subordination is indispensable in order to avoid as much as possible local confusion and to insure maximum integration of all available opposition forces in each given place. At present, each City Chief is only to be told in general terms that he will be brought into touch with other opposition groups in his area and the need for discipline and subordination must be explained to him. We shall send you specific instructions as to when, where and how these contacts between () City Chiefs and the local commanders of the Liberation Forces are to be made, in due time.

5. () ought to give each City Chief detailed advance instructions for the following types of operations, each of which ought to start on a given day. He should therefore arrange for a simple code word for each of these types of operations so that the beginning can be signaled quickly as soon as we tell you. (In one case, Operation "A" may be referred to as "Aunt Annie", "B" as "Uncle Benno", etc. while for another city team the code words may be trees or flowers with the appropriate initials, or the like).

6. OPERATION "A":

(I) Rumor campaign -- Specific themes for rumors are to follow later:
() must first explain to each Chief how to get rumors started (and believe as much as possible), how to take specific cues from the clandestine radio and from further messages he will send. FYI, the main purpose of the rumor campaign is to create the right psychological atmosphere for the final phase, to confusing and discouraging our enemies.

(II) Sabotage against enemy key personnel -- Each City Chief is to select a limited number of enemy personalities (government and police officials, communist leaders, unfriendly army officers etc.), not more than he and his team can effectively handle. Against each of these target personalities, a series of measures are to be devised which will lower his morale, if possible get him to abandon the enemy side or at least get him out of the way in the critical hours. These measures must be "custom tailored" for each individual case, since different people have different vulnerable spots and react in different manners. Some of the means to be used might include the following (plus whatever local inventors may suggest):

- a) Sending death notices
- b) Telephone calls -- preferably between 2 and 5 a.m. --, whispering a threat or a warning (either against impending purge by PGT or government -- or against being blacklisted by Liberation Movement)
- c) Marking subject's house "here lives a Moscow agent" or the like (luminous paint!)
- d) Sending cardboard coffin or hangman's noose through mail or depositing before subject's house or office.
- e) Sending subject a fake summons, asking him to appear in Guatemala City to answer charges of deviation from the party line (if a PGT member), or embezzlement or betrayal of government secrets (if a government official)
- f) Informing subject's wife that he is in danger and that she must see to it that he seeks safety.
- g) Exposing true or very likely dark spots in subject's private life, by telling him, or his wife or denouncing him to his superiors or publishing the story via black leaflet.
- h) Sending subject a wire, announcing a successful business deal to be made, asking him to come for important meeting, or pretending an accident which befell family member, mistress or close friend in far-away place, to remove him from scene for critical moment, and so forth.

(III) Encourage people to listen to the clandestine radio, by word-of-mouth propaganda, by painting wave lengths and times on walls, etc.

7. OPERATION "G":

- (I) Start distribution of the material (leaflets, posters) which() is receiving from you and which he will have divided up among the City Teams for storage in advance -- since bulk shipments to outlying cities are likely to become increasingly difficult towards the final phase.
- (II) Start production and distribution of local, mimeographed bulletins and leaflets -- exploiting the local situation plus news heard on the clandestine radio, publishing black lists of dangerous enemies, communists, police informers etc. (as a further step in the "nerve war" described in Operation "F" above).
- (III) Start painting slogans on walls.

c. OPERATION "G" (This is the most sensitive part of the entire enterprise. We leave it to your judgment how much of it you want to tell to() already now. In any case, he must not tell any of this part to his City Chief's any earlier than is absolutely necessary!:

- (I) prevent, or slow down, as much as possible, hostile action by the Army or by the Police, for instance
 - a) by preliminary propaganda aimed either at the military and police personnel as a whole or at individual officers and men, considered potentially friendly to us;
 - b) by organizing, if locally feasible, demonstrations by women and children in front of the police station or the army barracks, slowing down the departure of troops, preventing the use of fire arms, clamoring for the release of political prisoners, etc.
- (II) frustrate communist-led strikes or provoke, on the contrary, strikes which can help the liberation movement (like all parts of Operation "G", this one has to be particularly carefully coordinated with the local commander of the Liberation Forces, as set forth in paragraph 4 above) -- for instance, a railroad workers strike to hold up troop movements, a strike at the city electrical power plant plunging the city into darkness a printers strike to prevent publication of pro-Arbenz newspapers, leaflets or posters, and so forth.
- (III) Use all locally available resources, leaflets, bulletins, possibly also local newspapers and radio stations, word of mouth, meetings (if and as practicable) etc. to rally the local population around the liberation movement, to keep them informed about the progress of our action, to counteract enemy announcements, propaganda or rumors and to provide disciplined mass support for the Liberation Forces.

9. The security implications of the above are obvious. Just as you will pass these instructions to() not earlier than required,() in turn will give each City Chief and the men at his underground headquarters no information prior to the moment where it is needed and will give no individual more information than this individual requires in order to accomplish his own assignments. Each City Chief again will pass on instructions to the members of his team on a strict "need-to-know"

basic and will not reveal any sensitive fact any earlier than necessary. Certain parts of the intended activities require considerable preparations, for instance, the collection of relevant information for the "nerve war", defined above as part of Operation "A" - but this is a comparatively non-sensitive task. Information on communications, whether with()Headquarters or with the local Commander of the Liberation Forces, or any preparation for Operation "C", on the other hand, is highly sensitive and must be confined absolutely to the people who need them. Impress upon everybody the fact that at least a few members of the entire organization are likely to be arrested during the preparatory period, while others might talk under the influence of liquor, women or money: the safest way of keeping the possible damage to a minimum is to let nobody know more than he must know -- or any earlier than he has to know. No amount of torture or corruption can extract from a person information which he has not got.

10. You may expect to receive the final set of our instructions as well as the signal to start Operations "A" very shortly. Complete preparations therefore as speedily as possible and keep sending us full reports on all phases of this work.

(HAND CARRY)

31 March 1954

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MEMORANDUM

TO All Staff Officers
FROM C/[]

SUBJECT: Selection of individuals for disposal by Junta Group.

C/[] has requested a list of names be compiled for study by Staff Officers to determine if they meet the latest criteria for inclusion on the Junta's disposal list.

Consideration for inclusion on the final list should positively establish that the individual falls into one or more of the following groups:

- 1) High government and organizational leaders whose outward position has not disclosed the fact they are motivated and directed by the Cominform, and who are irrevocably implicated in Communist doctrine and policy.
- 2) Out-and-out proven Communist leaders whose removal from the political scene is required for the immediate and future success of the new government.
- 3) Those few individuals in key government and military positions of tactical importance whose removal for psychological, organizational or other reasons is mandatory for the success of military action.

This document is routed to Staff Officers for deletions, additions, and/or comments. It is requested that a final list of disposees be approved promptly to permit P.M. planning to proceed on schedule.

The following list of individuals for consideration has been assembled from old lists supplied by the Junta and from recent intelligence available at []. Your careful consideration is requested in making additions or deletions.

Each officer is to indicate his concurrence by placing his initials after each name on the attached list which he believes should remain on this list. Exceptions, additions or deletions are to be noted on the blank pages following the attachment.

Attachments:

1. Disposal list
2. Blank pages
3. Biographic data

Elimination Test
April 1. - Rips is taking a copy of list &
names for clearing with []
April 2. - Date Original Memo
with attached Biographic data
has been forwarded to []
Returned by [] on 1 June 1954.

100-2000000-1000000

* Biographic data attached.

[REDACTED] BIOGRAPHIC DATA EXCISED - CSI/HRG [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ABOVE IS TRUE WORDING FROM DOCUMENT. CSI/HRG
REVIEW TEAM UNABLE TO MAKE A LEGIBLE COPY.

CONTINUED:

*BIOGRAPHIC DATA ATTACHED.

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Training file
of PBSuccess

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
APPROVED FOR RELEASE BY
CSI / HRC ON 12 JULY 95

fall 1968

A STUDY OF ASSASSINATION

DEFINITION

Assassination is a term thought to be derived from "Hashish", a drug similar to marijuanna, said to have been used by Hassan-Ben-Sabah to induce motivation in his followers, who were assigned to carry out political and other murders, usually at the cost of their lives.

It is here used to describe the planned killing of a person who is not under the legal jurisdiction of the killer, who is not physically in the hands of the killer, who has been selected by a resistance organization for death, and whose death provides positive advantages to that organization.

IMPLEMENTATION

Assassination is an extreme measure not normally used in clandestine operations. It should be assumed that it will never be ordered or authorized by any U. S. Headquarters, though the latter may in rare instances agree to its execution by members of an associated foreign service. This reticence is partly due to the necessity for committing communications to paper. No assassination instructions should ever be written or recorded. Consequently, the decision to employ this technique must nearly always be reached in the field, at the area where the act will take place. Decision and instructions should be confined to an absolute minimum of persons. Ideally, only one person will be involved. No report may be made, but usually the act will be properly covered by several news services, whose output is available to all concerned.

JUSTIFICATION

Murder is not morally justifiable. Self-defense may be argued if the victim has knowledge which ~~may~~ destroy the resistance organization, developed. Assassination of persons responsible for atrocities or reprisals may be regarded as just punishment. Killing a political leader whose burgeoning career is a clear and present danger to the cause of freedom may be held necessary.

But assassination can seldom be employed with a clear conscience. Persons who are morally squeamish should not attempt it.

CLASSIFICATIONS

The techniques employed will vary according to whether the subject is unaware of his danger, aware but unguarded, or guarded. They will also be affected by whether or not the assassin is to be killed with the subject hereafter, assassinations in which the subject is unaware will be termed "simple"; those where the subject is aware but unguarded will be termed "grave"; those where the victim is guarded will be termed "guarded."

If the assassin is to die with the subject, the act will be called "last." If the assassin is to escape, the adjective will be "safe." It should be noted that no compromise should exist here. The assassin ~~must~~ not fall alive into enemy hands.

A further type division is caused by the need to conceal the fact that the subject was actually the victim of assassination, rather than an accident or natural causes. If such concealment is desirable the operation will be called "secret"; if concealment is impossible, the act will be called "open"; while if the contamination requires publicity to be effective it will be termed "terroristic."

Following these definitions, the assassination of Julius Caesar was safe, simple, and terroristic, while that of Huay Long was lost, guarded and open. Obviously, successful secret assassinations are not recorded as assassination at all. Attacks of Thailand and Augustus, Caesar may have been the victims of safe, guarded and secret assassination. These assassinations usually involve clandestine agents or members of criminal organization.

THE ASSASSIN

In safe assassination, the assassin needs the usual qualities of a clandestine agent. He should be determined, courageous, intelligent, resourceful, and physically active. If special equipment is to be used, such as firearms or drugs, it is clear that he must have outstanding skill with such equipment.

Except in ~~safe~~ terroristic assassination, it is desirable that the assassin be a transient in the area. He should have an absolute minimum of contact with the rest of the organization, and his instructions should be given orally by one person only. His safe evacuation after the act is absolutely essential, but here again contact should be as limited as possible. It is preferable that the person issuing instructions also conduct any withdrawal or covering action which may be necessary.

In lost assassination, the assassin must be a fanatic of some sort. Politics, religion, and revenge are about the only feasible motives. Since a fanatic is unstable psychologically, he must be handled with extreme care. He must not know the identities of the other members of the organization, for although it is intended that he die in the act, something may go wrong. Significant information, while the assassin of Trotsky has never revealed any, it was unknown to depend on this when the act was planned.

PLANNING

When the decision to assassinate has been reached, the tactics of the operation must be planned, based upon an estimate of the situation similar to that used in military operations. The preliminary estimate will reveal gaps in information and possibly indicate a need for special equipment which must be procured or constructed. When all necessary data has been collected, an effective tactical plan can be prepared. All planning must be hental; no papers should ever contain evidence of the operation.

In resistance situations, assassination may be used as a counter-reprisal. Since this requires advertising to be effective, the resistance organization must be in a position to warn high officials publicly that their lives will be the price of reprisal action against innocent people. Such a threat is of no value unless it can be carried out, so it may be necessary to plan the assassination of various responsible officers of the oppressive regime and hold such plans in readiness to be used only if provoked by excessive brutality. Such plans must be modified frequently to meet changes in the tactical situation.

TECHNIQUES

The essential point of assassination is the death of the subject. A human being may be killed in many ways but sureness is often overlooked by those who may be emotionally unstrung by the seriousness of this act they intend to commit. The specific techniques employed will depend upon a large number of variables, but should be constant in one point: Death must be absolutely certain. The attempt on Hitler's life failed because the conspiracy did not give this matter proper attention.

Techniques may be considered as follows:

1. Manual.

It is possible to kill a man with the bare hands, but very few are skillful enough to do it well. Even a highly trained Judo expert will hesitate to risk killing by hand unless he has absolutely no alternative. However, the simplest local tools are often such the most efficient means of assassination. A hammer, axe, wrench, screw driver, fire poker, kitchen knife, lamp stand, or anything hard, heavy and handy will suffice. A length of rope or wire or a belt will do if the assassin is strong and agile. All such improvised weapons have the important advantage of availability and apparent innocence. The obviously lethal machine gun failed to kill Trotsky where an item of sporting goods succeeded.

In all safe cases the assassin may be subject to search, either before or after the act, specialized weapons should not be used. Even in the last case, the assassin may accidentally be searched before the act and should not carry an incriminating device if any sort of lethal weapon can be improvised at or near the site. If the assassin normally carries weapons because of the nature of his job, it may still be desirable to improvise and implement at the scene to avoid disclosure of his identity.

2. Accidents.

For secret assassination, either simple or chase, the contrived accident is the most effective technique. When successfully executed, it causes little excitement and is only casually investigated.

The most efficient accident, in simple assassination, is a fall of 75 feet or more onto a hard surface. Elevator shafts, stair walls, unscreened windows and bridges will serve. Bridge falls into water are not reliable. In simple cases a private meeting with the subject may be arranged at a property-cased location. The act may be executed by sudden, vigorous of the ankles, tipping the subject over the edge. If the assassin immediately sets up an outcry, playing the "horrified witness", no alibi or circumstantial withdrawal is necessary.

In chase cases it will usually be necessary to stun or drug the subject before dropping him. Care is required to insure that no wound or condition not attributable to the fall is discernable after death.

Falls into the sea or swiftly flowing rivers may suffice if the subject cannot swim. It will be more reliable if the assassin can arrange to attempt rescue, as he can thus be sure of the subject's death and at the same time establish a workable alibi.

If the subject's personal habits make it feasible, alcohol may be used ~~unquestionably~~ to prepare him for a contrived accident of any kind.

Falls before trains or subway cars are usually effective, but require exact timing and can seldom be free from unexpected observation.

Automobile accidents are a less satisfactory means of assassination. If the subject is deliberately run down, very exact timing is necessary and investigation is likely to be thorough. If the subject's car is tampered with, reliability is very low. The subject may be stunned or drugged and then placed in the car, but this is only reliable when the car can be run off a high cliff or into deep water without observation.

Arson can cause accidental death if the subject is drugged and left in a burning building. Reliability is not satisfactory unless the building is isolated and highly combustible.

3. Drugs.

In all types of assassination except terroristic, drugs can be very effective. If the assassin is trained as a doctor or nurse and the subject is under medical care, this is an easy and sure method. An overdose of morphine administered as a sedative will cause death without disturbance and is difficult to detect. The size of the dose will depend upon whether the subject has been using narcotics regularly. If not, two grains will suffice.

If the subject drinks heavily, morphine or a similar narcotic can be injected at the passing out stage, and the cause of death will often be held to be acute alcoholism.

Specific poisons, such as arsenic or strichine, are effective but their possession or procurement is incriminating, and accurate dosage is problematical.

Poison was used unsuccessfully in the assassinations of Rasputin and Molotov, though the latter case is more accurately described as a murder.

b. Edge Weapons

Any locally obtained edge device may be successfully employed. A certain minimum of anatomical knowledge is needed for reliability.

Puncture wounds of the body cavity may not be reliable unless the heart is reached. The heart is protected by the rib cage and is not always easy to locate.

Head wounds were once nearly always mortal, but modern medical treatment has made this no longer true.

Absolute reliability is obtained by severing the spinal cord in the cervical region. This can be done with the point of a knife or a light blow of an axe or hatchet.

Another reliable method is the severing of both jugular and carotid blood vessels on both sides of the windpipe.

If the subject has been rendered unconscious by other wounds or drugs, either of the above methods can be used to insure death.

c. Blunt Weapons

As with edge weapons, blunt weapons require some anatomical knowledge for effective use. Their main advantage is their universal availability. A bat or may be picked up almost anywhere in the world. Baseball and cricket bats are very widely distributed. Even a rock or a heavy stick will do, and nothing resembling a weapon need be procured, carried or subsequently disposed of.

Blows should be directed to the temple, the area just below and behind the ear, and the lower, rear portion of the skull. Of course, if the blow is very heavy, any portion of the upper skull will do. The lower frontal portion of the head, from the eyes to the throat, can withstand enormous blows without fatal consequences.

6. Firearms

Firearms are often used in assassination, often very ineffectively. The assassin usually has insufficient technical knowledge of the limitations of weapons, and expects more range, accuracy and killing power than can be provided with reliability. Since certainty of death is the major requirement, firearms should be used which can provide destructive power at least 100% in excess of that thought to be necessary, and ranges should be half that considered practical for the weapon.

Firearms have other drawbacks. Their possession is often incriminating. They may be difficult to obtain. They require a degree of expertise from the user. They are noisy. Their lethality is consistently over-rated.

However, there are many cases in which firearms are probably more efficient than any other means. These cases usually involve distance between the assassin and the subject, or comparative physical weakness of the assassin, as with a woman.

(a) The precision rifle. In guarded assassination, a good hunting or target rifle should always be considered as a possibility. Absolute reliability can nearly always be achieved at a distance of one hundred yards. In ideal circumstances, the range may be extended to 250 yards. The rifle should be a well made bolt or falling block action type, handling a powerful long-range cartridge. The .300 F.W. Magnum is probably the best cartridge readily available. Other excellent calibers are .375 H.&F. Magnum, .270 Winchester, .30 - '06 r.c., 8 X 60 MM Magnum, 9.3 X

62 MM and others of this type. These are preferable to ordinary military calibers, since ammunition available for them is usually of the expanding bullet type, whereas most ammunition for military rifles is full jacketed and hence not sufficiently lethal. Military ammunition should not be altered by filing or drilling bullets, as this will adversely affect accuracy.

The rifle may be of the "bull gun" variety, with extra heavy barrel and set triggers, but in any case should be capable of maximum precision. Ideally, the weapon should be able to group in one inch at one hundred yards, but $2\frac{1}{2}$ " groups are adequate. The sight should be telescopic, not only for accuracy, but because such a sight is much better in dim light or near darkness. As long as the bare outline of the target is discernable, a telescope sight will work, even if the rifle and shooter are in total darkness.

An expanding, hunting bullet of such calibers as described above will produce extravagant laceration and shock at short or mid-range. If a man is struck just once in the body cavity, his death is almost entirely certain.

Public figures or guarded officials may be killed with great reliability and some safety if a firing point can be established prior to an official occasion. The propaganda value of this system may be very high.

(b) The machine gun.

Machine guns may be used in most cases where the precision rifle is applicable. Usually, this will require

the subversion of a unit of an official guard at a ceremony, though a skillful and determined team might conceivably dispose of a loyal gun crew without commotion and take over the gun at the critical time.

The area fire capacity of the machine gun should not be used to search out a concealed subject. This was tried with predictable lack of success on Trotsky. The automatic feature of the machine gun should rather be used to increase reliability by placing a 5 second burst on the subject. Even with full jacket ammunition, this will be absolutely lethal if the burst pattern is no larger than a man. This can be accomplished at about 150 yards. In ideal circumstances, a properly bedded and targeted machine gun can do it at 850 yards. The major difficulty is placing the first burst exactly on the target, as most machine gunners are trained to spot their fire on target by observation of strike. This will not do in assassination as the subject will not wait.

(e) The Submachine Gun.

This weapon, known as the "machine-pistol" by the Russians and Germans and "machine-carbine" by the British, is occasionally useful in assassination. Unlike the rifle and machine gun, this is a short range weapon and since it fires pistol ammunition, much less powerful. To be reliable, it should deliver at least 5 rounds into the subject's chest, though the .45 caliber U.S. weapons have a much larger margin of killing efficiency than the 9 mm European arms.

The assassination range of the submachine gun is point

blank. While accurate single rounds can be delivered by sub-machine gunners at 50 yards or more, this is not certain enough for assassination. Under ordinary circumstances, the SMG should be used as a fully automatic weapon. In the hands of a capable gunner, a high cyclic rate is a distinct advantage, as speed of execution is most desirable, particularly in the case of multiple subjects.

The sub-machine gun is especially adapted to indoor work when more than one subject is to be assassinated. An effective technique has been devised for the use of a pair of submachine gunners, by which a room containing as many as a dozen subjects can be "purified" in about twenty seconds with little or no risk to the gunners.

It is illustrated below.

Fig. 1 -

While the U.S. sub-machine guns fire the most lethal cartridge, the higher cyclic rate of some foreign weapons enable the gunner to cover a target quicker with acceptable pattern density. The Bergmann Model 1934 is particularly good in this way. The Spanish Madrazo SMG has a moderately good cyclic rate and is admirably compact and concealable. The Russian SMG's have a good cyclic rate, but are handicapped by a small, light projectile which requires more hits for equivalent killing effect.

(4) The Shotgun.

A large bore shotgun is a most effective

killing instrument as long as the range is kept under ten yards. It should normally be used only on single targets as it cannot sustain fire successfully. The barrel may be "sawed-off" for convenience, but this is not a significant factor in its killing performance. Its optimum range is just out of reach of the subject. 00 buckshot is considered the best shot size for a twelve gage gun, but anything from single balls to bird shot will do if the range is right. The assassin should aim for the solar plexus as the shot pattern is small at close range and can easily miss the head.

(c) The Pistol

While the handgun is quite inefficient as a weapon of assassination, it is often used, partly, because it is readily available and can be concealed on the person, and partly because its limitations are not widely appreciated. While many well known assassinations have been carried out with pistols (Lincoln, ^{G. C. W.} McKinley, Ghandi), such attempts fail as often as they succeed (Truman, Roosevelt, Churchill).

If a pistol is used, it should be as powerful as possible and fired from just beyond reach. The pistol and the shotgun are used in similar tactical situations, except that the shotgun is much more lethal and the pistol is much more easily concealed.

In the hands of an expert, a powerful pistol is quite deadly, but such experts are rare and not usually available for assassination missions.

16 .45 Colt, .44 Special, .455 Ely, .45 A.C.P. (U.S. Service)

rounds can suffice but are less reliable. Sub-power cartridges such as the .32s and .35s should be avoided.

In all cases, the subject should be hit solidly at least three times for complete reliability.

(f) Silent Firearms

The sound of the explosion of the propellant in a firearm can be effectively silenced by appropriate attachment. However, the sound of the projectile passing through the air cannot, since this sound is generated outside the weapon. In cases where the velocity of the bullet greatly exceeds that of sound, the noise so generated is much louder than that of the explosion. Since all powerful rifles have muzzle velocities of over 2000 feet per second, they cannot be silenced.

Pistol bullets, on the other hand, usually travel slower than sound and the sound of their flight is negligible. Therefore, pistols, submachine guns and any sort of improvised carbine or rifle which will take a low velocity cartridge can be silenced. The user should not forget that the sound of the operation of a repeating action is considerable, and that the sound of bullet strike, particularly in bone, is quite loud.

Silent firearms are only occasionally useful to the assassin, though they have been widely publicized in this connection. Because permissible velocity is low, effective precision range is held to about 100 yards with rifle or carbine type weapons, while with pistols, silent or otherwise,

are most efficient just beyond arm length. The silent feature attempts to provide a degree of safety to the assassin, but mere possession of a silent firearm is likely to create enough hazard to counter the advantage of its silence. The silent pistol combines the disadvantages of any pistol with the added one of its obviously clandestine purpose.

A telescopically sighted, closed-action carbine shooting a low velocity bullet of great weight, and built for accuracy, could be very useful to an assassin in certain situations.

At the time of writing, no such weapon is known to exist.

7. Explosives.

Bombs and demolition charges of various sorts have been used frequently in assassination. Such devices, in both private and open assassination, can provide safety and overcome guard barriers, but it is curious that bombs have often been the implement of lost assassinations.

The major factor which affects reliability is the use of explosives for assassination. The charge must be very large and the detonation must be controlled exactly as to time by the assassin who can observe the subject. A small or moderate explosive charge is highly unreliable as a cause of death, and time delay or booby-trap devices are extremely prone to kill the wrong man. In addition to the moral aspects of indiscriminate killing, the death of casual bystanders can often produce public reactions unfavorable to the cause for which the assassination is carried out.

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Bombs or grenades should be set or be thrown at a subject. While this

It always causes a commotion and may even result in the subject's death; it is sloppy, unreliable, and bad propaganda. The charge must be too small and the assassin is never sure of: (1) reaching his attack position, (2) placing the charge close enough to the target and (3) firing the charge at the right time.

Placing the charge surreptitiously in advance permits a charge of proper size to be employed, but requires accurate prediction of the subject's movements.

Ten pounds of high explosive should normally be regarded as a minimum, and this is exclusive of fragmentation material. The latter can consist of any hard, tough material as long as the fragments are large enough. Metal or rock fragments should be walnut-size rather than pea-size. If solid plates are used, to be ruptured by the explosion, cast iron, 1" thick, gives excellent fragmentation. Military or commercial high explosives are practical for use in assassination. Homemade or improvised explosives should be avoided. While possibly powerful, they tend to be dangerous and unreliable. Anti-personnel explosive missiles are excellent, provided the assassin has sufficient technical knowledge to fuse them properly. 81 or 82 mm mortar shells, or the 120 mm mortar shell, are particularly good. Anti-personnel shells for 82, 88, 90, 100 and 105 mm guns and howitzers are both large enough to be completely reliable and small enough to be carried by one man.

The charge should be so placed that the subject is not over six feet from it at the moment of detonation.

A large, shaped charge with the case filled with iron fragments (such as 1" nuts and bolts) will fire a highly lethal shotgun-type

to 50 yards. This reaction has not been thoroughly tested, however, and an exact replica of the proposed device should be fired in advance to determine exact range, pattern-size, and penetration of fragments. Fragments should penetrate at least 1" of seasoned pine or equivalent for minimum reliability.

Any firing device may be used which permits exact control by the assassin. An ordinary commercial or military exploder is efficient, as long as it is rigged for instantaneous action with no time fuse in the system.

The wire screen electric target can serve as the triggering device and provide exact timing from as far away as the assassin can reliably hit the target. This will avoid the disadvantages of stringing wire between the proposed position of the assassin and the subject, and also permit the assassin to fire the charge from a variety of possible positions.

The radio switch can be used to fire a charge, though its reliability is somewhat lower and its procurement may not be easy.

~~Exhibit B~~
There may be presented brief outlines, with critical evaluations of the following assassinations and attempts:

Marat	Hedrich
Lincoln	Hitler
Harding	Roosevelt
Grand Duke Sergei	Truman
Piphvie	Mussolini
Archduke Francis Ferdinand	Benes
Rasputin	Aung Sang

Rudolf

Kirov

Ho Chi Minh

Alexander of Yugoslavia


Trotzky

Pasewa


Abdullah

Ghandi


Conference Room Technique




(1) Enters Room Quietly But Quietly
 (2) Stands in Doorway




(2) Opens fire on first Subject to React. Swings Across Group Toward Center of Mass. Times Burst to Empty Magazine at end of SWING
 (1) covers group to prevent Individual Dangerous Reactions, if necessary, fires individual Bursts of 3 rounds




(2) Finishes Burst. Commands "Shift." Drops Back thru Door, Replaces Empty Magazine. Covers Corridor.
 (1) On Command "Shift," Opens fire on opposite side of target, Swings one Burst Across Group



(1) Finishes Burst. Commands "Shift." Drops Back thru Door, Replaces Magazine. Covers Corridor.
 (2) On Command, "Shift," Re-enters room. Covers group; kills survivors with Two-round Bursts. LEAVES Propaganda.



(2) Leaves Room. Commands "GO," covers rear with nearly full Magazine.
 (1) On Command "GO," Leads withdraws, covering front with full magazine



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[] finca located south of Santa Lucia Cotz. Cotz location 14 degrees 20 minutes north, 91 degrees 1 minute West. Cotz on main road 6W between Such- Escuintla and Mazatenango. The dirt road leading to finca branches off to south at Cotz. Railroad exactly $2\frac{1}{2}$ km south of Cotz. 700 meters south of RR is wooden bridge. Finca believed just south of this bridge.

Identifying data: runway, approx 1 mile from main complex finca bldgs. Bridge leading directly to finca is made of iron.

[] Above is best I can make of data we have. [] says in his report that he will submit a more detailed report and possibly a map. This is not here to my knowledge. Suggest Guat be info on if any action cable you may write, so that they may forward more precise data, if they have it.

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GENERAL STAFF
C 51 / RQ NO 1171575
APR 1968

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Report No. 21

Date of Report: 10 December 1952

Date of Inform: 15 November to
10 December 1952

TO : Chief, WH

From : []

SUBJECT: Current Political Picture, Honduras, C. A.

1. General Tiburcio CARIAS Andino and President Juan Manuel GÁLVEZ reconciled their political differences at a meeting held on December 2nd at the home of Vice-President Julio LOZANO, Jr. The threatened split in the National Party has been averted.

2. Gálvez is not to run for re-election. Both Carias and Gálvez have agreed, in the interests of party solidarity, to withdraw from the presidential race and unite behind a common candidate, who is as yet unspecified.

3. Carias is still the undisputed head of the National Party, as indicated by the following:

a. On Sunday, November 30th, in nation-wide elections for town mayors, General Carias' candidates won over-whelmingly.¹ Total votes for his candidates were nearly four times the combined votes for all other candidates - i.e. - those supported by Gálvez and those supported by the Liberal Party. This was a direct test of strength between the supporters of General Carias and President Gálvez.

b. The National Assembly, opening its annual meeting on December 3rd elected several pro-Carias men as leaders for the current session.

c. The earlier report that the 5% contribution from each government employee to Carias had been stopped proved erroneous. As head of the National Party Carias still receives the contribution.

4. General Abraham WILLIAMS has been eased out of the picture for the present. Just where Williams stands politically is not clear at the moment, except that he has been temporarily shelved.

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5. The Guatemalans attempted to exert political influence, approaching Gálvez and offering their support in helping him remove Carias. They failed in this move.

6. Francisco MORAZÁN, a Honduran, currently private secretary to President ARENAL of Guatemala, visited Gálvez in Tegucigalpa (November 1952) and offered himself as a compromise candidate between General Carias and President Gálvez.

7. There is some form of liaison between Francisco Morazán and General Williams, the nature of which is not clear at this time. On his recent trip to Honduras Morazán delivered a truck-load of arms to the finca of General Williams, near Choluteca. The arms are still there.

C] Comment: This does not necessarily reflect a true picture of popular sentiment, since in many instances Carias' men controlled the local election machinery. Also many people voted the National Party ticket without realizing there was any question of choosing between Carias and Gálvez.

Attachments:

- "A" - Meeting, Carias-Gálvez
- "B" - Political Parties
- "C" - Election Results

Attachment: "A"
To: Report No. 21

SUBJECT: Meeting Between President Juan M. Gálvez and General Tiburcio Carias Andino, December 2, 1952. Tegucigalpa, D. C.

SOURCE :
CALLIGERIS, for paragraph 2.

1. General Carias, President Gálvez, and don Julio Lozano (Vice-President) met in the home of don Julio for a meeting which lasted two and a half hours. Carias and Gálvez agreed to drop out of the picture, solidify the National Party, and work for don Julio as successor to Gálvez. Reports indicate that General Williams, who was not invited to the meeting, was not taken into consideration in any way and will be left to shift for himself.

2. Gálvez, during his meeting with Carias, included in his remarks the following:

- a. That the Guatemalan government through its official representatives in Honduras had offered to help him remove Carias, by assassination if necessary;
- b. That both he and Carias must be very careful of their personal security in the future and use bodyguards.

Source Comment: The Guatemalans recognize in Carias the major obstacle to their political aspirations in Honduras, and they are prepared to employ any means to effect his elimination.

Attachment: "B"
To: Report No. 21

SUBJECT: Political Parties; Partido Nacional and Partido Liberal.

SOURCE : [] Honduras, C. A.

1. The two traditional parties, and the only ones which presently have any apparent strength, are the National Party (Partido Nacional) and the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal). There are several lesser political parties, such as the Honduran Democratic Revolutionary Party (Partido Democrático Revolucionario Hondureño), and others which are subdivisions of the National or Liberal parties. However, at this writing we have no information on these smaller groups and hence shall leave them for a later report.

2. The relative strength of each one of the parties depends on the leaders of same and the propaganda which each party issues.

3. There is nothing in Honduran law which obliges the political parties to inscribe themselves as such in any register, in order that they be considered legal political parties. All the political groupings which exist in the country are legal. The National Party is the only one which has specifically requested recognition as a legal entity. This was done to enable it to acquire property, to have money deposits, and to exercise any other faculty which only natural or legal persons are capable of exercising.

4. The political parties meet in conventions to designate their candidates. All the officers and party members or supporters who can, attend these conventions. The rules of each party set forth the regulations for conventions, and it is the Directory group of each party which sets forth the date for such meetings according to the political circumstances.

5. In conformance with the Political Constitution of Honduras, the next presidential election must take place the second Sunday of October, 1954, and the President will take office the first of January, 1955.

Attachment: "C"
To: Report No. 21

SUBJECT: Mayoralty Election Results
Congressional Officials

SOURCE : Local newspapers, Tegucigalpa, D. C., Honduras, C. A.

1. The following are the official results of the nation-wide mayoralty elections, held November 30th.

National Party group (General Carias)	79,884
Liberal Party	13,883
so-called "Mixed Group" (Dr. Gálvez)	8,638
Others	5,756
Blank Ballots	166
Annulled Ballots	<u>562</u>
Total	106,889

2. A few departments still have some votes to report. This will in no way change the results of the elections.

3. The individuals chosen in Congress on December 3rd, 1952, to head the legislative body this coming year are:

President - Ingeniero Camilo Gómez y Gómez (departamento de Francisco Morazán)
Vice-President - Lic. Francisco Salomón Jiménez Castro (departamento de Francisco Morazán)
Secretario 1° - P. Q. Conrado Bonilla (departamento de Cortés)
Secretario 2° - Jeronimo Alcerro Castro (departamento de Santa Bárbara)
Pro-Secretario - Fernando Bustillo (departamento de Francisco Morazán)
Pro-Secretario - Jesús Villela Vidal (departamento de Ocotepeque)

4. The voting on the above slate of officers ran 24 in favor with 22 opposed. Most of the above men are considered Cariistas.

6. The officers of the National Party are the following:

Tiburcio Cárdenas Andino	Supreme Chief
Manuel Romero L.	Committee President (Presidente del Comité)
Eduardo R. Coello	Vice-President
José María Casco	Supervisor (Fiscal)
Marcos Ramírez	Vice-Treasurer
Fernando Zepeda Durón	Treasurer
Gabriel R. Aguilar	Presides in absence of President & V.-P. (Vocal)
César A. Ramos	"
César F. Matomoros	"
Salomón Jiménez	"
Antonio B. Raquel	"
J. Francisco Martínez	"
Eleazar F. Vargas	"
Rafael López	"
Miguel A. Cruz Zambrano	1st Secretary
Luis F. Lardizábal	2nd Secretary
Octavio Vallecillo	1st Pro-Secretary
Eligio Elvir Quiñónez	2nd Pro-Secretary

R

7. The officers of the Liberal Party are the following:

Ramón Villeda Morales	Vocal 1*
Pedro A. Zúñiga	" 2*
Félix Zavala Niñez	" 3*
Oscar A. Flores	" 4*
Manuel F. Barahona	" 5*
Alfonso Alvarado	Secretary
Juan Miguel Mejía	Secretary

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27 April 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR: []

SUBJECT : Situation Report - PBSUCCESS for the Period 20-26 April 1954

I. Operational - The following events of operational significance occurred during the reporting period:

A. Ambassador Peurifoy arrived in Washington from Guatemala City on 20 April and met the next day with officials of this Agency for debriefing. Notes on this meeting may be found in a detailed "Memorandum for the Record" dated 22 April 1954 in PBSUCCESS files. At present [] is preparing to brief the Ambassador on pertinent aspects of PBSUCCESS.

B. On 21 April 1954 [] reported that [] chief of the PP group in Guatemala, became the object of a police search as the result of a crackdown by the Guatemalan Government on the "32 campaign". [] took refuge in [] apartment, but left later that same night as he felt that his hiding would be evidence of his guilt. In connection with the police attack on the [] group, Radio Internacional was attacked the night of 21 April by five armed masked men believed by the radio station owner to be members of the Guatemalan Secret Police. The owner based his belief on the fact that police had previously warned him against carrying anti-Communist programs.

C. On 21 April President Osorio of El Salvador stated that he and President Arbenz of Guatemala have a secret pact pledging mutual non-interference. Osorio also said that he has information regarding recent large arms shipments to Guatemala. The bold assassination attempt on President Somoza of Nicaragua, coupled with the foregoing, genuinely worries Osorio in regard to Guatemala's intentions toward El Salvador. []

D.

It has been suggested by Lincoln that travel to Lincoln for 60 days in connection with PP activities.

E. The Guatemalan Government intends to replace Rogelio CRUZ Wer as Chief of Police but is withholding action until police complete an investigation of telegrams intercepted by their agents in an unnamed

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nearby country. These telegrams reportedly reveal details of Calligeris' activities. One of the telegrams reads, "Ya estan comprados los K". It was also reported that CRUZ Wer refuses to give up his office until the return to Guatemala of Col. Carlos Enrique DIAZ, Chief of the Guatemalan Armed Forces who at present is touring South America. DIAZ was responsible for CRUZ Wer's appointment as police chief.

F. Two black flights were successfully completed [] on 26 April, carrying a total of 10,000 pounds of cargo. Another black flight is scheduled for 27 April and will carry communications gear for Sherwood []

G. In regard to [] threatened resignation, Calligeris wrote a letter to [] expressing distress at his threat to resign and expressed concern for the latter's health. He went on to remind him of his patriotic duty and stated that he hoped the two could meet in the U.S. as soon as possible to discuss his resignation, future relationships, and political plans. In conclusion, Calligeris admits some of his mistakes to []. In the event that [] follows through with his plan to resign from PBSUCCESS, Calligeris states that [] is his choice to replace []

H. The [] team is now in [] preparing to process about twenty three persons previously not available for testing.

I. [] had an interview with [] []
[] the possibility of securing employment with that company. [] reported to Mr. [] that the interview was satisfactory as far as he was concerned but that no definite commitment of employment was made. Company officials stated that [] would bear from them in about ten days. In the interim [] was authorized by Mr. [] to travel from [] to his home []

J. The site for the Sherwood Program has been established and is ready for operation. []

K. Headquarters prepared a labor paper to be presented to Calligeris for his approval, the purpose of which is to insure the emergence of a free-trade union movement upon the completion of PBSUCCESS.

II. Administrative Support Activities

A. Logistics

An air freight flight was accomplished without incident from [] on 23 and 24 April. The cargo consisted of approximately 10,000 lbs. of communications gear for Sherwood.

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B. Personnel

Several routine personnel transactions were accomplished during the week. The main problem with regard to personnel is the matter of their present and future status and promotion policy while assigned to PBSUCCESS. Lincoln continues to recommend personnel for promotions and does not feel that promotions must necessarily be in accord with present WHD policy. A staff paper outlining the problems will be submitted next week for study.

C. Finance

Headquarters received the monthly requirements for additional funds to be forwarded to Lincoln and regional command stations. The request has been submitted and approved by DD/P and the funds will be pouched through the regular secure finance channel.

D. General

Twice weekly pouch service in and out of [] has been established for regional command stations.

[]

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ANNEX B

PAPA-MILITARY

PART TWO by Assistant FM Officer, []

Departure from LINCOLN was made early in June with several purposes in mind to be accomplished upon arrival [] They were:

a. Bring the shock troops to a state of preparedness which would permit the initiation of the campaign at an early date and at the same time would permit support of a premature uprising which might be caused by any one of a number of actions within the target country.

b. Organize five-man "Hornet" teams for the harassment of the enemy in localities far removed from the obvious area of activity.

c. Launch the remaining resident radio operators to their respective points.

d. Move all shock troop equipment to selected staging areas near the border.

e. Move by all possible methods, land, sea and air, arms to the inner organizations.

f. Bring sabotage plans to the final stages. Ready the sab leaders for launching to their areas.

g. Prepare [] for launching to his targets.

h. Check the final military plans and modify them to suit the latest analysis of the situation.

Upon arrival, and after meeting with [] and [] as well as with all the leaders of the CASTILLO Armas organization, it was obvious that much of the above would be very difficult to accomplish in the short time which remained. It was apparent that CASTILLO Armas had very little knowledge of the numerical strength of his own organization. At various times he claimed to have from 300 to 500 men [] It was on the basis of these figures that the decision to form the five-man teams was made. During the attempts to form these groups CASTILLO Armas made a number of excuses as to why this could not be done. It was finally apparent that he undoubtedly did not have the men that he claimed to have and a list of all men [] was demanded by name. He submitted a list of men far below the number that we had hoped was present. The list contained 150 names. This not only did not permit the formation of the five-man teams, but it also did not furnish the required numbers for the shock troop organization. This information came only a week before the intended D-Day.

Upon the receipt of this information, my first inclination was to relay the shocking facts to LINCOLN with an urgent plea to postpone the initiation of the campaign. After much careful consideration, however, it was my decision that due to the possibility of gathering considerable

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sympathizers along the way, we could launch the campaign as planned. I felt that any relaying of such information would have the effect of detracting from and dampening the enthusiasm of the CASTILLO Armas organization as well as having the effect of possibly postponing a campaign which might bog down hopelessly if not permitted to begin on schedule.

Much of the preparation for the campaign was made very difficult by the turn of events within the target country. The crack-down after the first leaflet drop made arms ingress almost impossible. Most of our methods broke down completely and we had to rely on such methods as [] and his plane delivering arms to his personal finca. We were able to send individuals across the line with arms in suitcases and bags. It is not known at this time how much of that was effective. We tried every method imaginable and we are confident that some of them worked. Even the launching of the radio operators was extremely difficult and hazardous for them. We are sure that a number of them were picked up and of those who did get to their respective areas, only a few came on the air.

[] had done a fine job of preparing the sabotage leaders and all were eager to get in and begin their work. There remained the problem of getting the proper equipment in for them to work with. Some was sent in through [] and some was taken in by hand. While mentioning [] it might be added that he had done wonders in organizing CASTILLO Armas' staff into the proper sections. All hands had the utmost respect for [] and his command presence as well as his language qualifications made him invaluable.

In looking over the final military plans, it struck me that the movement of our [] troops by way of Gualan would not only give the enemy adequate warning of the movement but the concentration of Communist personnel at Gualan would hinder our advance to such a degree that the [] enemy forces might stage a successful counter-attack. It appeared that a pincers movement on [] would be more likely to succeed. A plan was worked out to bring an additional force from Copan Ruinas down through Canotan and Jocotan for an attack upon Chiquimula and thence to []. The mission of this force was 1) to aid in the capture of [] in the event that the [] team experienced difficulty, and 2) if [] fell to us early, to move rapidly through the Jalapa area to the capital. In the latter case, the [] forces would protect the rear of this column. CASTILLO Armas' staff took to this plan with alacrity and it was decided that the CP would be with this group.

Much of my time was taken up with interviews of personnel newly arrived from Guatemala, both military and civilian. Upon the arrival of [] and, following an interview with him, I recommended that he be placed in command of the [] force, replacing []. I felt that as [] had been in command of the garrison of [] at one time, along with his higher rank and greater experience, he should be commander of this very important force.

Another arrival was Colonel [] I was very much impressed with his force and bearing and recommended him for some command. In this case it was command of the force which was to cross from Eneva Ocotepeque.

In the absence of the five-man teams for harassment, it was decided to utilize the talents of [] in this line. He had been most anxious to do something other than deliver arms to his finca and claimed to be able to perform bombing missions with his Cessna 100. I was frankly skeptical

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about the accuracy of such bombing, but he convinced me that it was feasible. [] constructed bombs of TNT blocks surrounding concussion grenades, armed so that they would detonate upon impact. [] took off on his initial flight of this type, headed []. He had with him two men, for as a "bombardier." He flew in almost on the ground toward the gasoline tanks at San Jose. As he approached the tanks, he pulled into a semi-stall and the bombardier threw the bomb. His first attempt was a direct hit and the tank burst into flame. He then flew to Retaluchoe and did the same thing to the SHELL and ESSO tanks there. He ran out of bombs but "strafed" the [] tanks with a Madsen gun, successfully puncturing them and then set them afire with grenades. [] flew another of these missions to []. His audacity was illustrated by his calling the field tower at [], saying that he was an air force plane wishing to land. The tower gave him the proper instructions and he came in to his bombing mission on the TEXACO tank. He received much AA fire as he tried to bomb an AT-6 on the runway of the field. In eluding the fire he dived into a group of trees and caught a branch of one of them in his control surfaces. He had to land at the first available field [] to remove it.

[] was very anxious to perform very hazardous missions at all times and was invaluable to our efforts.

Our safe house facilities in [] included a house where the staff of CASTILLO Armas could function as a unit. There we had maps, tables, conference rooms and briefing rooms. [] and I met there every day early in the morning and worked there all day with the staff. [] worked in another safe house, too, which served as a storehouse for our supplies. He worked with his sabotage leaders there. The latter house was located high on the mountainside outside of the city. Upon the arrival of the PCP radio personnel, we activated another safe house about halfway between []. This house was ideal for the radio station as it was well into the suburbs and comings and goings were not noticed. After this house was opened, we spent much of our time there.

Upon the arrival of [], the final touches were put on the plans and very shortly after his arrival the campaign was initiated. It should be noted here that the entire organization of CASTILLO Armas had complete confidence in [] and in his leadership. So far as I could tell, none of his decisions were ever questioned and for that matter, neither were any of mine, before he came. CASTILLO Armas made the same plan for strong air attacks to [] that he had made previously to me. He was not given any assurance whatsoever that air support would be forthcoming other than for air delivery of supplies, which we felt would be a sure thing. All of the personnel who came out of the country to us [] were of the firm opinion that, should powerful air blows be delivered on the city in the early phases, the campaign would not be a long one. The consensus of opinion was that if several bombs were dropped - on the Guardia de Honor, on La Aurora Air Field, on the Base Militar and possibly one other one on a selected target - the Government would fall immediately. Colonel [] brother [] insisted that the Government almost fell with the first leaflet drop.

Just before the arrival of [] our organizer returned to []. He had been captured by several soldiers who recognized him from a former association in the army. He was tortured but escaped to return with valuable information. People were coming and going along the border at this time without interference, particularly in the [] and [] areas.

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One of our big problems was the movement of men and supplies []
[] We had cooperation with [] an representative
was to the extent that he agreed to send a truckload of arms into
the country [] However, this did not work out. We
did send several loads of arms in specially constructed private automobiles
with false compartments. We had no cooperation from the President there.

Movement of shock troops to the staging areas began in small numbers. Receiving parties were sent ahead and when we received word that the areas were ready, movement was initiated. Movement was very slow and in very small numbers. Finally, when time became short and D-day approached, more speed was necessary and troops were moved in larger and less clandestine groups. This movement caused a flood of newsmen to descend [] [], making operations all the more difficult. Final movement of the shock troops brought the operation fully into the open as it became necessary to move the troops by commercial, chartered airplanes. This was necessary in order to assemble the troops at the staging areas at the proper time for the attack.

Difficulty was encountered in the plans for the seaborne operation for [] for which we had purchased a boat at La Ceiba on the north coast of Honduras. The boat was loaded with equipment which was delivered to La Ceiba through the cooperation of [] who, incidentally, was of tremendous help in many ways. [] transported equipment in [] planes for us to many points and into fields which were not well-suited to his planes. A group was dispatched to La Ceiba to man the boat but discovered it to be missing. Presumably the boat had made a run to the islands for cover purposes. Finally the team caught up with the boat and boarded it for the operation. It is not entirely clear at this date what developed from this operation. It is known that the boat was picked up, but more than that is not known.

Communications were good with the exception that at night all contact was lost between [] and SHERWOOD, thereby causing a terrific pile-up of messages in the morning and a consequent bogging down of those messages. There was considerable time lag between the sending of messages from the field and their reception at []. For this reason, it was decided to move the [] back to [] in order to give more adequate service to the field. With respect to answering some messages which came in from the field, it was frequently impossible to gain contact with the field stations for some hours. More urgent messages would follow and some of the original messages went unanswered.

With regard to security, it is obvious that many of the desirable security measures which would normally be employed in a truly clandestine operation were disregarded in this instance. In order to accomplish the job, much of the clandestinity had to be abandoned. We had to move openly in [] to and from safe houses, thereby undoubtedly identifying ourselves with the organization of CASTILLO Armas. It can be said, though, that this movement was kept to an absolute minimum and that some of it was absolutely necessary to accomplish the task. The safe house where the FCP was located was by far the best and kept the most clandestine.

-After the movement to [] 1, the FCP functioned much more efficiently and was able to offer the desired support to the field. The fact that the [] Jstaff worked right with the Air Ops facilitated this support, in addition to keeping everyone informed as to the field situation - which situation had not existed prior to this time.

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~~REF ID: A65653~~

COMMENTS

Other than the numerous small lessons learned during the campaign, there are, in my opinion, two main lessons to be learned from the overall situation. First, at the very outset of the planning for an operation of this type, a decision should be made as to the importance of its success. Upon reaching this decision, the amount of power to be utilized and the method of employment of this power should also be decided. This power (and in this case it was air bombardment) should not be withheld. It should be utilized at the very beginning of the operation. It is my considered opinion that if the air power which was used in the final phases of the operation had been used on the first day in the same manner, the campaign would not have lasted 48 hours. Undoubtedly, a few lives would have been lost in the bombing, but many more lives could have been saved by shortening the campaign. This opinion is based upon both the reports of persons who came from [] and my previous knowledge of the Latin people.

Secondly, I believe that the [] program could have been better coordinated with the [] program. By this I refer to the leaflet drops. The reaction to these drops was terrific. The results, however, were definitely detrimental to the [] effort, and the reaction of the staff of CASTILLO Armas [] was one of dejection. It was the opinion of all of us, including [] that it would have been well if the field had been consulted before the decision to make the drop had been made. The leaflet drops caused a crackdown within Guatemala which would have come eventually when the movement of our troops to the border was noticed, but it came at a time when we were still able to make delivery of arms, radio operators and sabotage personnel into the country. After the crackdown, it was virtually impossible to accomplish this. [] pleaded with us to permit no more leaflet drops as every one reduced the effectiveness of his air operations. The overall effect of such [] activity cannot be underestimated, but it is recommended that in the future they be coordinated with the [] activity so that they can be mutually supporting.

With regard to communications, as in operations in which I have been involved in the military service, much of the planning is based upon split second contact between units and command by radio. I have never seen this contact work out completely as planned, even with highly trained operators. In this case, with indigenous operators and difficult conditions, while the results were amazing, they did not work out as planned. Only in the final phases did the radio commo begin to work properly.

Finally, while an operation of this type is most difficult to keep clandestine, it would have been much more easily accomplished if the enemy had not been fully alerted some weeks before D-day. Had not martial law been proclaimed and the curfews, police patrols, etc., not been in effect, our movement and sabotage plans would have been much more likely to succeed. It is not known at this time how much of our sabotage was completed, but so far not much of it has been reported.

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ANNEX B

PARA-MILITARY

PART FOUR - by PM Operations Officer, []

The following is a summary of the course of events from the time [] was dispatched [] 11 January 1954, to the end of activities against Guatemala.

The synopsis will attempt to shed light on all phases, that is: Training, organization, security, operational matters and the effect which the overall training had on the final phase and success of the project. This report is divided into three phases: (1) From [] departure to the White Paper; (2) Training period; (3) Setting up of the para-military organization of CASTILLO Armas [] Phases 2 and 3 are considered the most important as far as [] activities are concerned. They deal mostly with training and organizational setup.

PHASE I

Upon [] arrival [] a semi-organization for para-military activities had been set up. A total of fifteen men were on hand as the advanced training element. The equipment had not arrived and selection of the training site had not been settled.

Originally, training was to begin by 14 January but up to that date no facilities had been made available.

After considerable negotiations with [] authorization was given to commence movement of personnel and equipment to []

First difficulties encountered were movements of equipment and personnel while taking into consideration the most strict security measures. After an unsuccessful attempt to have [] furnish a boat for transfer and movement, negotiations with a private concern were made to rent a suitable launch. Cover story was that a crew of engineers were to work on private experiments for []. This story was maintained throughout entire project.

On taking over [] the only facilities made available were a barn and an inadequate water well. A complete training site had to be constructed. Two living quarters, mess hall, sanitary units and showers were built along with development of suitable areas for training activities. During this period evaluations, observations, complete interviews and background studies were made of the trainees. Food and building materials were shipped on a daily basis and continued until approximately 22 January.

On or about 22 January food shipments were discontinued, (reasons unknown to [] at that time) although daily messages were air dropped stating all was fine and that an attempt by [] was being made to purchase a boat to enable the project to discontinue use of the rented launch. No attempts were

made to pick up our distress messages telling that absolutely no food was available and that serious conditions existed, although a pre-arranged method for pick-ups of messages had been made. (A rig had been constructed solely for this purpose.)

During this critical period [] had one serious malaria case, an appendicitis case, a hernia patient and two VD cases. No medical items had been included in the entire shipment of equipment. Every effort was made to justify the conditions to the trainees. It was certainly one of the darkest periods as far as the trainees were concerned and it is mentioned here only because [. . .] was never allowed to forget it by the trainees who had experienced it. After a week of such conditions, a small boat arrived with small quantities of foodstuffs and building materials. [] immediately returned [] to inquire about the disorganized logistics.

On arrival at [. . .] all newspapers were carrying the accounts that CHACO DELGADO had passed on to the Guatemalan government.

As [] was in the United States, [] immediately began liaison with [], requesting a new location. Arrangements were made and all equipment and personnel were evacuated that same night without incident or problems.

Again, the new location was without adequate facilities and work was begun immediately to construct suitable billets, training sites, etc.

During the brief stay [], some training had begun, primarily to develop a small cadre for future use as instructors.

A half-day training and work schedule had to be implemented. Labor units worked in the mornings and group instruction took place during the afternoons. Individual instructions were held after supper.

During this early training period only one major problem was on hand. It had been reported that the advance element would be comprised of CASTILLO Armas' top leaders who were to be semi-trained or experienced, and to bear in mind that they were to be the revolt's organizers. This was truly an underestimate. In fact, of the first twenty-seven trainees arriving at [] only four had the possibilities, or were considered capable, of becoming organizers or leaders. This later slowed down normal training operations because separate groups had to be maintained.

Schedules were revised and instructions changed to meet the requirements for the conditions originally set up. Three groups were established which consisted of officers, sab trainees and troops. Three complete running schedules, independent of each other, were drawn up. During the second phase of the training, sab trainees and troops were made interchangeable.

COMMENTS:

1. Security prior to the "White Paper" had been extremely lax on the part of the personnel working in []. This was primarily because no control was maintained over the personnel. No serious precautions or attempts at compartmentation had been undertaken.

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Compartmentation was unheard of among the principal factions and contacts in most cases were made overtly. A cutout system was never employed.

2. No adequate facilities were maintained for complete security regarding incoming or outgoing correspondence. Safes were not made available and file folders were available for inspection by anyone. All personal folders were made interchangeable among the principals [] DELGADO and []. The "need-to-know" principle was never practiced. All conversations, even those regarding the highest operational matters, were discussed "openly" with absolutely no regard for security.

3. It is felt that because of the above lax security DELGADO was able to secure and photograph a large number of documents.

PHASE II

On receiving word to reactivate training at [] all efforts were then concentrated on the training program.

By the early part of March a total of 65 trainees were at []

The following schedule was adopted and carried out with full force:

- a. Classes for officers were held from 0700 to 1800 hours and from 1930 to 2230 hours.
- b. Classes for Sab personnel were identical.
- c. Classes for the troops were the same except for guard and KP duties.

During the first three weeks, theory and blackboard problems and instructions were in order. Classes organized for officers concentrated primarily on the following courses:

- a. Troop leadership.
- b. Command and staff problems.
- c. Map reading and terrain evaluation.
- d. Basic infantry tactics.
- e. Deployment of troops in guerrilla warfare.
- f. Guerrilla tactics.
- g. Effective use of fire power.
- h. Supply problems and aerial resupply.
- i. First aid.
- j. Attack on, and control of, cities.

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- k. Security
- l. Nomenclature, care and cleaning of all weapons.
- m. Tradecraft problems.

Subjects on which stress was placed were: Deployment of troops, affective use of fire power, aerial resupply, map reading, troop leadership and guerrilla tactics. Security was stressed in tradecraft instruction. Also included were lectures on cutout systems, contacts, surveillance, CE, CI, etc. After the theory and blackboard instruction, live problems were conducted.

Officers were then assigned definite jobs and placed as group leaders. A continual rotation to various duties was mandatory for each officer to familiarize him with other duties in addition to his squad duties. Such duties as Sanitation, Mess, Adjutant, First Aid (Medical Officer), Instructor, Liaison, Staff Control, etc., gave each officer a wealth of experience.

During the same period Sab training was also conducted in full force. Selected Sab trainees totaled approximately 30, with an eventual prospect of using the best 20 for operations. The training commenced with preliminary theory instruction. During the course of training it was discovered that most of the trainees were limited in mathematical calculations and a simplification method had to be employed. Stress was on photograph targets, rather than mathematical calculation. Included during this period were simulated charge positions, actual handling of charges and detonators, electric wiring, handling and demonstrations of electric and non-electric caps, time calculations and improvised charges.

During the second week actual participation in sab problems was conducted by the trainees, permitting the student to attain the necessary confidence in handling explosives.

The third week was a continual nightmare for the trainees. Strict problems were conducted mostly at night. Stress was on target approach and coordinated attacks. A model village was erected in the midst of the jungle approximately six kilometers from [] It consisted of several small houses, rail track sections, small generators, automotive parts and gas and oil drums. Approach to target was consistently changed with simulated action being conducted while trainees were at work. Observers were always on the spot for checking of sab personnel or teams.

The third element, the foot soldiers, were instructed in care and cleaning of weapons, firing techniques, patrol and recon procedures, methods to overcome terrain difficulties, security, individual survival, first aid, map study, etc.

By late March and early April the three groups were working together in an effort to establish coordinated attacks. Constant critiques were in order. For final exercises a three day CPI was conducted.

On many occasions [] student tactical radio operators were utilized in training, sab and field problems.

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COMMENTS:

1. During the entire Phase II period, [] bore in mind the necessity for developing "organizers" and in some respects viewed it with skepticism for the following reasons:

- a. The caliber of personnel sent to SARANAC was not what it was expected to be.
- b. Of the 99 trainees, only about ten were qualified as organizers.
- c. Most of the men were of the "hood" type and could only be utilized in regular troop units, guerrillas or sab teams.

2. For the above reasons the term "instructors" was designated to what was originally intended to be organizers. According to later results the organizers had been selected and were either living covertly or overtly in their designated targets.

3. Logistics: This was, above all, the biggest headache. It took anywhere from one complete day to two days for the purchasing of foods and materials to maintain the camp actively. Goods had to be purchased in [] Personnel had to be detached with a considerable loss of valuable man-hours.

4. Security: Overall excellent. Guards were posted on a regular tour of duty. During the period several stragglers were made captive and turned over to [] On one occasion, two "gun runners" were apprehended who later turned out to be principals in the attempted assassination of [] It was also during this phase that [] requested the transfer of [] to [] because of their laxness in security.

5. Liaison: Liaison was maintained with [] on a very good relationship, discussing periodically matters as directed by LINCOLN, procurement of documentation, local authority support, etc. Relationship with top [] officials was on such a confidential basis that it enabled [] to obtain considerable first-hand, high-level information with regard to internal and external government machinations. This is evident from cable correspondence maintained during that period.

6. Training: On completion of training, it was felt by [] that results obtained could be considered excellent for the following reasons:

- a. Ideological motives were chiefly involved rather than materialistic.
- b. Trainees were extremely eager and willing to learn. Their willingness to endure the hardship of training and their constant cooperation made it extremely easy to handle and instruct the men.
- c. The majority had been at one time or another political prisoners or tortured by the opposition.

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- d. [] took advantage and exploited the "Sentimentalism," a Latin trait, at every opportunity.
- e. Trainees were made to feel "highly superior" in relation to the opposition troops by constantly indoctrinating them in the fact that they would be better trained, have superior weapons and fire power, and were led by highly efficient officers.
- f. Morale during the period of training was always high. Every effort to attain the best recreational facilities was made. Disagreements among the men were referred to [] and were always settled by boxing matches.
- g. The [] slogan was "We were born to die for God and Country." This was the premise by which the men and officers lived and trained and which was kept uppermost in their minds day and night.

PHASE 3

After closing [] I returned to LINCOLN for reorientation, instructions and further preparations before departing to rejoin the CASTILLO Armas organization.

On May 6, 1954, [] departed with instructions to act as the [] advisor and assist CASTILLO Armas in every possible way. The first few days were spent in just making observations and assisting wherever possible. To [] amazement, no semi-military organization had been established. A request to correct this situation was forwarded to CASTILLO Armas and he was asked to assign one of his top military aides to [] in order to begin organizing and building a staff. Colonel [] was assigned and made Chief of Staff at [] request. A definite military organization was then established, with G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4 sections to insure the preliminary working stage for staff study, assignments, etc. Job assignments were then given to all officers to insure that all available resources were put to use in the best interest of the movement. Up to this time no such organization had existed despite repeated assurances by CASTILLO Armas.

Other sections organized were: A training center for the instruction of new arrivals, security section, and CI and CE working units.

Shock troop units, as well as Sab and instructor assignments, were organized.

Operations forwarded by LINCOLN were studied and necessary changes made because of rapid and constant changes in the internal situation in Guatemala.

Several separate operations were established which later had a strong bearing on the success of the project. These operations were those at Copan Ruinas, Nueva Ocotepeque, Morales and "La Siesta." For comments on results see Attachment 1.

It is extremely difficult to give a complete and full report of the successes and defeats of all military operations as well

as the Sab actions because of the lack of information and confirmations. All information on the successes and defeats mentioned in the Attachments are as a result of debriefings with the exception of "La Siesta" operation. The latter information was received on the monitored radio reports passed on by []

2 Attachments

ATTACHMENT I

On June 16, 1954, all shock troops were in position. Those included, other than [] and [] were [] and [] and the [] and [] troops.

Each of the above operations will be dealt with separately in an attempt to focus some light as to their successes or failures.

I. [] SHOCK TROOPS.

The assignment of [] Shock troops was to strike on the night of D-Day with the ultimate goal of completely sealing the exit of government troops that might attempt to assist or to control the rail line between [] and [].

As far as can be determined and in the debriefing of one member of that force, the [] troops arrived at and did block the tunnel located approximately six kilometers from [] and also set up a block at Pierda Parada located on the Atlantic Highway on D + 1. From reports, several small guerrilla groups were sent to the outskirts of [] for harassment purposes. These positions were maintained for approximately three days.

Information received from monitored calls confirmed that opposition troops had been continuously flown from Guatemala City to [] with the primary objective of re-establishing the connection between [] forces with those off [].

Approximately four days after D-Day, a sizeable enemy force counter-attacked and disorganized the [] shock troops. The troops dispersed and commenced retreating which eventually terminated at Los Corridores, Honduras.

II. [] GROUP

This group consisted of approximately 30 organized men and had the mission of taking and holding [] located between [] and [].

The group was quite successful and on D-Day captured [] and Bananera, holding both for three days until the break-through of the enemy forces front []. During this period [] the leader, had organized and reinforced his group totalling approximately 120 men.

Failure to achieve further success, according to [] was due to the lack of supplies. After a delayed action the group gave way and retreated, but not until they had caused considerable damage and casualties to the enemy forces. [] retreated to his jumping off base, Los Tarros, Honduras, with approximately 100 men.

His request for more supplies was granted and immediate steps were taken to consolidate the [] shock troops with the [] group with the primary object of retaking [] which has an airfield, by 30 June, and commencing movement toward [] with the objective of attacking and capturing it.

On the eve of 29 June this force was on the outskirts of [] fully equipped, and ready to attack when word was sent of the peace negotiations, and to remain in position until further notice.

III. [] GROUP

This group totaled 27 men who sailed from [] to an area approximately above Santo Tomas which is located below and Southwest of []. Their primary mission was to harass []. This action was planned and coordinated so that they landed approximately D + 1.

According to monitored radio reports the group made a successful landing. The ship was discovered and captured on the day of landing, but minus its cargo and men. Reports further indicated that this group was fighting a winning battle against the enemy forces because the enemy [] Commander, Colonel Bolanos, was consistently requesting additional reinforcements from Guatemala City to cope with the small force. It was not until nine days later that it was reported that [] group had finally been defeated and that nine members had been captured. It was also reported that all were executed.

This group did not have a TRO. Several attempts were made to localize this group from the monitored reports but every one failed. It was therefore impossible to give them an aerial resupply or to aid them with air support.

It is felt that this group was the most courageous and sustained the enemy, limiting their objective in reestablishing the [] and [] connections by continuously defeating and harassing the city and keeping those elements occupied during the other battle phases.

IV. [] SHOCK TROOPS

The primary mission of this group was in accordance with original plans. Only one change was made and that was to bypass Gualan by detaching a small group and blocking the small element that existed in Gualan.

According to the debriefing of the TRO, this plan was in order until a battle began between the enemy forces and the small detachment. The detachment requested aid from the shock troop leader who, with his force, was on his way to []. The troop leader temporarily changed his plans and returned to Gualan and captured same only after a fierce battle.

On taking Gualan, the shock troop staff moved into the quartel to reorganize and build up their troops for continuation of their march to [].

During this period, it was presumed by the TRO, that request for reinforcements had been dispatched to [] by the Gualan commander prior to his defeat, because the following morning a sizeable force was detected coming from the direction of []. A battle commenced and lasted for approximately 50 hours with the complete annihilation of Castillo Armas' forces in Gualan. The only force not caught in this was []'s detachment which had been deployed south of Gualan near Choyo.

The TRO was asked if any blunders were committed that might have resulted in the defeat. Subject stated that it was his honest belief that if troops had had enough rest that circumstances might have been different. He further stated that the trek across the mountains and the continual push by the commander to meet his dead-line resulted in only having fatigued troops. They were completely exhausted, even before commencing the fight, and the fighting continued for three straight days without them having the benefit of rest or sleep.

The later successes of [redacted] can be attributed to the tremendous losses sustained by the enemy due to both the battles of Oualan and the last ditch stand of [redacted]

V. COPAN RUINAS AND NUEVA OCOTEPEQUE

These two forces can be included in the same movement, although their jumpoff points were distinctly apart. Both forces merged at Quezaltepeque for the eventual attack of Chiquimula.

The success of Chiquimula can be attributed to many situations, with only a few mentioned here:

The successful aerial resupply of these forces, the fact that the Advanced CP was here and the majority of the high level staff were together, the successful aerial support and the checking of a possible pincer movement by enemy forces coming from [redacted] to Chiquimula and a southern movement from Ipala. A force totalling 100 men were dispatched to check this latter group with success on the part of Castillo Armas' troops. [redacted] had maintained constant enemy OB situations from monitored radio reports and principally dispatched troops to this area to avoid a rear attack of the Chiquimula forces.

The capturing of a considerable quantity of munitions, weapons including 81mm mortars intact with large quantities of shells, was indeed evidence that the majority of troops had been dispatched from [redacted] in an early attempt to defeat troops there rather than at the strategic [redacted]

The [redacted] movement never developed because of the intervention by [redacted] [redacted] These forces were merged with the Nueva Ocotepeque troops.

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W.D. 10/30/68

ATTACHMENT II

SAB ACTIVITY

During the action, Sab activity was in action at the following points:

- a. Rail and communications between Entre Rios and Tenedores.
- b. Rail and communications between Tenedores and Morales and between La Libertad and Morales.
- c. Rail and communications NE of Gualan and NW of Gualan.
- d. Rail and communications NE of [] and NW of []
- e. The San Francisco Bridge, located below Tenedores.

The above sab activity was coordinated to assist all troops.

Other Sab operations were as follows:

a. [] It was reported that destruction of the oil storage tanks, which was to have been the signal to begin activities, did occur on D-Day at approximately 2020 hours, just ten minutes before the exact time of plans.

b. TGR. It was never reported whether an attempt or actual activity occurred against TGR. Although the station continued to broadcast, it was reported that TGR and other hookups had been grouped to enable the continuation of broadcasts also utilizing the Quetzaltenango transmitters.

c. All possible telecommunications in or around the capital by three separate teams.

d. Rails and communications leading to El Salvador.

The Sab activity successes have been the most difficult to determine. Whether attempts or actual action was accomplished on selected targets is problematical because of the inaccurate reports, the tight security maintained by the enemy forces during the stage, and because of lack of information.

~~SECRET~~~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONFIRMATION

SUBJECT: Meeting at the Westbury Hotel, 10:30 a.m., 2 May 1952, with []

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
 FOR RELEASE AS SANITIZED BY
 CST/ITAG ON 3/4/95

1. Suitable cover for Mr. [] and Mr. [] was discussed. The consensus of opinion is that Mr. [] could be attached to the [] in Guatemala, with an assignment which would give him complete freedom of movement and keep him in constant contact. [] [] Mr. [] could go as an engineer to [] where the [] [] is more active than in Guatemala. Contrary to Mr. [] [] opinion a few days ago Mr. [] said that there are no immediate projects in Guatemala requiring the services [] and that their current policy of cutting expenses to the bone has been so enforced that the arrival of [] [] on the scene might arouse suspicious comment.

2. Mr. [] described his meetings with Castillo Armas in Honduras. He asked Armas if he knew how to prepare an Order of Battle. Armas said he did, and [] requested him to put all details on paper. Some 15 to 20 pages were prepared and these were delivered on 7 April to an indicated person of the Embassy in [] who in turn was sending them to []. Mr. [] said that Castillo Armas, although willing to delay his movement until he is given the green light, calls attention to the fact that the rainy season begins at the end of May or early June and continues to December and that those months would be the poorest for military action. Castillo Armas would welcome military advice and counsel. If Mr. [] is qualified, it would be a big asset. Castillo Armas is low in funds and Mr. [] gave him \$1,000 to tide him over. Approaches have been made to Castillo Armas by Arbenz and the post of a European Embassy was dangled in front of him as bait. He refused. Four men have been sent to assassinate him, but one of the four tipped him off and he is safe and sound — for the moment.

3. Recently [] assisted a certain Guatemalan to escape from there by dressing him up in mechanic's clothes and storing him away in his plane, flying him to Honduras. Although presumably no one knew of this, there was a leak. Mr. [] knows that one of the [] staff disclosed the operation.

4. [] are flying this evening to Washington and will meet at our office tomorrow at 9:00 a.m. with Col. []. Mr. [] is then flying to Honduras and would like to have a further list of questions to put to

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SECURITY INFORMATION

-2-

Castillo Armas. I informed him that I would be somewhere in Central America during the next two weeks and if there is any important material obtained, would act as courier.

[]

CON

[]
5 May 1952

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9 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Central American Situation.

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE AS SANITIZED, BY
CSI/HRG ON 3 JULY 45

1. At 9 a.m. on 9 October 1952, a meeting was held in the office of the Director. Present were the Director, [], and

2. The Director explained to [] that all plans for action were canceled. [] then pointed out the responsibilities we have towards the people who are already in the field and who have committed themselves, and the dangers to the entire Caribbean area of the decision reached yesterday. The Director replied that he was fully aware of the dangers inherent in such a decision, but that this Agency is merely an executive agency to carry out the policies of the Department of State and the Department of Defense, and if they instruct us not to engage in a certain operation, we shall not engage in that operation. [] then commented that the Department of State might very well change its position in the near future because of the explosive situation in the Caribbean. To this the Director agreed.

[] then stated that there had been developments since []'s report last evening to the Director, and that it appeared we had received all the necessary clearances for the shipment of machinery from New Orleans in spite of the questions raised yesterday by State. [] stated that he was not even suggesting action in violation of the position taken by State yesterday, but that this shipment could go out as planned except that it would be to a new consignee and to a secure place under our absolute control in []. The General asked what place did [] have in mind - was it our own? When the answer was in the affirmative, the Director telephoned [] and informed him that while we were not shipping the machinery to the country for which it was originally destined, apparently we had all the necessary clearance and would ship it to a place of our own in []. Although [] expressed himself as surprised that we had such clearances, apparently no objection was interposed. The Director authorized to proceed with this shipment to our place if it could be securely arranged and if it were true that necessary authorizations did exist.

3. [] and [] described the situation of RUFUS, with a number of men already mobilized, and the need of supplying RUFUS with cash at once for a liquidation action if we were not to be even more embarrassed with our Central American friends. The Director asked how much was needed. [] replied \$3,000 a week. The Director said he would go along for four weeks and would approve \$15,000.

[]

[]

~~SECRET~~
~~Security information~~

Additional 56
Documents on
Cancellation of
PB FORTUNO

CONFIDENTIAL ONLY 9 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Central American Situation.

1. At 10 p.m. on 8 October 1952, a meeting was held in the offices of [] Present were [] and []
2. informed the group that as a result of a policy decision by State yesterday opposing the shipment of machinery as planned, this decision being precipitated by indiscretions of Somoza, all of the action planned in support of the opposition was off. explained that Tachito Somoza had indiscreetly approached Assistant Secretary Miller in Panama and asked him where was the machinery, and both the Nicaraguan and Dominican Ambassadors had called on Mr. Mann at the Department of State to discuss the same matter. This confirmed our general belief that no Latin American can be trusted to keep his mouth shut. [] raised the question of the feeding of the men who are already mobilized, and pointed out that even though no further action is taken, RUFUS must have money to liquidate his forces if he is not completely to lose face; that approximately \$3,000 per week are RUFUS' present requirements. The possibility was discussed of using the ship arriving in New Orleans on Monday for shipment of machinery to our own place. [] said this could be done without difficulty if there were no trouble in getting the machinery on board. He was sure he could re-route his ship and have it go direct to our own place.

[]

[]

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE AS SANITIZED, BY
G.S.Z./A.C.C. ON 03 JULY 55

~~SECRET~~
~~Security information~~

20 February 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
SUBJECT : Compromise of Cable Traffic - PBSUCCESS

1. The Lincoln station advised headquarters on 19 February 1954 that a major compromise of Commo and project security was discovered on or about 17 February 1954 by [] replacement with the Castillo Armas group. The following is a chronological report of the compromise as received by WHD from Lincoln:

a. During the week of 15 February 1954, [] met [] owner of an apartment [] formerly occupied [] and settled his account. During this meeting, [] handed to [] the original copies of all messages which have been passed by the Chief of Station, [] to []. [] advised that [] left these messages in the apartment when he left the country. [] further stated that because of the apparent importance of the information contained in the messages, he had made said messages immediately available to his good friend, []. When [] examined the messages in question, he immediately realized that a serious exposure of Agency cryptonyms and PBSUCCESS organizational methods and procedures had been revealed to at least two known unauthorized persons and probably an indeterminable number of others. He immediately cabled Station Lincoln advising them of the compromise in general terms and indicated that he was departing for Lincoln immediately with the documents in question.

b. Station Lincoln alerted headquarters at 1300 hours, 19 February 1954, by telephone and advised that a courier would arrive at headquarters at 2200 hours, 19 February 1954, with the compromised documents. Lincoln followed the telephone call with cable 612 which indicated that fact that the compromise consisted of 5 pages of slightly paraphrased text containing all basic cryptonyms and pseudonyms applying not only to PBSUCCESS but to the Agency at large. The PBSUCCESS desk made a preliminary examination upon receipt of cable 612 and determined that the compromise involved roughly six cables. It was not possible at that time, however, to determine exactly which cryptonyms had been exposed. When the courier arrived with the compromised messages, [] [] of Commo was called and he and [] [] deau officer PBSUCCESS, examined the documents together and compiled an

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-2-

accurate list of exposed indicators. Mr. () of the Security Office was advised of this list the morning of 20 February and a copy of the list was hand-carried to his office at 1020 hours that date.

c. The following is a list of those cryptonyms and pseudonyms which were exposed to () and an indeterminable number of others:

LINCOLN (LINC)	()	()
()	()	()
()	()	()
PBSUCCESS	()	()
()	()	()
()	()	()
CALLIGERIS	()	()
()	()	()
()	()	()
()	()	LINCOLN Security Officer } Compromising
()	()	() } phrases
()	()	()
()	()	()

2. A preliminary analysis of the exposed messages has been performed, and based on that analysis and assessment, the following assumptions have been made:

a. That () and an indeterminable number of others now know that a powerful, well organized, official United States organization is backing the Castillo Armas group.

b. That a definite possibility exists that the information contained in subject messages may have gotten into the hands of Raul Saqueda, chief of personnel for the Castillo Armas group, and () pilot, soldier of fortune and (). If this happened, it could well be that any or all of the information may have gotten into the hands of the Guatemalan government through agents in the Castillo Armas organization.

c. If () is less than he purports to be, the information may have been passed to any one of a number of other intelligence services. As regards (), however, a preliminary investigation gives indication that he is pro-American and that he probably has handled the messages in the manner he indicated.

~~SECRET~~

3. A preliminary analysis of the report by () (attached hereto), otherwise known as (), re the circumstances under which he procured () messages in () clearly indicates the following about ()

a. Specifically as regards the copies of paraphrased cables, he apparently intentionally withheld from the Agency information of what was known to him to constitute a major breach of security directly affecting the security of the project and the security of the Agency. The fact that this was known to him is clearly indicated by his having arranged, while in Washington, without notifying the Agency, the mailing of a letter to () who is not yet cleared, in () the expressed aim of which was the recovery of the papers.

b. () is completely unreliable, professionally and personally.

c. () has been recalled to headquarters from his home [] He will be given a very thorough and detailed interrogation. The situation cited in paragraph 3a above clearly and painfully indicates that PBSUCCESS may be compromised to a degree heretofore considered beyond the realm of possibility, and further, a large amount of information yet unrevealed may be in the hands of the Arbenz government.

5. It must be kept in mind that the foregoing report is at best a cursory examination of the situation and that a more detailed analysis cannot be presented formally until Lincoln and headquarters have had time to collect and collate all information re this specific incident and [] the general pattern of action since October 1953.

[]

ATTACHMENTS:

1. True copy of compromised messages
2. () report
3. Memo from Security re ()
4. Memo to Security re ()
5. Memo to Security re Compromise of Cryptonyms.

~~SECRET~~

76. Easman, Memorandum for Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison,
 "Estimate of Situation in Guatemala," 14 January 1952
 (Carbon copy)

~~SECRET~~
 Security Information

11 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: REAR ADMIRAL ROBERT L. DENNISON
 NAVAL AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT
 SUBJECT: Estimate of Situation in Guatemala

The Director of Central Intelligence has requested that the subject memorandum be shown to the President. It is to be noted that the information contained therein has not been coordinated with the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

SIGNED

J. S. EASMAN
 Assistant to the Director

Enclosure

Memo dtd 11 Jan 52 (from Col. King, OPC, to DD/P - ER 2-4811)

O/DCI:JSEasman/dr

Distributions:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

2 - Signer

1 - DD/P w/oc of memo of 11 Jan 52 ✓ CDR 1 Jan 52

25

DOCUMENT NO. _____
 NO CHANGE IN CLASS: A
DI DECLASSIFIED
 RELEASE CHANGED TO: 10 10 2011
 BEST REFERENCE: _____
 SIGN: DD/P-4
20001111-REFID: A11111

~~SECRET~~
 Security Information

76. (Continued)

11 January 1952
Revised 14 Jan 1952

Executive Registry
2-4811

Dated by DCI
14 Jan 1952

11 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

SUBJECT: Estimate of Situation in Guatemala

Communist Activities

The Communists continue to be very active in Guatemala and continue to receive Government support. Since the anti-Communist rioting in July 1951 the Communists have softened their overt campaign for immediate action in the political field, but they have forged ahead in the labor movement, succeeding in forming, under the guidance of Vicente LIMBARDO Toledano and Louis SAILLANT, a central labor organization comprising almost all the unions in the country. The Communist newspaper Octubre is published regularly and circulates freely. It has devoted its columns to anti-United States propaganda and to trying to aggravate the United Fruit Company's labor troubles. The Guatemalan Communists are small in number, but their influence in both government and labor is substantial.

Anti-Communist Activities

The Anti-Communist Party of Guatemala has been formed since the July rioting and has received strong support from the Catholic middle class and from the Indians. The university students have furnished leadership to form a substantial bloc in the Party. They have requested President Arbenz to dismiss the Communists holding positions in the Government, and to expell all foreign Communists. The movement continues to develop in all sections of the country.

Political Situation

President ARBENZ has shown no sign of changing the policy set by AREVALO as regards Communism. He has stated his opposition to the anti-Communist movement. Ramiro OROZCO Pennington, leftist Minister of Government, has recently resigned and been replaced by Ricardo CHAVEZ Mackman. CHAVEZ is generally regarded as an anti-Communist. However, on 14 January 1952 he announced that the government had decided to ban all anti-Communist demonstrations. Colonel PAZ Tejada, who had studiously avoided attending all Communist rallies, but who was forced to attend the last one as the representative of President ARBENZ, has been replaced as Minister of Communications by Colonel Carlos ALDANA Sandoval, an Arbenz supporter. PAZ Tejada has been placed in charge of the construction of the highway to the Atlantic.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Economic Situation

ARBENZ inherited a very black economic picture, and the labor trouble and subsequent threat to withdraw from Guatemala by the United Fruit Company has made the outlook even darker.

Activity of Political Exiles

At least three Guatemalan exile groups are plotting against the ARBENZ regime. They are, in probable order of strength:

- a) a group headed by Colonel CASTILLO Armas, former Comandante of the Escuela Militar, and now in Costa Rica, who originally planned a January 1952 uprising. It has been reported that CASTILLO Armas has been offered aid by the United Fruit Company and a Peruvian group, possibly the government;
- b) a group in Mexico headed by Colonel Arturo RAMIREZ who has been in exile since an attempted revolt in 1948. This group may be financed in part by American oil promoters;
- c) supporters of General IDIGORAS Fuentes, unsuccessful presidential candidate of the 1950 elections who is now in El Salvador.

The CASTILLO Armas and RAMIREZ groups have been in contact, but so far no agreement has been reached. If the two groups were to unite, a successful revolution might result.

Conclusions

Communist influence in the Guatemalan government continues to be serious. Rumors persist in Guatemala that President Arbenz is ill with leukemia. Efforts to verify these rumors are being made. In the event that ARBENZ were forced to leave his office, Roberto ALVAREADO Fuentes, president of the Guatemalan congress, could constitutionally assume presidency. Such an eventuality would further aggravate the situation in Guatemala because ALVAREADO Fuentes is a strong Communist supporter having recently attended a Communist sponsored pro-peace meeting in Vienna.

J. CALDWELL KING
SA/ID/P-LA

SECRET

FN4

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE NO.

PRIORITY

22 MAR 52

OUT 64489

FROM: OPERATIONS
CONFIRMATION: WH 1-2)

INFORMATION: RI (3-4-5), AD/SO (6), AD/PC (7), OPS (8), STC (9), CAL (10)
S/C (11-12-13), DDP (14)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as **SECRET** Correspondence per Para 35 (1) (b) 6 (A), (B).

WASH 32567

TO: [REDACTED] CITE: WASHFG

RE: F-3113-EN-29399

1 AGREE CASTILLO MUST BE CONTACTED. - HOPE [] CAN

HANDLE.

2.C D WILL CONTACT YOU PROBABLY 25 MARCH. WITH YOU HE
SHOULD ASCERTAIN: (1) OPPOSING FORCES, (2) OPPORTUNITY FOR BUYING
SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY ARMY GUARDIA CIVIL AND KEY GOV'T FIGURES, FOR
IMMOBILIZING FORCES NOT BUYABLE THROUGH STUDENT CHURCH OR LABOR IN-
SPIRED ACTION, (3) ALL DETAILS REQUIRED FOR ESTIMATING SUCCESS OF
PROPOSED MOVEMENT AND HOW WE CAN ASSIST.

3. NOT WITTING AT PRESENT OF OUR INTENT TO AID BUT
IS FULLY CLEARED.

4. SUBMIT FULL REPORT OF CONVERSATIONS.

RELEASED BY OFFICES

ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATION OFFICES

TOD: 17537 22 MAR 52

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

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CSI/HRG
ON 5 July 95

EN 6

4 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT : Conference with ()

~~EYES ONLY~~

Conference of () and () on 31 July, and ()
() and () 1 August developed the following points:

1. () has maintained excellent cover().
() (). His trip to
the States is easily explained, but failure to return to his post
would be most suspicious.

2. () has met with CALLIGERIS on eight occasions, but
has been very discreet in his meetings and is confident that his
association is known only to ().

3. () has apparently gained CALLIGERIS' complete con-
fidence as the representative of an anti-Communist group in the
United States. CALLIGERIS has discussed his plans and problems
frankly and seemingly without reservation. After discussions with
() CALLIGERIS has developed a revised plan which involves
the following variations on the original:

a. Smuggling arms to his people within his country
and mounting revolt primarily from within the country
rather than as invasion from outside.

b. Elimination of requirement for bomber and fighter
aviation.

c. Reduction of requirement for combat shipping to
point where local shipping will serve.

d. Reduction of requirement for communications equip-
ment.

e. Elimination of requirement for kitchens and food-
stuffs.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

FN 7,8

9 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Guatemalan Situation

Summary:

The growing Communist tendencies of the present Guatemalan Government have alienated the majority of Guatemalans to such an extent that a popular uprising to overthrow the government is to be expected as a normal reaction. Forces supporting the government are confined to the Communists and fellow-travelers and to those members of the Armed Forces and labor who have benefited materially under the present regime. The recent passage of the Agrarian Reform Act, which makes land available to all Guatemalans in the Communist pattern, is expected to win further adherents to the government although it is opposed by the landowning class whose influence will wane as the Act takes effect.

Armed action against the government has been planned and pending since early this year and is now imminent. Details of the plan for such action, which follows through to the establishment of a democratic government, are known to us. [] considers that if proper support can be provided the plan is feasible and practical and has a good chance of succeeding if it is put in effect by 1 September 1952.

Col. Castillo Armas, now resident in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, is the leader of the movement which is supported by organized groups in Honduras, El Salvador, Mexico and Guatemala. Cordova Cerna, resident in Guatemala City, is Castillo's man in Guatemala. Carlos Simons, resident in Guatemala City, is the leader of another large anti-government group in Guatemala which is planning armed action, but which is not as yet working in coordination with Castillo. Coordination is being effected. These three are of exceptional ability and character and are fast friends of the U. S.

Castillo's movement has the moral support of President Somoza of Nicaragua and of President Galvez of Honduras, and it is believed that material support from these two men would be forthcoming if they could be assured of U. S. approval.

Castillo's plan envisages moving against the government with clandestine armed forces from the borders of Mexico, El Salvador and Honduras and from the sea on Puerto Barrios in conjunction with

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FOR RELEASE,
OCT 1952
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internal revolt. He can arm the group in Mexico through purchase of materiel in that country and his other forces have some arms available. However, he will require assistance with materiel from some source outside the area. His requests for combat air support are not considered to be necessary, but his request for air transport support should be met. His requests for shipping support can be met through procurement in the area. Simons can procure arms locally for his part in the action. Considerable local financial support has already been obtained by both Castillo and Simons, but further support is indicated. Castillo's additional financial needs are estimated at \$175,000 and Simons' at \$50,000, to include purchase of arms available in the area.

Conclusions:

1. Armed action in Guatemala is imminent.
2. The success of any action undertaken without further outside support is questionable and may well result in the elimination of all effective anti-Communist opposition in Guatemala.
3. Support in the form of direction, arms and equipment, enlisting the aid of area chiefs of state, finances, and air transport and shipping support can guarantee a good chance of success.

Recommendations:

1. That two more men from WHD be sent [] to assist the man now there in advising on operations.
2. That support with arms and equipment be provided. (These to be returnable upon successful conclusion of the operation.)
3. That Somoza and Galvez be informed that any assistance they give to Castillo will not reflect to their discredit.
4. That financial support in the amount of \$225,000 be provided. (This amount to be reimbursable upon the successful conclusion of the operation.)
5. That air transport and ocean shipping support be arranged by the other parties interested in the operation.

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CSE/KRS
ON 2 JUL 95

ACWH

WH/[]/al

Distribution:

Copy 1 of 4: Addressee
Copy 2 of 4: "
Copy 3 of 4: ACWH File
Copy 4 of 4: WH/III File

EYES ONLY

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

3 COPY OF 3 COP

~~SECRET~~

FN - 8

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

NO.

DATE

8 October 1952

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECD	FWD'D		
1.					EYES ONLY
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15.					

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
BY SANITIZED FOR RELEASE AS ON 03 JUN 1952
CSC/HC

CIO:WPL

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

8 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: []

SUBJECT : Guatemala

1. Early in July Mr. Dulles, [] and myself visited the State Department where we had a conference at which were present Assistant Secretary of State [], his Deputy, Mr. [], and Mr. []. The CIA delegation posed the following three questions: (as well as I can remember)

1. Would the State Department like to see a different government in Guatemala?

2. Would the State Department oppose a government established by the use of force?

3. Does the State Department wish CIA to take steps to bring about a change of government?

2. The first question was answered positively. The second question was answered negatively. The third question was not answered clearly but by implication, positively.

3. Mr. Dulles asked me to make a Memorandum of Conversation in long-hand and deliver the one copy to him. I did this and waited in his office while he showed it to the Director. In a few minutes I was called into the Director's office, and it was soon clear that the Director was dissatisfied with the lack of a direct answer to the third question. He then telephoned to Mr. [] to make arrangements for a meeting.

4. I later gathered from Mr. Dulles that the Director had received a satisfactory answer from Mr. []

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~~EX-REF ID: A65124~~

FN 8,9

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SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

CHRONOLOGY OF MEETINGS LEADING TO APPROVAL OF PROJECT A

1. 10 July 1952

A meeting was held in the office of [] to discuss Project A. Those present: Mr. [], Mr. [], Mr. Dulles, Mr. [] Mr. [], and []. Project was approved by inference. Details of the meeting are covered in memorandum of Mr. []'s dated 8 October. Original paper is believed to be in Mr. Dulles' files.

2. 11 July 1952

A meeting was held in the Director's office. Those present: the Director, Mr. Dulles, Mr. [] Mr. []. A report was made of the previous day's meeting with State. The Director was dissatisfied with the inconclusive position taken by Mr. [] and Mr. []. He telephoned to make an appointment to discuss Project A with [].

3. 12 August 1952

A meeting was held in Mr. []'s office. Those present: Mr. [] Mr. [], and []. Mr. [] stated that authority to furnish materiel was given.

4. 13-14 August 1952

A meeting was held in Mr. Dulles' office. Those present: Mr. Dulles, Mr. [], and Mr. []. Conversation seemed to be carried on on the assumption that action was being taken. Mr. [] specifically asked Mr. Dulles whether we had the "green light" and Mr. Dulles replied affirmatively, stating that [] had been told that they could have the material if and when they would indicate where they wished to pick it up. (At this or at a previous conference, Mr. Dulles mentioned that the Director had had conversations with [].)

5. 18 August 1952

A meeting was held in the Director's office. Those present: the Director, [] Mr. Dulles and []. The Director called [] and instructed him to make recommendations as to future action. He requested that a memorandum be prepared and presented to him. On 19 August the memorandum was prepared for the signature of [], was discussed with Mr. Dulles by [], and forwarded to the Director. It was approved by the Director on 9 September.

~~SECRET~~

PAGE No.

FN 10

11

To: []

"SECURITY INFORMATION"

PRIORITY

FROM:

OPC/OSO

26 JAN 52

CONFIRMATION:

WHD (1-2)

OUT 52650

INFORMATION:

IR (3-4), AD/SD (5), OPS (6), S/C (7-8-9), STC (10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-S

WASH 24629

TO: []

CITE: WASHFG

1. HQ DESIRES FIRM LIST TOP FLIGHT COMMUNISTS WHOM NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD DESIRE TO ELIMINATE IMMEDIATELY IN EVENT OF SUCCESSFUL ANTI-COMMUNIST COUP.

2. REQUEST YOU VERIFY FOLLOWING LIST AND RECOMMEND ADDITIONS OR DELETIONS: []

[]
RELEASING OFFICER

[]
ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

[]
AUTENTICATING OFFICER

1938Z 26 JAN 52

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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11

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PAGE NO.

To: [] "SECURITY INFORMATION" PRIORITY
FROM: [] 29 JAN 52
CONFIRMATION: [] (1-2) OUT 53112
INFORMATION: IR (3-4), AD/SO (5), OPS (6), STC (7), S/C (8-9-10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (f) 60.4 AR-380-5

WASH 24924

TO: [] CITE: WASHFG
RE: WASH 24629 (OUT 52650)
[]

1. HQ. DESIRES LIST COMMUNISTS AND/OR SYMPATHIZERS WHOM NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD DESIRE ENCARCERATED IMMEDIATELY IN EVENT OF SUCCESSFUL ANTI-COMMUNIST COUP.
2. REQUEST YOU VERIFY FOLLOWING LIST AND RECOMMEND ADDITIONS OR DELETIONS: []

3. ABOVE SECONDARY TO LIST IN CABLE REFERENCE.

[] COORDINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS []

[] AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

2318Z 29 JAN 52

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FORM NO.
DEC. 1941 35-5

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~SECRET~~~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

PAGE NO.

FROM: [] ROUTINE
 To: []/T 29 JAN 52
 ACTION: [](1-2-3) IN 16927

INFORMATION: IR (4-5), AD/SO (6), OPS (7), STC (8), S/C (9-10-11)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. SI (1) COA AR-350-5

[]

TO: WASHFG CITE []

[]

REF WASH 24629(OUT 52650)

1. SUGGEST ADD FOLLOWING: []

2. CANNOT SAY ALL ON LIST ARE COMMIES BUT THEIR LEANINGS
ARE SUCH THAT CONSIDERED DANGEROUS OUR INTERESTS. NOTE YOU INCLUDED

[]

3. MINIMUM ACTION OF ARREST AND DEPORTATION ALL ON []
LIST SHOULD BE A NEW GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE. CONSIDER DOUBTFUL
NEW GOVT COULD LONG CONTROL WITHOUT DEPORTATION MAJORITY ON LIST.THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE AS SANITIZED BY
252/HRG ON 1/9/2015

0115Z 30 JAN 52

TOR:

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REPORT #1

FN 13

18 September 1952

TO: Chief, []

FROM: []

SUBJECT: Guatemalan Communist Personnel to be disposed of during
Military Operations of Calligeris

1. Included herein is the list of Guatemalan Communist Personnel
to be disposed of during military operations to be carried out by
Calligeris.

a. Category I - persons to be disposed of through Executive
action (attachment # 1)

b. Category II - persons to be disposed of through imprison-
ment or exile (attachment # 2)

2. This list is a revision, revised by Calligeris, of an original
list prepared by Headquarters in February 1952.

Attachments: 2

Distribution: Orig. & 1, Headquarters

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CST/HK 6 ON 03 JUN 1955

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Orig in []

Comunistas: Categorias fl

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SECRET ~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED~~ ~~HEREIN~~ ~~IS UNCLASSIFIED~~

Communists: Categoría #2

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~~SECRET~~ - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIST "A"

1. 100% COTTON

2. 100% POLYESTER

3. 100% POLYAMIDE

LIST "B"

[

]

1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

[

]

[REDACTED]

[18 pages of biographic
material have been deleted - HRG]

Report # 3

18 September 1952

TO: Chief, WH

FROM: []

SUBJECT: Liaison Between Calligeris and General Trujillo of Santo Domingo

1. On 12 September 1952 an agent from General Trujillo, one [], arrived in Honduras for a conference with Calligeris.¹
2. [] stated that General Trujillo desired and was prepared to aid Calligeris with arms, aircraft, men, and money.
3. In return for this help General Trujillo asked that four (4) Santo Dominicanos, at present residing in Guatemala, be killed a few days prior to D-Day. (Names of the four men are not at present available.)
4. Calligeris stated that he would be glad to carry out the executive action, but that it could not be done prior to D-Day for security reasons. He pointed out that his own plans included similar action and that special squads were being designated. [] was assured that the action could and would be carried out on D-Day.
5. Calligeris is confident that this matter can be resolved between him and General Trujillo.
6. Further conferences are scheduled.

¹ Source comment - [] is one of General Trujillo's most trusted men. He is employed at present in the []

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FOR RELEASE, ON 03 JUL 15
C 5 H C 5 C 5

Distribution: Orig. & 1, Headquarters

EN 15

Report No. 20Date of Report: 1 December 1952Date of Inform: 27 Nov.- 1 Dec. 1952

TO : Chief VH

FROM :

SUBJECT: Conference and

1. Attached hereto is a report on the conference held by _____ and _____ during the period - 27 November through 1 December 1952.

2. The report is divided into two sections as follows;

Section I - Current Activities of the Guatemalan Government.

Section II- Activities of the CALLIGRIS Organization in Guatemala.

3. _____ was unable to attend the conference as scheduled due to serious family illness.

Attachment: Letter from _____ to _____ and "The Group".

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C.S.I./H.R.Q. ON 3 JULY 96

EX-

~~SECRET~~

SECTION I - CURRENT ACTIVITIES OF THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT

1. Military

a. The Guatemalan government has, during the last few weeks, shifted three or four of its garrison commanders. This of course is one measure taken to prevent anti-government forces from becoming established in the army. In two instances this shifting of commanders has worked against us and we have been obliged to select new leaders within the garrisons concerned. We anticipate further moves of this nature and expect to counteract it by having at least two of the superior officers in our organization.

b. Recently, we learned of the government's plan to make Quetzaltenango its headquarters in the event of revolution. The government expects any invasion to start from across the Salvadoran frontier and believes its best chances for defense are to fall back on Quetzaltenango and establish a defensive line roughly north and south through that city. Terrain favors such a defense and, by so doing, the government will have in its rear, i.e. the area between Quetzaltenango and the Mexican frontier, the wealthiest and most productive section of Guatemala from which to draw support. The government recently transferred one of its best officers to command Quetzaltenango and has re-enforced the area with troops and arms. Fortunately at the same time the government transferred to the garrison as [] its command one of our best officers. Thus, as long as he is there we will be fully informed on all government plans for the area. In this instance shifting of commanders has worked in our favor.

Comment: This information, i.e. that the government is thinking defensively instead of offensively in the event of revolution is of considerable importance and supports CALLIGERIS' plan for heavy initial shock action and rapid concentration around the Capitol.

c. Because the government no longer completely trusts the army it has begun the development of a secret force of non-military personnel. Though full details are not available the force numbers approximately 1500 men all of which are handpicked for their experience and toughness. The total force breaks down into three

FBI
[Signature]

seperate organizations. These are;

- (1) Caribbean Legion. About 200 men mostly central Americans, commanded by General RUIJEREZ, a Santo Domingan; the second in command is Col. Rivas MONTES, a Honduran. General RUIJEREZ at present owns and operates a sawmill on the outskirts of Jalapa where he has the 200 men supposedly working. We believe it is a training area for the Legion. Col. MONTES is living in Guatemala City where he heads Aviateca for the Guatemalan government.
- (2) Secret Communist Organization. Composed of roughly 500 men scattered throughout Guatemala. Commander of this organization is a closely guarded secret. The function of this group is to act as "shock" troops in the event of trouble and, to liquidate any communist leaders who get out of line. President Arbenz and the other top communist leaders are well aware of this latter function.
- (3) ? No known name for this organization. Its leader is one FERNANDEZ, a Cuban of Spanish origin(?). The group is composed of Cubans and Spanish republicans. Size of organization is unknown. We do know that FERNANDEZ is in close contact with Carlos Prieto SOCORROS, a Cuban. I believe this organization more dangerous than the Legion.

d. The Guatemalan government has been purchasing arms from El Salvador, Czechoslovakia, and probably Mexico. We do not know the extent of these purchases. Interestingly enough we do know that none of the arms purchased are going to Guatemalan army. We have reason to believe the arms are going to labor organizations and communist groups.

Comment: CALLIGRIS reports that Czech arms purchases to date have consisted of six(6) AA MG .50 Cal.

2. Political. Present political activity of the government centers around the following:

- a. Communist infiltration of all legal political parties in Guatemala. For this purpose the government is not using men well known as communists but men known to it, the government, as communists or communist sympathizers. During 16-18 January 1953 deputies to the national congress are to be elected. Though the communists now control the national congress they hope to dominate it completely by placing their men through the other parties.
- b. In March 1953 all judgeships in the supreme and lower courts come up for re-appointment. The deputies elected in January take office on 1 March and they will make the appointments to the courts. These appointments will carry down to the city magistrate level. Thus if the communists completely dominate the national congress through the election of their deputies in January, and I assure you they will, they will in turn appoint their own men to the courts and will, by 15 March, completely dominate the three branches of the government, i.e. Executive, Legislative and, Judicial.
- c. The government has embarked on a campaign to sell communism to the people. The usual propaganda outlets are being employed. Recently they have begun the publication of pamphlets, copies of three of which I have given you. The booklet on the Agrarian Law is being widely distributed in Honduras and Salvador.

Comment: Copies of the pamphlets referred to are enclosed.

d. Honduras. Guatemalan political activity is on the increase.

(1) We have information that in northern Honduras there are more than forty (40) communist cells in existence.

(2) _____ is on the Guatemalan payroll. As far as we can determine he is receiving \$2000.00 a month from the Guatemalan government.

(3)

we believe the man the government really intends to support is Francisco KORNMAN, a Honduran, at present private secretary to President Arbenz of Guatemala.

Costa Rica.

Economic. Economic conditions in Guatemala are very grave and are becoming worse every day. Capital is leaving the country. It is going to Mexico and the United States.

- a. On 21 November last I was told by [] here is with us as are his three (300) hundred soldiers. Our initial striking force in this area consists of three (300) hundred armed civilians. In addition we have fifteen (1500) hundred men ready but without arms. We have sufficient trucks to move this entire force.
- b. The Guatemalan government is preparing to impose a 6% tax on all imports and exports.

SECTION II - ACTIVITIES OF THE CALLIGERIS ORGANIZATION IN GUATEMALA.

I am not fully informed on every phase of our military preparation in Guatemala, that being primarily CALLIGERIS' responsibility, however I can say that we have reached a high degree of organization and have never been in a better state of readiness than we are at this moment.

1. Troop Organization.

- a. Jutiapa. The Guatemalan [] here is with us as are his three (300) hundred soldiers. Our initial striking force in this area consists of three (300) hundred armed civilians. In addition we have fifteen (1500) hundred men ready but without arms. We have sufficient trucks to move this entire force.

- b. Jalapa. The officers and one (100) hundred men stationed here are with us. We have eight (800) civilians ready but without arms.

- c. Santa Rosa. No army garrison here. We have one (1000) thousand men ready here but without arms.

- d. Zacapa. The garrison here has six (600) hundred soldiers well armed. They have four (4) 75mm canon and four (4) AA MG .50 Cal. We are not sure of this garrison but hope they will join us.

Liaison

e. Ciudad. No garrison here. We have two (200) hundred men here unarmed.

f. Coban. Army garrison here of about fifteen (1500) hundred men. The post has four (4) 75mm canon (Pack How.). The second and third in command plus a nucleus in the ranks are with us. We have two (2000) thousand men ready here as an initial force. More than an adequate number of trucks.

g. Salama. No garrison here. We have a force of six (600) hundred men ready without arms.

h. Quetzaltenango. There is a garrison of eight (800) hundred men in this area. The [] in command are with us. In this area we have organized a group of fifty (50) commandos in sub-units of five (5) men each. Their mission will be to kill all political and military leaders in the city. In the general area we have three (3000) thousand men. They need arms. The city has an excellent airport which we plan to capture and use.

i. San Jose. (Port on the Pacific ocean) No garrison. The city has an excellent military airfield built by the Americans. The field is not used by the military there being no Guatemalan air force units here.

j. Mazatenango. Garrison of three hundred and fifty (350) soldiers. The [] in command are with us. We have eight hundred (800) men organized here but without arms.

k. Chimaltenango. No garrison. We have one thousand (1000) men here without arms. We have sixty trucks (60) ready. We are building an airfield here.

l. Santaate. (SW of El Progreso) No garrison. We have five hundred (500) men ready without arms.

m. El Progreso. No garrison. We have five hundred (500) men without arms.

n. Puerto Barrios. Garrison of one hundred and fifty (150) men. The garrison recently received four (4) AA MG .50 Cal. The [] in command is with us. I do not know the size of our civilian force.

o. Guatemala City. The government here has about five thousand (5000) men including soldiers and police. Within the city we have six hundred (600) men organized in commando units each with a specific mission.

"X" Groups. Mission to kill all leading political and military leaders. The list has already been drawn up. I have in my possession a city map showing the location of the homes and offices of all targets.

Saboteurs. We have teams ready to sabotage, communications, utilities, all headquarters, transportation, military installation and equipment. For these teams we have selected men whose civilian employment is at or near the targets assigned. We do not plan permanent but only disruptive sabotage.

Documents teams. These teams will capture and impound all documents in government office, party headquarters, and labor unions.

p. Liberation Committees. Independent of our fighting organization we have organized in each town a liberation committee. The function of these committees will be to assume political and police control in each town as it is liberated and thus re-establish and assure public order and welfare until the new government is prepared to assume these functions.

q. Identity Cards. To protect our personnel and prevent enemy personnel from changing sides during and after the action I have prepared and issued 40,000 identity cards.

2. Intelligence Service. We have developed an intelligence organization. It exists in the government, police, and the army. The head of this service is a man we trust implicitly and a man who has over 20 years intelligence experience. At present he is seeking to penetrate the labor unions.

3. Airfields. We are selecting and developing airfields all over Guatemala, and in particular around the Capitol. Our major field in the Capitol area is near the town of Dolores (SSE of Guatemala City and ENE of Esquintla) a particularly isolated area. Here we expect to bring in by air arms and equipment and assemble 3000 men which force will comprise one column for the march on the capitol. We already have the necessary trucks earmarked.

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In selecting our airfield sites we have enlisted the aid of an American living in Guatemala. He served as a pilot in WW II and has agreed to fly for us. He states that he can buy us four (4) DO-3s and get us three more American pilots.

Comment: _____ has asked that this man be sent to visit CALLIGERIS.

4. Psychological Warfare. We have prepared a psychological warfare program.

(a) the farmers of Guatemala have collected money to carryout a press and radio campaign. This is being developed.

(b) We are prepared to carryout CALLIGERIS' 30 day campaign.

(c)

5. Current Plans of the Organization. CALLIGERIS recently asked me to visit General Trujillo and ask for help. I believe such a trip would be profitless because neither General Trujillo or General Somoza will give us material help without being properly assured by the United States government that approves of such help. Without this approval both of these men stand to lose too much.

We have been building our organization before March of this year. We counted heavily upon your help. Unfortunately that help has now been withdrawn. We used that promise of help as a restraint upon our people from impatient action. Now we can restrain them ~~no~~ longer. Secondly, the Guatemalan government is now proceeding on a plan of action which, if successful, will give that government complete domination of every phase of Guatemalan life. If we permit the government to succeed in its present plan then our chances of eventually overthrowing that government will be very considerably reduced. It has therefore been the decision of the group controlling our organization to strike not later than the first of February 1953 with whatever means we have at our disposal.

TOP SECRET

1116

FN 16

5 November, 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : [] AC/WH/PW

SUBJECT: PW Conference in []

1) The main themes discussed in [] between CWH, WH/PW and the [] were:

- A. Present PW facilities in the Central American area;
- B. The means of PW support for the Guatemalan anti-Communist movement; and the -
- C. Feasibility and means of Central American PW support of any possible activity of RUFUS.


2) It was concluded that, with proper support with specialists and money from Headquarters as indicated in project [] all the [] will be able to give PW support to any PW campaign or action on the part of RUFUS and/or any other Guatemalan anti-Communist.

3) Our contact with RUFUS reported the following:

- A. RUFUS has read and rewritten the "30 day plan", including all the major themes (see attachment);
- B. Material for the "plan" will be printed in Guatemala. All facilities are ready for immediate use. The estimated cost of production will be \$5,000.
- C. RUFUS is presently reprinting 1,000 copies a week of a Guatemalan anti-Communist bulletin []. The expenses are being borne out of the personal funds of RUFUS.
- D. RUFUS is creating a PW team and arranging for the covert dissemination of the "30 day plan" & PW materials and any latter propaganda to be used in combat and consolidation.
- E. All possible propaganda will be printed as soon as funds are made available to insure better dissemination when the time is ripe.

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE AS SANITIZED, BY
C.S.I.C./H.R.S. ON 03 JULY 5

4) The following chart is an illustration of the means of promoting the widest dissemination of PW themes. It was agreed upon as the most efficient and secure means of accomplishing our objective:



5) [] have stated that they are able to support any future RUFUS PW on the following themes:

- A. RUFUS forces represent a popular uprising;
- B. RUFUS forces are acting in defence of the Guatemalan Constitution;
- C. The Guatemalan Communists were plotting complete subjugation of Guatemala;
- D. Guatemalan government arms have been sent by the Soviet orbit countries;
- E. Guatemalan government is only a tool of the USSR;
- F. Participation of the other Central American Republics in the uprising indicate a higher prestige and prosperity for Guatemala under RUFUS;
- G. Guatemalan army atrocity stories and pictures; and
- H. Any material on RUFUS and supporters and their aims.

6) [] will initiate the following actions if feasible:

- A. The [] populace will be ordered to arrest any fleeing Guatemalan Communist agents, who finding themselves unable to operate any longer in Guatemala, are attempting to re-establish themselves in neighbor countries; and
- B. In the event that Arbenz escapes to [] a press release will be sent to the [] newspapers, allegedly from Arbenz, stating that he was held a prisoner by the Communists. Newspapers will check this story. He will have to accept or deny his Communist affiliations. Either way there is a story. Any further action against Arbenz will depend on his own attitude.

7) [] will be responsible for the following actions:

- A. Alert all [] if any high Guatemalan official hides out in the Soviet Embassy []

B. Attempt to prevent important statements from
[] which would
support the present Guatemalan government; and

C. Immediately expand the circulation of the Guatemalan
anti-Communist news bulletin [] so
that it will be familiar to all important Latin American
newspapers.

6) Miscellaneous data:

A. RUFUS is studying the use of liquidation lists;

B. The means of preventing the rise of Communist
martyrs is being considered by RUFUS and WH/CPW;

C. []



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A PREPARATORY PLAN OF PROPAGANDA FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER

ANTI-COMMUNIST

COMMUNIST

Nov. 1

A poster showing Stalin trampling on the flag and Constitution of Guatemala.

Nov. 1

Circulate leaflets, signed by any Communist cell in Guatemala, which favor a national religion. These should be distributed in a semi-anonymous manner and in a small quantity.

Nov. 2

The text of article 32 and a promise of its complete fulfilment.

Nov. 3

Posters with patriotic and religious themes.

Nov. 4

An attack on the Communists by press, radio and leaflets.

Nov. 4

A Communist alert calling together all their followers for the defense of "the revolution" against an armed movement planned by the reactionaries for the night of 12 November.

Nov. 5

An appeal to all the Christians to unite in a fight against Communism, and an appeal directed to the members of other religious sects.

Nov. 6

By means of pamphlets, list the principle Communists accused of being traitors to their Country and their religion.

Nov. 7

Continue with the same subjects as those mentioned for the 4th, 5th and 6th days.

Nov. 7

Accuse the Christians of plotting against the government and accuse the clergymen of participating in national politics demanding a revision of the permissions granted to the nuns and jesuits and prohibiting the wearing of their robes on the streets.

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30 DAY PLAN

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ANTI COMMUNIST

SECRET

COMMUNIST

Nov. 8

Publication of the first draft of the minutes of a Communist session, thus:

1. Establishment of a National Church.
2. Colonization of new lands as a means of political domination - and the dissociation of family and social ties necessary for the complete establishment of a Communist regime.
3. The official establishment of a party police to collaborate in the support of the regime.
4. A study of the possibility of acquiring a number of Russian teachers, for the schools.
5. The establishment of the Russian language as a means of communication, both inside and outside of the Party.
6. Elimination of the clergymen who oppose the realization of a National Church.
7. Collection of funds among the affiliates and sympathizers of the Party for the erection of a monument to the greatest leaders of the workers of the world.
8. A study for the change in the patriotic symbols - (Flag, National anthem and Coat of Arms)
9. To request a law for urban reform, with an equal distribution of dwellings.
10. Free discussion.
11. Close of session.

Nov. 9

A poster depicting Russian dominance over the Guatemalan government.

Nov. 9

Poster denying the veracity of the meeting and accusing the Catholics of forgery, and of plotting against the government of Col. Arbenz, and, in addition, presenting Catholicism as anti-Nationalist and idolatrous.

Nov. 10

Answer to the anti-religious poster and a request for the union of all the Christians in a fight against Communism.

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ANTI COMMUNIST

Security Information COMMUNIST

Nov. 11

A petition to the people that they show their repudiation of Communism and their loyalty to their religion and Country by placing posters in their homes and businesses. (Posters WE ARE ANTI-COMMUNISTS FOR GOD AND FOR OUR COUNTRY)

Nov. 12

The placing and dissemination of anti-Communist posters.

Nov. 13

A poster depicting the tortures that the Communists have used in Guatemala.

Nov. 14

Point out, by means of pamphlets, the principle Communists of Guatemala and the positions that they occupy in the government.

Nov. 15

Nationalist and anti-Communist propaganda.

Nov. 15

A general appeal to the proletariat for the defense of the October revolution, endangered by the projects of the reactionaries, who, plotting with some of the unrecognized officials and members of the Party within the country will try to undermine the constitutional order on the morning of the 22 of November.

Nov. 16

Nov. 16

Mockery of the fears of the Communists.

Posters blaming the opposition for national restlessness, accusing the pardoned politicians of having supported subversive organizations, "biting the hand that gave them the bread of freedom", asking the government for action against those evil patriots who handicap the great social purposes of the Revolution.

Nov. 17

A defense of the pardoned members and a pamphlet denying the intention

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ANTI COMMUNIST

- 4 -
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Security Information
COMMUNIST

Nov. 17

to overthrow the government by force; ridiculing the fear of the Communists.

Nov. 18

A notice on the creation of a splinter-group of Communists who refused to be guided by Russia and wanted a National Communist Party - resembling the APRA.

Nov. 19

Nationalist propaganda ridiculing the idea of erecting a statue to the great leaders of the workers of the world.

Nov. 19

A furious denial of any speculation concerning the dissension within the Communist ranks and re-affirming their strength, preparation and unity to be used against the enemies of the Revolution.

Nov. 20

National and anti-Communist propaganda, showing the crimes committed by the Communists.

Nov. 20

A petition to the people so that with their assistance, the Communist Party may acquire a greater number of representatives in Congress and may comply with what was suggested by their followers during the campaigns and presidencies of Dr. Arévalo and Col. Arbenz.

Nov. 21

Petition so that the Communists will not be able to enter nor remain in the National Congress.

Nov. 22

Petition for the local excommunication of Communists.

Nov. 23

Declare a "boycott" of all Communists.

Nov. 24

Lists of Communists to be distributed by means of leaflets.

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ANTI-COMMUNIST

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Security Information

COMMUNIST

Nov. 25

Denounce the Terrorist Plan of the Communists (a Bogotazo) ready to be executed.

Nov. 26

An appeal to the surrounding people to integrate the Committees of Defense in their districts.

Nov. 26

An enraged denial of the Terrorist Plan and an accusation attacking the clergy and the opposition - accusing them of conspiring with high military officials for the overthrow of the government - for this reason the President is asked to fill the positions of greatest responsibility with military men of known loyalty to the October cause.

Nov. 27

An offer made by the Committee of the Districts to the authorities to maintain order in any circumstances.

Nov. 28

Accusing the Communist Party of possessing arms and explosives and a claim of a tour of inspection - pointing out one of the deposits.

Nov. 29

A petition to the people asking them to refrain from going out of their homes at night except for worthy reasons.
(Sickness and Work)

Nov. 29

A petition to the members of the Party to remain alert for an opposition attack on the government with their phoney Committees of Defense, offering the government their unconditional aid, adding that although many of them are disarmed, they will be ready to defend themselves in the districts when the moment is designated.

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Security Information

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PROGRAM SCHEDULE
FOR SEPTEMBER

ANTI-COMMUNIST

1. 32 Poster - Dios y Libertad, with cross and no. 32.
- 2.
3. The ArchBishop's statement on Communism (Handbills).
4. Explanation of 32 and get rid of Communism in Guatemala. (Poster)
5. Religious poster - one with Stalin in sheep's clothing.
6. Stalin and the local Communist party stamping on 32 and the little people labeled "derechos", "libertad", etc.

7. -----SUNDAY-----

8. Poster ridiculing the Communist alert of the 5th.
9. List of Communist Fronts which are violating Art. 32 of their very existence and support of Communism and the USSR.
10. Comment on the formation of the Communist splinter group.
11. Poster showing fronts as backers of atheism and the destruction of Guatemalan liberty for the glory of - not Guatemala - but solely for the USSR.
12. Poster showing government disregard for Art. 32 and the betrayal of the Guatemalan Constitution.

PRO-COMMUNIST

Communist statement following line of how Guatemalan Communist love Catholicism. (Handbill)

A Communist alert to the effect that rumors say that an attempted revolution will begin Saturday. Mobilize all forces (Handbills)

Provide evidence of a Cosmic splinter group through a poster, handbill, claiming this group to be a real Nationalist "communistic" group such as the ancient Indian population had.

Communist blame all trouble on the ignorance of Catholics - ridicule the Virgin of Guadelupe and quote their leaders. (Handbills)

Communists again point to immediate dangers and request a show of strength for the following day.

Communist request for funds to be sent to the Soviet embassy in Mexico, or to the Guatemalan Treasury.

Communist invitations to a fiesta-- free food, drink and entertainment. All paid for by the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, the local Communist Party and the Guatemalan government.

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Security Information

~~Security Information~~

13. Poster ridiculing the alert of the 10th.

Communists deny payment by the USSR Embassy. Claim money for fiesta is only from local Party and Guat. Treas.

14. ----- SUNDAY -----

15. Poster and handbill on Communist treatment of Catholics in all nations where they are in control.

Handbill commenting on the use of funds from the National Treasury for a Communist fiesta.

A copy of minutes of a meeting between top Communists in Guatemala is discovered. These minutes should deal with: (1) Establishment of a new national Communist church to worship Stalin; (2) Arbitrary resettlement of the population to destroy family ties; (3) The establishment of Guat. NVD; (4) The importing of Soviet teachers for better education of Guatemalans; (5) The establishment of Russian as the first language in Guatemala to be used in all official communications; (6) The destruction of all existing churches, and the summary imprisonment of all clerics; (7) The abolishment of Sunday as a legal holiday; (8) The construction of 100 statues honoring Stalin and Lenin; (9) A new Guatemalan flag and a new constitution modeled after that of the USSR. AND ANYTHING ELSE WHICH WOULD CREATE ANGER ON THE PART OF ~~the people~~ THE GUATEMALAN PUBLIC.

16. Handbill naming leaders of Communist fronts who have betrayed Guatemala and their religion. Keep simple and to the point.

Communists again call for mobilization for the 17th. Communists deny "plan" even though such things may have happened in other Communist nations, they say that these things could never happen in Guatemala.

17. Poster calling attention to Communist plans.

Splinter Communist group claims that all funds collected are going to high Communist Party members and the USSR. None for Guatemala.

18. Handbill pointing out that the Guatemalan Government has done nothing to back up article 32 of the Constitution nor any other article except those that better the cause of the USSR.

Communists report that funds are not being received by the USSR Embassy in Mexico. That this will make the USSR angry at Guatemala and to all Guatemalans who should owe allegiance to the Soviet Union.

- 3 -

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19. Handbill denouncing all phases of the Communist plans. Keep brief, concise and play on all sentiments of populace.

Invitations to a meeting where the Soviet Amb. to Mexico will speak. Also Lombardo Toledano, Luis Carlos Prestes and Diego Rivera and any other Communist who would be hard to get. Also promise the presence of certain high government officials of Guatemala.

20. Poster showing statues of Stalin everywhere - Soviet flags with caption: "If this is Guatemala, where are the Guatemalans?" or something to that effect.

21. -----SUNDAY-----

22. Poster naming Communist leaders in Guatemala calling them traitors to Guatemala, labor, their Church and their families.

Communist apologize for other false alerts and say that the real danger is on the 23rd - all workers excused from work to defend their homes.

23. Handbills stating: "Why are the Communists afraid? What is there to be afraid of? Are they afraid that patriotic Guatemalans will turn against the men who would sell us out to Moscow?"

Splinter group calls attention to the needs of the Guatemalans, but points out that funds are going to the USSR. Don't support Communist or these men. Name leaders of the local party and Commie fronts.

Communist invite public to pay homage to the new President of Guatemala, Marshall Stalin.

24. Handbill reacting to Communist desire to pay homage to Stalin. Suggest people pay homage to genuine Guatemalans and get rid of people who pay homage to a foreign ruler. Name Commie leaders in the Guatemalan government.

25. Poster calling attention to the statement of the Guatemalan Arch Bishop.

Communists again call for an alert of people and especially the labor groups who have been armed by the government.

26. Poster illustrating some of the Communist plans.

Communist splinter groups attacks the senseless alerts, but suggests that it might be a good thing for Guatemala if the people arose and got rid of the people who are apparently so enamoured with the USSR.

27. Poster ridiculing the continuous alerts which obviously are mere expressions of a guilty conscience of those who have so brazenly sold out Guatemala to the USSR. Name the prime targets with evidence.
28. Name the traitors and their backgrounds.
29. Same on request action.
30. A call to arms to protect the Constitution and Guatemala.

From this day on try to issue conflicting orders on government letterheads, via the telephones, through mails, handbills, etc. to sow as much confusion and unrest as possible.

In the event of action it will be advisable to publish the names of those who are on the side of God - spread rumors to the effect that Communists have fled Guat. and are hiding in the USSR Embassy in Mexico - spread the word that other Communists have used Party funds to build fortunes in other countries and have already departed or are preparing for immediate departure - gain control of the radio and cite control of various locales-loudspeakers and leaflets should reiterate the Communist plan - and plants in labor and the Communist part of the armed forces should spread conflicting orders via every available means. Rumors to the effect that some army unit carry the Soviet flag rather than the Guatemalan one, but that the USSR has withdrawn moral and financial support of the local party for bungleing the Guatemalan situation. Rumors should be spread that the Communists outside of Guatemala have denounced their comrades and any other rumors which would affect the morale of the troops such as saying that there is a boat waiting for all Officers who have party cards - troops will be deserted, etc.

FN 16, FN 28

Report No. 22
12 December 1952

TO : Chief, []
FROM : []

SUBJECT: Current planning of CALLIGERIS organization

1. Submitted herewith is report on current planning by CALLIGERIS organization in preparing for proposed military operation.

Attachments:

- A - Arms purchases by Guatemala in Mexico
- B - Captain
- C - Señores
- D -
- E - Plan for Arms Purchases by CALLIGERIS

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
C.S.I./H.R.C. ON 03 JULY 1985

November 12, 1952
Report No. 22

1. The CALLIGERIS organization is preparing for a D-Day in late January 1953 at which time it will attempt to overthrow the present Guatemalan government.

2. CALLIGERIS has been forced into this decision by a) the current political and military activities of the Guatemalan government, and b) the state of readiness of his own organization and the impatience of its members.

3. Current political and military activities of the Guatemalan government consist of:

- a. Political - Plans for a series of political moves in the National Congress and in the courts of the country which will, by March 1953, give the government complete domination of country and people. These moves, plus certain contemplated economic steps, will enable the government to progressively stifle all will to resist on the part of the people through political, economic, and police control.
- b. Military - The government has taken the following military measures:
 - 1) Frequent shifting of military commanders to keep the opposition off balance.
 - 2) Development of a defensive area, in the event of uprising, based on the city of Quetzaltenango.
 - 3) Arms purchases. (see attachment "A" for a report on the most recent purchases.)
 - 4) Begun the arming of labor and political groups loyal to the government. It has been verified that all recent arms purchases have been turned over to these groups rather than to the army.
 - 5) Created a secret police force to fight anti-Communists in and outside the country. The second in command of this force is one Captain [redacted]. His known mission is the assassination of CALLIGERIS. (See attachment "B" for more on this man.)

4. The CALLIGERIS organization, from the standpoint of organization and morale, is in excellent condition to begin operations. Members are becoming increasingly urgent in their demands for action. [] reports that among the general population there are symptoms of apathy towards the government which in time can lead to resignation and acceptance.

5. In a general review and evaluation of the situation the CALLIGERIS organization believes it must begin operations within six to eight weeks. This it proposes to do.

6. On the matter of weapons procurement the leaders of the organization have accepted the plain fact that whereas many groups and countries want to help none will do so without some form of approval from the United States. Thus the leaders have turned to direct purchases as the only means of arms procurement.

7. Arms will be purchased to the limit of the organization's financial ability and the time available. Approximately \$100,000.00 has been raised; this however must suffice for all purposes. CALLIGERIS estimates about \$500,000.00 in total will be necessary.

8. As the attempt to overthrow the government will be made with fewer arms than at first expected, a major change has been made in the original plan of operations. CALLIGERIS now proposes to make maximum use of "K" Group, sabotage, and the large force to be assembled in the Jutiapa area to overpower and capture the Capital immediately. He counts upon this rapid seizure plus destruction of all political and military leaders and a popular uprising throughout the country to bring about the capitulation of the government. As a minimum accomplishment CALLIGERIS believes the country can be thrown into a state of civil war which his organization, in the long run, can win. On this premise then, planning is going into the final stages. (see attachment "D")

9. Under the conditions outlined in paragraphs 5 through 8 the important question now is, "what financial help are Headquarters and [] now prepared to give?" To further emphasize the aid Headquarters may want to give and, through force of circumstances, may have to provide, a list of questions is presented below.

a. What financial aid will Headquarters and [] provide? If any, how much? And when available?

b. []

c. Does Headquarters still plan to advance funds for the 30 day propaganda campaign?

d. It has been recommended that Headquarters place a documents team in Guatemala to process captured documents. Does Headquarters approve? If so, forward pertinent instructions.

e. Can Headquarters stop gasoline deliveries to Guatemala three to four weeks prior to D-Day?

f. CALLIGERIS is counting heavily on sabotage. Would it not be worth the experience to use ideas and techniques developed by TSS?

g. If the proposed military operations bring about a prolonged state of civil war, is Headquarters prepared to support CALLIGERIS?

h. Assuming a state of prolonged civil war, neighboring countries and groups are going to take an active part. Has Headquarters plans to cope with this possibility?

i. In the event of complete victory by CALLIGERIS, is Headquarters and/or [] prepared to support him financially, if necessary, during the period of consolidation by his government?

10. Headquarter's answers to the questions "a" through "f" will have a direct bearing on final planning. In addition, time is short. For these reasons this report is being forwarded by courier with the request that he be held at Headquarters until the answers are ready.

Attachment "A"
To: Report No. 22.

[]

SUBJECT: Arms Purchases by Guatemala in Mexico.

1. During November 1952 the Guatemalan government made the following arms purchases in Mexico;

200 Machine Guns, medium
500 Machine Guns, light
? Carbines
? Hand Grenades
? Ammunition for the machine guns.
2. Delivery of these purchases has already been made to Guatemala.
3. These weapons were not given to the guatemalan army but were turned over by the government to labor and political groups.

Attachment "B"
To: Report No. 22.

Date of Inform: 6-8 Dec. 1952

SUBJECT: Captain [].

SOURCE : [] paragraphs 1, 2, and 3.
[]

1. Subject is Guatemalan Army Officer.
2. Subject is [] -in-command of the Guardia Judicial in Guatemala.
3. Subject's missions:
 - a. To establish an internal police force and frontier guard to capture anti-communists.
 - b. To assassinate CALLIGERIS.
4. On 5 December subject was seen in Tegucigalpa, Honduras.
5. [] has received instructions from [] to notify him if subject asks for a visa to []. [] intends to jail subject should he enter [].

Attachment "C"
To: Report No. 22.

[]
Date of Inform: 1 Dec. 1952

SUBJECT: []

[]

1. These two men met in Mexico, D.F. while attending the inauguration of President Ruiz Cortines.
2. During their conversations [] remarked;
 - a. Honduras and El Salvador must prepare to take joint action against Guatemala.
 - b. That the two countries should back CALIJERIS.
 - c. Asked if he, [] could approach the El Salvador government on this matter.
3. Since then the [] has been instructed to continue these conversations with the [] government.

Attachment "D"
To: Report No. 22.

[]

SUBJECT: []

(Ref: Report No. 20, Section I, par. 1c(3).)

1. Subject is leader of a group (size unknown) of Cubans and Spanish Republicans in Guatemala.
2. Subject is Santo Dominican, former chief of secret police in [] under []
3. With the fall of [] Subject fled [] with the help of the Guatemalan ambassador.

SUBJECT: []

(Ref: Report No. 20, Section I, par. 1c(1).)

1. Subject is now commander of the [] in Guatemala.

Field comment: General Trujillo of Dominican Republic has placed a reward of \$50,000.00 on the head of each of these men.

Attachment: "E"
To: Report No. 22

SUBJECT: Plan for Arms Purchases by CALLIGERIS

1. CALLIGERIS has opened up two sources wherein arms can be purchased. These are [] A third possible source, as yet not fully investigated, is []

2. CALLIGERIS proposes, for security reasons, to use trusted [] purchasing agents. All purchases will be moved by airplane or boat to []. The possibility of moving all arms from [] is being studied. The purpose of this plan is, in the event of discovery, to give the impression that the arms are for military operations against []

3. From [] the arms will be transported by airplane, boat, and truck to Guatemala.

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SECURITY INFORMATION
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CLASSIFICATION

SMN: _____

MRN: [] 0941
DATE: RCD 30 MAR 53 2030Z
31 MAR 53 1302Z

GPS

CN : 011

FROM: []

INFO:

TO : []

REF :

SUB :

FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM [].

"DIR SGUAT[] CITE[] 0720. REF
[] 0719. PBFORTUNE.

1. COL[], CHIEF OF [] -

TODAY TOLD SOURCE FOLLOWING:

- A. WILL NOT DECLARE WAR AGAINST GUATEMALA.
- B. NICARAGUAN, HONDURAN AND SALVADORAN SOLDIERS WILL INFILTRATE GUATEMALA ARMED, BUT IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES.
- C. THEY WILL ASSASSINATE UNNAMED COMMUNIST LEADERS.

2. COL[] INSPECTING

BARRACKS. OTHER HIGH ARMY OFFICERS UNUSUALLY BUSY.

3. [] INDICATED EXECUTION OF PLANS BAKER AND CHARLIE DURING HOLY WEEK. SOURCE [] EVAL B3. PASSED EMBASSY

SECURITY INFORMATION
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(CONTINUED)

INCOMING

SECURITY INFORMATION
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CLASSIFICATION

SMN: _____

MRN: C 7 0941

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DATE: _____

CN : 011

FROM:

TO : INFO:

SUB : PAGE TWO REF :

AND M. A. NOTE: EVALUTION OF C 7 0719 IS B3.

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F N 18

PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION IF PLAN IS NOT CONTINUED IN PRESENT FORM

1. Increased emphasis on penetrations of:
 - a. Guatemalan Communist Party.
 - b. Armed labor groups.
 - c. Foreign Office.
 - d. Presidential Secretariat.
 - e. Department charged with arms procurement.
 - f. Police.
 - g. Armed Forces intelligence.
 - h. Establishment of one of our agents under enemy control for the purpose of our intelligence CE.
2. Defections.
 - a. Army officers in command positions.
 - b. Police officers in command positions.
 - c. Labor officials.
 - d. []
 - e. []
 - f. []
 - g. Other Cabinet members.
3. Eliminations.
 - a. [] - After the creation of a story that [] is preparing to oust the Communists. His elimination will be laid to the Commies and used to bring about a mass defection of the Army officers group who still support him.
4. Sabotage.
 - a. Delay and, if possible, prevent the movement of supplies into or out of Guatemalan ports. This would be done by sabotage of the railroad, blowing up of highway bridges, road blocks

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of all sorts, sabotage to trucks and attacks on shipments to and from the ports. This would be accompanied by propaganda explaining the objective is to bring about the immediate bankruptcy and consequent fall of the Communist government in Guatemala and is an indication of the strength of the opposition.

- b. Oil storage facilities.
- c. Cement plant (This was suggested by []).
d. Coffee bags.
~~e. Execution of cotton plan as proposed by Mr. X to [] for the purpose of ruining financially Arbenz and his country.~~
- 5. Harassments.
Send threatening messages to the small fry among the known Communists, follow up with damage to their homes and, in some cases, with physical violence.
- 6. Intensified propaganda.
 - a. Maximum exploitation of clandestine radio station.
 - b. Anti-Commie labor conference []
 - c. Anti-Commie hemispheric conference []
 - d. Spread stories of dire economic consequences resulting from possible OAS action in September.
 - e. Continue present planned propaganda campaign within Guatemala.
 - f. Intensify efforts in Latin American countries whose support of any OAS action against Guatemala is doubtful, to obtain that support.
- 7. Movement of Arms.
 - a. Utilize the already trained special squads to capture or destroy the Communist arms caches whose exact location has been reported. This will reduce the capabilities of the enemy, encourage the resistance, lessen the number of border crossings required to bring in arms, and furnish an excellent cover story for the acquisition of arms by the resistance.

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b. Periodic black flights [] and border crossings into Guatemala to keep PM assets in being and furnish the resistance with essential supplies for the carrying out of the missions listed above.

[]

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203 Answer 19-3

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The urgency for effecting a change in the Government of Guatemala, while effective opposition still exists and before the cancer of Communism has spread and established itself still more firmly in this hemisphere, is further aggravated by the approaching coffee harvest and the concurrent necessity for at least threatening some economic pressure before this year's crop is sold in December. While other action will be necessary, it is recognized that only through military action can a new and stable government, friendly to the United States, be established promptly. It is agreed that MFTD is the only individual with the background, ideals, following and organization who can satisfactorily effect this change through armed action. However, during the past year the Government of Guatemala and the Communist elements within the country have strengthened their position, while that of at least some of the opposition elements has deteriorated.

1. The probability of military success will be greatly strengthened if plans are revised to include:

a. Capture of Quincygale City from within, rather than from without by an army which would be dependent upon possibly unreliable guerrilla forces from the interior. The capture of the capital can be accomplished successfully if the officers of its garrison are converted, subverted, obstructed or assassinated concurrently with other effective measures. Although the purported organization of 50,000 anti-Communists in cities may still be intact, the effective participation of an appreciable percentage

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of this group in organized formal military action is too uncertain at this time to permit sound planning to place too heavy dependence upon them as members of a guerrilla army. Unless there is a decided re-stimulation of anti-Communist elements, coupled with strong indications of initial success on D-Day, it is possible that many elements would not rise to form such a guerrilla army. It also appears that some of these elements could be utilized more effectively in types of action which do not call for sustained combat courage in the face of organized troops.

3. Establishment of the new provisional government in the capital (other than in a remote point such as Puerto Barrios as originally proposed). The announcement from the capital of a new government with appreciable Armed Forces backing, coupled with the announcement of strong forces moving on the capital from outlying districts, would carry with it assurances of success and would give the necessary courage to rise to many of the civilian components who might be unwilling otherwise to take the initiative. A provisional government established in the capital would also command more respect and permit more open support from other governments than one precariously established at a remote point.

4. Capture of the communications and public utilities facilities at the very outset of the action. Capture of the Government radio station in Guatemala City is an important element in enabling the new provisional government to call the people timely to arms.

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and to solicit the support of other governments. Plans should insure at a minimum the denial of all communications facilities (including military air), throughout the country, to the Guatemalan Government.

2. The probability of military success can be further strengthened if moves are made on the part of a major proportion of the Armed Forces. A softening-up campaign to precede armed action should therefore shake the faith of the Army in its Government and in its own future under that Government by:

- a. Moving so the known fact that the Government is arming civilians and placing more reliance on the Communist Plan of the new military.
- b. providing naval, air, and military assistance ports with neighboring countries.
- c. providing material and military training missions to neighboring countries.
- d. softening military leaders to neutrals and neutrals and neutrals who are neutral.

The non-political Guatemalan Armed Forces are quite likely to turn against a government which, by its own premeditated actions, is weakening its military and forcing the strengthening of the neighbors, and at the worst time is causing the two pro-Communist civilians. Individual officers also remain loyal to the Government and to eliminating by other means

3. The probability of military success can be further strengthened

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through the conduct of PR designed to strengthen the will of the opposition, break the faith of and create disension among present supporters of the government, and discredit the government with the foreign world. PR should include at least the threat of a conference of one or of Foreign Ministers to consider evidence that Guatemala constitutes a threat to [redacted] security through its support of International Communism. This conference should be held in December and sufficient convincing, incontrovertible evidence must be provided, by fabrication if necessary.

1. The probability of military pressure can be further strengthened through bringing to bear, or threatening, certain economic pressures. Some economic pressure is feasible and can be effective. The threat of other economic pressures can be equally effective.
2. The probability of military pressure can be greatly strengthened through the delivery of material to [redacted] for the following items:
 - a. Delivery of material by [redacted] to the First Port of New York for pick-up and delivery by [redacted] [redacted].
 - b. Purchase and delivery of additional material from the First Port of New York [redacted] to [redacted]. This material (cost approximately \$100,000) to be purchased for [redacted] by [redacted] with money delivered to [redacted] through foreign sources and turned over to him by [redacted] will make his military base [redacted] available to [redacted].
3. Any probability of military [redacted] [redacted] continued

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-2-

support of KAFNU and his group, as a minimum

- a. With a payment of \$10,000 in the immediate future to satisfy present debts and expenditures.
- b. With \$10,000 monthly regular payments from 1 September 52; until D-Day which will permit KAFNU to hold his present organization together.

The payments listed above are considerably lower than the figures projected by KAFNU, but are believed to be sufficient to maintain an effective resistance group, and not so high as to attract undue attention to the maintenance of such a group. Such payments can be made through foreign sources so that they cannot be attributed to any U. S. source. Other payments for the purchase of transport and other items of special equipment may be necessary.

- c. With the expenditure of further funds at the time military action is initiated and during the establishing of the new government. In the thirty days prior to D-Day as much as \$250,000 may be required. Money requirements during the period in which the new Government is establishing itself can be handled on an overt loan basis.

All action taken must be carefully planned in detail, timed to perfection, and faultlessly executed. Support of all interested groups must be prompt and complete.

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C.I.A. ON 6/15/75

FN 70

11 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THROUGH: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
SUBJECT: Guatemala - General Plan of Action

1. Attached is the requested general plan of action and summary budget estimate concerning proposed operations against Guatemala, prepared jointly by Mr. [] Chief of Operations [] and [] of the WH Division specially assigned to the project.

2. The plan was given provisional approval by the undersigned and submitted to the working group connected with the project, which includes Messrs. [] and [] of the State Department and Mr. [], at a meeting on 9 September 1953.

After thorough discussion, all members of the group concurred in the general plan.

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
AS SUBMITTED, BY
FOR SIGNATURES.
C.J.S./B.R.C.
ON 03 JUL 53

Chief, []

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~~EYES ONLY~~

11 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Guatemala.

During the past few years Guatemala has become the leading base of operations for Moscow influenced communism in Central America.

Ruled by powerful, anti-US President Arbenz supported by a leftist coalition government, with all key positions below cabinet level thoroughly controlled by a Communist dominated bureaucracy, Guatemala now represents a serious threat to hemispheric solidarity and to our security in the Caribbean area.

Essentially a primitive, rural country the size of Louisiana with a population of 3 1/2 million, Guatemala is currently engaged in an intensely nationalistic program of progress colored by the touchy, anti-foreign inferiority complex of the "Banana Republic".

With labor to a large degree organized according to communistic methods, and a land reform plan benefiting the peasantry, the present Arbenz government commands substantial popular support in spite of evidence of opposition in the capital, Guatemala City (Population 180,000).

With an army of 7000, the well-trained, and quite well equipped, hard core of which is stationed in the capital city, Guatemala maintains the balance of military power in Central America. This, coupled with communist subversive activities extending across the Guatemalan borders, is a matter of increasing concern to nearby States including Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador.

The disturbing and subversive influence of communist dominated Guatemala within the Pan-American orbit, as well as an aggressively hardening anti-US policy targeted directly against American interests in

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the country, has recently caused the United States Government to adopt a somewhat firmer attitude towards Guatemala than heretofore. Based on NSC 144/1 and up-to-date PSB policy guidance, CIA has placed top operational priority on an effort to reduce and possibly eliminate Communist power in Guatemala. Appropriate authorization has been issued to permit close and prompt cooperation with the Departments of Defense, State and other Government agencies in order to support CIA in this task.

A study of available intelligence estimates (most recently NIE-84) reveals no internal conditions that could be developed into a vital threat to the present Arbenz administration without determined support from the outside.

Though it is pointed out that the main political opposition to the government is located in the capital city, it is also stated that, although the dissatisfaction of important urban elements will probably increase, effective political unity among these elements is not likely to be achieved. The political union of urban and rural interests is even less likely.

Additional information appears to indicate that previously available active resistance to the government is decreasing rapidly due to general discouragement, especially after an abortive uprising earlier this year, which resulted in the imprisonment and/or exile of important opposition leaders.

It is further estimated that the army is the only organized element in Guatemala capable of rapidly and decisively altering the political situation and that there is no reason to doubt the continued loyalty of the army high command and most of the army to the President, who in turn is

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under the direct and indirect influence of Communist officials in key government posts and firmly entrenched within pro-Administration political parties.

Military units outside the capital are reported to have little potential for effective revolutionary action due to poor equipment, lack of training and the vigilance and security measures of trusted area commanders.

The police force (3500) could neither defeat an army coup nor itself overthrow the government without army support.

Another of the few organised elements of any consequence, the Catholic Church, is reportedly handicapped by the meagerness of its resources, the small number of priests in proportion to population, the fact that most priests are aliens subject to deportation, and the lack of a program capable of competing with the Communist-led labor movement or with agrarian reform.

A study of a recent evaluation of CIA's political and psychological warfare operations indicates that past efforts by the Agency to combat Communism in Guatemala have been hampered by a policy of extreme caution adhered to by State Department representatives in the field. As a result of this, existing CIA assets personnelwise and otherwise in respect to psychological warfare and political action within Guatemala are negligible.

The main operational asset immediately available to CIA is a group of revolutionary activists numbering a few hundred, led by an exiled Guatemalan army officer (RUFUS) and located in Honduras. More than a year ago, some planning within the Agency contemplated the implementation

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of an ambitious militant plan of revolutionary action on the part of RUFUS and his group. For a variety of reasons this operation was indefinitely postponed; meanwhile RUFUS has received financial aid from private American interests. He allegedly controls considerable clandestine elements and contacts within Guatemala; in fact the above-mentioned operation would have depended for its success on immediate popular support of RUFUS and his revolutionaries, backed by active assistance of an extensive underground resistance organization and certain oulying army garrisons, as soon as RUFUS and his men entered the country.

In light of existing conditions in Guatemala, with the government steadily strengthening its position, and active opposition deteriorating, the original RUFUS plan is now considered substantially obsolete. It is disturbing that reports from the CIA case officer indicate that unless the RUFUS asset is operationally activated within a very short time (maximum 120 days), it will be subjected to a serious morale problem, and RUFUS' alleged clandestine support organization within Guatemala is likely to disintegrate along with other government opposition.

Undoubtedly there are means and ways of maintaining the RUFUS group on a stand-by basis.

The RUFUS plan would in any case have to be radically readjusted to meet a more adverse situation. Also, any major action on the part of RUFUS and his supporters would have to be preceded by elaborate covert payway, political action, sabotage and similar operations that would require a time-consuming

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build-up of Agency assets of various kinds, including the placement of
qualified personnel in the field.

In this connection, it would be the primary concern of CIA to
ascertain the existence, scope and potential of alleged Guatemalan covert
resistance elements, and alleged clandestine contacts suitable for psycho-
logical warfare and political action purposes, as well as for possible
active support of a para-military effort at a later date.

Note

There is a general feeling of urgency in respect to action against
Guatemala on the part of State and Agency officials connected with this
priority task, but also a growing realization of the fact that existing opera-
tional assets do not permit any optimistic viewpoints relative to speedy
success within a relatively short period of time.

It is recognized that the task headed by CIA calls for a general,
over-all plan of combined overt and covert action of major proportions.
Some steps have already been taken to initiate certain preparatory measures
in regard to supporting overt action and other US government sponsored
pressure aimed at off-setting the leading position of Guatemalan military
strength in Central America.

A general outline of a contemplated course of action follows:

(a) Military Aid to other Central American States: In order to isolate
the target country (Guatemala), military aid agreements will be con-
cluded with Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador. Implementation of
such aid programs will be expedited on a priority basis and US military
missions will proceed to the countries in question to supervise de-
liveries of military equipment and offer technical assistance. Nego-
tiations with Nicaragua are progressing (ACTION: State and Defense).

Joint statement: 6 March 1961
(March 1961)

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*recent info
incident to
arrive at least
required.*

and it is expected that arms shipments will commence shortly

(ACTION: Defense and FOA). Preliminary steps to encourage Honduras to follow suit are in progress (ACTION: CIA, subsequently State and Defense), and El Salvador is expected to join up without delay (ACTION: State and Defense).

(March 1954)

(b) Cessation of Military Aid to Guatemala: US military missions will

be withdrawn from Guatemala at an appropriate time. Deliveries of arms, heavy equipment and other industrial products of military use have been stopped (ACTION: Defense and State). Efforts should be made to curtail or stop similar deliveries from foreign sources wherever possible (ACTION: State).

(c) Supporting Official Pressure: The US Government must from here

in adopt a strong, critical attitude towards the Guatemalan Arbenz Government. Every opportunity to crack down hard on Guatemala in response to official correspondence or statements must be fully exploited and subsequently followed up by active measures wherever feasible. (ACTION: State).

(d) Official Discrediting of Guatemala: The threat of a conference of OAS

or of Foreign Ministers should be made and reiterated in due course. The objective of the conference is to consider evidence that Guatemala constitutes a menace to Hemispheric solidarity and the internal security of friendly nations through aggressive Communist subversion. (ACTION: State). Collection of evidence, or fabrication of same, will be attended to accordingly (ACTION: CIA and State).

(e) Economic Pressure: Considering that Guatemalan Government economy

is susceptible to pressures, covert economic warfare methods targeted against oil supplies, shipping and vital exports and imports, where feasible, will be applied. In this connection, an already cleared group

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extensive experience in Latin American banking, shipping, publicity,

general investments and oil, will be assigned the task of preparing

a plan of covert action. This will be augmented by advice from

[] aided by three of his most trusted advisers in economic affairs who have just arrived from Guatemala for consultation. These men occupy high positions in Guatemalan business and industrial life.

Rhetorical, or when necessary fabricated evidence re. aggression and subversion, will be used at an OAS conference to obtain approval of the American States for multilateral economic action against Guatemala, particularly in respect to coffee. A study is under way to determine what phases of the coffee industry may be attacked which will damage the Arbenz government and its supporters without seriously affecting anti-communist elements (ACTION: CIA and State).

(f) Psychological Warfare: Paywar activities

but targeted against Guatemala, will be stepped up forthwith through the exploitation of exile groups and internal anti-communist organizations presently engaged in active operations (ACTION: CIA).

A complete psychological warfare campaign for internal implementation in Guatemala is in the planning stage. [] the Chief organizer of an extensive clandestine resistance movement, recently joined RUFUS in Honduras after being exiled from Guatemala. Contrary to current intelligence reports, [] claims control over substantial assets

that would be capable of covert Paywar activities and black operations using contacts within the press, radio, church, army and other organized elements susceptible to rumor, pamphleteering, poster campaigns and other subversive action. [] is presently in Washington assisting in preparations for Paywar activity and political action. It will be

REF ID: A671
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necessary to strengthen the CIA field station in Guatemala forthwith
in order to supervise the launching of a sustained Paywar program and
verify the capabilities of the [] /RUFUS clandestine organi-
zation in Guatemala City and elsewhere (ACTION: CIA).

(g) Political Action: Preparations for subversion and defection of Army leaders as well as government officials and political personalities are in progress. Here again, [] is assisting and offering capabilities for operational exploitation. (ACTION: CIA).

(h) Para-Military Action: As described in the foregoing, RUFUS and his small revolutionary group in Honduras (300) is the revolutionary nucleus around which last year's operational plan was formulated. Success depended entirely on immediate popular support inside Guatemala and a month-long military campaign gaining momentum through a series of complicated maneuvers and rendez-vous climaxing in an irregular assault on Guatemala City. This plan is now considered obsolete; however, it is still contemplated to make proper use of the RUFUS asset in appropriate coordination with an overt and covert "softening-up" effort described in the foregoing.

Current thinking singles out Guatemala City as the key target upon which all efforts must be concentrated including a swift, climactic military action sparked by a reinforced RUFUS group with essential support from defected elements of the City garrison and active civilian resistance groups backed by a series of well-prepared unconventional warfare operations. This must include the neutralisation of key military figures and control of power and communication centers.

Much preparatory work has already been completed to ensure logistical support of RUFUS. He and his group should take early

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advantage of the offered use of a military base.

Supplies now available in the Caribbean should be sent forward without delay to support an extensive covert training program. RUFUS and [] must at once take steps to strengthen their force by arranging for exfiltration of additional revolutionary personnel from Guatemala; leader and organizer types should be selected initially for intensive training, and some of these should be re-infiltrated to resistance elements within Guatemala. RUFUS' basic nucleus should eventually be built up to match as closely as practicable the numerical strength of the garrison of Guatemala City (approximately 3000).

The proposed expansion of the RUFUS group would in itself provide some measure of evidence as to RUFUS [] estimates and claims of control of resistance elements currently dependable in Guatemala

Further proof of the existence of organized clandestine resistance should be obtained by the gradual activation of one selected group after another within Guatemala commensurate with the development and increasing momentum of the psychological warfare and political action campaign. Some subversive operations should likewise be carried out to further testify to the existence of the alleged RUFUS [] capabilities inside the target country, and in order to stimulate popular interest and support. (Suitable target for one of these operations: disruption of a 15-man communist delegation scheduled to leave Guatemala City on 10 October '53 by commercial air carrier for a Communist Labor Congress in Vienna.)

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GSE/HMG

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~~EYES ONLY~~

Steps will immediately be taken to review the RUFUS plan according to concepts set forth in the above and progressively geared to take advantage of operational developments resulting from the before-mentioned overt and covert course of action. (ACTION: CIA supported by State and Defense as appropriate).

(1) Strengthening of CIA Station in Guatemala: As previously indicated, CIA assets in the field personnelwise and otherwise are negligible. No time should be lost in order to reinforce the station with a senior FI operator and an experienced senior PP operator. The current PP and FI effort is considered far short of even beginning to tackle the task at hand. Expert leadership is required to supervise the clandestine build-up in Guatemala without which no RUFUS plan involving revolutionary action sparked from the outside can be implemented with a reasonable chance of success. (ACTION: CIA - Priority.)

It is estimated that the contemplated operation can be mounted and completed over a period of not less than eight months. A provisional estimate of expenditure aggregates \$2,735,000. as per attached specification.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

BUDGET SUMMARY

(PBFORTUNE)

Psychological Warfare and Political Action	\$ 270,000
Subversion	250,000
Intelligence Operations	150,000
Maintenance of present cadre (8 months)	160,000
Expansion of cadre to 500	60,000
Arms and Equipment	400,000
Operation of [] training center	100,000
Support of internal organization (estimate)	150,000
Transportation, storage and travel (estimate)	85,000
Transport Aircraft and maintenance	600,000
Current Liabilities	10,000
Contingencies	100,000
TOTAL	<u>\$2,735,000</u>

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE AS BANITIZED, BY
CFS/HZS ON 03/21/

114-21
CIA

(5)

AIR

~~REF ID: A6200555 / SECRET~~

Chief, Lincoln

Chief of Station, Guatemala Info: Washington

[] Operational

Death Notices

Reference: LDC 1725

1. Attached are two different samples of death notice cards used in this area. The large folding type was obtained from [] through []. The smaller, less elaborate type was obtained from Mexico in early 1958 and is not unlike cards used in [].
2. For your information, the contemplated operation was previously tried here in 1958. Acting on instructions contained in DIR 47462, one death notice was sent each day for thirty days to []. Each card contained the name of a prominent communist who had been purged after he had outlived his usefulness. Each card also contained the request to pray for the soul of the particular communist victim. After thirty days three additional cards were sent on successive days to each of the four persons named above. On these cards the names of the addressees were inserted.
3. The first cards described in para. 2 above were mailed on 15 April 1958. Beginning 15 June 1958 the operation was repeated. In neither case was there any reported or observed reaction, but it is possible that it had the desired effect which was to implant a feeling of insecurity among the target individuals and their associates. If at this time you wish to repeat this type of operation, we will attempt to observe and report the results and reactions.
4. If you wish to review the operation described above you may refer to DIR 47462, OUA 840 and 825, [] and [].
5. For your information we have under consideration a similar operation in which we will employ birth announcements to advise selected addressees of the impending (re) birth of liberty in []. The purpose is the same as that which you contemplate in LDC 1725: to create a reeling that the anti-communist victory is inevitable. More details regarding this proposed operation will be submitted in a separate report.

Encls: as noted

19 April 1958

Distributions:

2 - Lincoln v/encl

2 - Washington v/encl ~~REF ID: A6200555 / SECRET~~

1 - Files v/encl





~~SECRET~~
Security Information

FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
CS3/HRG ON 5 July 95

5 November 1953

FN 23

MEMORANDUM FOR: []

SUBJECT : Summary of Directives and Instructions on PBSUCCESS

1. Pursuant to your verbal instructions of 4 November, there are listed below the principal directives, instructions and sources of instructions for Project PBSUCCESS.

2. General (in "Policy" folder)

- a. "Guatemala-General Plan of Action" TS # , dated 11 Sept 1953
- b. PBSUCCESS Status Report, dated 29 October 1953

3. US Military Assistance (in "Policy" folder)

a. Various memo's of conversations between [] and []. JCS have approved arms assistance negotiations with Nicaragua, and formal Defense Department notification to State is expected momentarily. JCS have not yet approved negotiations with Honduras or El Salvador.

b. The Guatemalan Government has requested several additional US Army personnel on a TDI basis, to be added to the US Military Mission. State [] has forwarded the request to Defense without comment. If necessary, State is prepared to ask Defense not to make the personnel available.

4. Economic Warfare

a. The Director of Security has been requested to obtain biographical data on proposed EW consultants. ("Policy" folder).

b. In discussions between [] in New York on 2 November, it was agreed that there should be an approach to [] to decide on EW methods directed toward cutting off petroleum and other supplies of the Guatemalan government. (For further details, see contact report written by [] in "EW" folder.)

5. PI

a. Attached Memorandum from C/YHD to Chief of Station, Guatemala (Attachment # 1) outlines priorities for development of [] assets.

6. PP

a. WHD Field Memoranda 50-53 (Attachment # 2) and 138-53 (Attachment # 3) instruct all WHD stations on how to support the anti-Guatemala [] campaign throughout the hemisphere.

b. WHD Field Memorandum 81-53 (available from []) also deals with hemisphere-wide support of the above campaign.

~~Security Information~~

II-17

~~SECRET~~

Security Information

c. Attachment # 1 outlines PP tasks of Guatemala Station.

d. Mr. [] has ordered [] to use all WHD covert media to disseminate [] which urges the US government to invoke the Monroe Doctrine in fighting Communism in the Western Hemisphere. [] files).

e. In discussions between C/PP/Ops - DD/P, etc. there has been talk of attempting to base various PP activities in [] and of organizing some sort of "International Organization for the Liberation of Guatemala from Communism". (Memos in "Policy" folder)

f. The \$30,000 given to [] in late September 1953 must last MUFUS through November. (Contact Report of [] dated 6 October 1953, in "Policy" folder.)

7. Instructions from WHD to Guatemala Station during 1953
(material extracted from Guatemala Chrono File)

a. 5 January, instructed Station to have [] continue writing articles about Guatemala for planting elsewhere in hemisphere. (According to [] now writes such articles.)

b. 26 February, Station was requested to furnish P.O. Box numbers used by Guatemalan Communists.

c. 6 April, Station was requested to furnish information on religious persecution in Guatemala for use elsewhere in hemisphere.

d. 2 April, Station was instructed to mail "mourning cards" for 30 successive days to [] and top Communist leaders. Cards were to mourn the purge or execution of various Communists in the world and to hint forthcoming doom to recipients.

e. 17 June, Station was requested to collect the following material for hemisphere-wide propaganda:

- (1) evidence of worsening economic conditions
- (2) photos and facts on failure of land reform
- (3) evidence that only Communists were profiting

f. 19 June, Station was requested to report:

- (1) Its facilities for placing material in press and on radio
- (2) Its facilities for preparing material, printing and distributing it
- (3) Its capabilities to initiate strikes, etc.
- (4) Its access to Communist or official Guatemalan letterheads, signatures, seals and to information useful for character assassination.

~~Security Info~~

~~SECRET~~
Sensitive Information

(5) Suggestions as to what action taken by the Guatemalan government would make it most unpopular at home; what the best targets for defenition are; which character assassinations could be most readily and profitably performed.

f. 1 July, implied and direct criticism of Station performance was made by dispatch. Station was told that:

(1) It had perhaps too willingly agreed to limitations imposed by the US Ambassador

(2) It did not seem to be using security techniques

(3) It had objected to the use of propaganda within Guatemala prepared outside the country, and had not made any alternate suggestions

(4) It had been slow in answering dispatches or had not answered at all

(5) Action and reporting on the labor situation were deficient.

[]

~~SECRET~~
Sensitive Information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY
DRAFT

42 November 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FN 23

SUBJECT:

Program for PBSUCCESS
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REFERENCES:

A. "Guatemala - General Plan of Action", ~~Top Secret~~, dated 11 September 1953

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B. Project PBSUCCESS Status Report, dated 29 October 1953

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
BY C.S./H.R.C.
AS SANITIZED
FOR RELEASE ON 12 JULY 1953
C.S./H.R.C.

A. Objectives

1. To remove covertly, and without bloodshed if possible, the menace of the present Communist-controlled government of Guatemala.
2. To install and sustain, covertly, a pro-US government in Guatemala.

B. Statement of the Problem

1. The Communists have become strongly entrenched in Guatemala and the Guatemalan government, thus constituting a threat to United States welfare in the Western Hemisphere.
2. The Guatemalan non-Communist opposition has become disillusioned and disunited. However, a latent anti-Communist resistance potential is believed to exist.
3. The resistance potential must be built up to the point where it can contribute materially to the accomplishment of the objectives of PBSUCCESS.
4. In view of growing Communist strength and declining non-Communist cohesion in Guatemala, the implementation and successful completion of the objectives of PBSUCCESS must proceed without delay.
5. It must be recognized that any major effort to dislodge the Communist-controlled government of Guatemala will probably be credited to the United States, and possibly even CIA. Covert accomplishment of the objectives of PBSUCCESS is therefore defined as meaning accomplishment with plausible denial of United States or CIA participation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C. Plan of Operations

1. Stage One - Staffing and Assessment -

a. Assessment of Project Personnel

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b. Field Survey by Communications Adviser

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- c. Briefing and despatch of Project field personnel.
- d. Assessment and analysis of friendly assets.
- e. Assessment and analysis of enemy assets.
- f. Preparation of detailed operational plans for Headquarters approval.

2. Stage Two - Preliminary Conditioning (D-7)

- a. Project Headquarters moves to the field.
- b. Create dissension and defection within the target.
- c. Discredit target at home and abroad.
- d. Demonstrate inability of target regime to represent best interests of the people.
- e. Create hope and encourage patience among non-Communists.
- f. Complete military agreements with Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador.
- g. Withdraw US military personnel from target at appropriate time.
- h. Begin economic pressure.
- i. Begin formation and training of a para-military force in exile.
- j. Assess accomplishments.
- k. Obtain Headquarters approval before proceeding to next stage.

3. Stage Three - Build-Up (D-75)

- a. Create maximum antagonism to target regime.
- b. Fan passive will to resist.
- c. Apply internal and external economic pressure to create serious difficulties.
- d. In concert with majority of OAS members, apply diplomatic pressures.
- e. Demonstrate urgency by speeding military build-up of neighboring countries (not including Mexico).

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~LIES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

- f. Accentuate para-military preparation.
- g. Initiate passive sabotage program.
- h. Assess accomplishments.
- i. Obtain Headquarters approval before proceeding to next stage.
4. Stage Four - Critical Period (D-25)
 - a. Apply maximum economic pressure.
 - b. Accentuate divisionist activity within target.
 - c. Intensive rumor campaign stimulating fear of war for the purpose of drawing enemy forces away from capital.
 - d. Constitutional revolutionary forces claim support of people.
 - e. Para-military force in readiness.
 - f. Passive sabotage evident.
 - g. Assess accomplishments.
 - h. Obtain Headquarters approval before proceeding to next stage.
5. Stage Five - Showdown (D-5)
 - a. Implement aggressive sabotage plan against key targets.
 - b. Constitutional leader claims capability to seize power by force and issues ultimatum to target regime to capitulate in order to avoid needless bloodshed.
 - c. Populace is told to await target regime's reply and further instructions from constitutional leader.
 - d. If ultimatum fails, popular uprising begins; para-military force enters target country, proclaims authority, declares target regime null and void.
 - e. Secure position and restore order.
6. Stage Six - Consolidation (D+ ?)
 - a. Roll-up of Communists and collaborators.
 - b. Dramatic initial proclamations and edicts.

~~LIES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

- c. Formation of government.
- d. Announcement of long-range domestic and foreign policy.
- e. OAS countries announce immediate recognition and support of new regime.
- f. United States offers aid.
- g. PBSUCCESS terminated.

D. Organization and Authority

- 1. Priority
 - a. PBSUCCESS has been given "Top Operational Priority" in the Agency.
- 2. Authority and Responsibility
 - a. Primary field authority and responsibility is vested in the Officer in Charge, PBSUCCESS.
 - b. This officer is designated "Special Deputy for PBSUCCESS, WHD." for initial
 - c. The command channel will be direct from Special Deputy to CWH.

3. Staff Requirements

- a. The following staff requirements for PBSUCCESS are believed to be the minimum for adequate implementation and control of the Plan of Operations envisaged herein. Additional personnel may required for varying periods of TIME.
- b. The T/O outlined below is exclusive of WHD's current T/O.

PROPOSED TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

PROJECT PBSUCCESS

<u>Pos. No.</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Grade</u>
1.	Chief	GS-15
2.	Operations Officer(Deputy)	GS-14
3.	Operations Officer	GS-13

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4.	Operations Officer	GS-12
5.	Operations Officer	GS-11
6.	Operations Officer	GS-11
7.	Operations Officer	GS-11
8.	Intelligence Officer	GS-9
9.	Budget and Fiscal Officer	GS-12
10.	Logistics Officer	GS-11
11.	Administrative Assistant	GS-7
12.	Secretary-Steno	GS-7
13.	Secretary General	GS-6
14.	Secretary General	GS-6
15.	Secretary-Steno	GS-5

7. Finance

- a. Upon approval of this program, financial accountability will be vested in CWH, under whose direction CWH/AD will be the accountable disbursing officer for Headquarters expenditures. Under the general direction of the CWH, the Special Deputy for PNSUCCESS will be the accountable disbursing officer for Field expenditures.
- b. Procedures for allocation, disbursement, and accounting of funds will be in a manner acceptable to the DD/A, and as shall be arranged between him and the CWH/AD.

APPROVED:

ECH

DD/P

CWH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FN 24

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 08 MAR 54

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : []

ACTION: WH (1-2)

INFO :

[] 3038 (IN 25314)

11027 9 MAR 54

ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

CITE: []

TO: []

INFO: DIR

PBSUCCESS [] RYBAT

FROM []

1. CALLIGERIS INDICATES:

- A. COMPLETE CONFORMANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DATE.
- B. CONFIDENCE THAT FEARS COS [] ON [] RAPPORT,

GROUNDLESS. WILL TEST THIS WEEK.

- C. ADAMANT IN BELIEF [] DANGEROUS POLITICIAN.

2. REQUEST [] BE INSTRUCTED:

- A. PROCEED [] 13 MAR.
- B. SET SCHEDULE GRADUATE LEADER CLASS 20 APRIL.
- C. STRESS TEAMWORK LEADER CLASS; I.E. NO INTRIGUES IF

DESIRE SUCCESS.

- 3. PLS PASS FOLLOWING []: NINE MOST SILENT RIFLES TO BE MARKED XZ FOR DELIVERY SECOND CAT DESTINATION AREA TWO. REMAINDER XG DESTINATION AREA ONE.

- 4. REQUEST TOTAL MAR BUDGET \$6,000 BE RELEASED []
- 5. COMMO TRAINING REPORTEDLY UNDER WAY. REQUEST QUERY IF

~~SECRET~~

REF ID: A65294

~~SECRET~~

08 MAR 54

[] 038 (IN 25314)

PAGE -2-

AN/GRC-9'S DELIVERED.

6. SUCCESSFUL PREPARATIONS FOR AIR STAGING IMMINENT.

7. [] JETA [] 1125, 8 MAR.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

FN 24

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 5 JANUARY 1954

~~SECRET~~

ROUTINE

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : []

ACTION: [](1)

INFO :

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
CSI/HBG ON 5 JULY 95

[] (IN 66672)

1841Z 5 JAN 54

ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

CITE: SLINC

TO: DIR

PBSUCCESS RYBAT

ATTN: []

CONTACT []/D AND T TO REQUEST SPECIAL PAPER ON
LIQUIDATION OF PERSONNEL. THIS PAPER IS TO BE UTILIZED
TO BRIEF TRAINING CHIEF BEFORE JAN 10 DEPARTURE.

END OF MESSAGE



[]

~~SECRET~~

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

OUTGOING FCABLE

STATION COPY

Routing

1	1994-1995	1994-1995
2	1995-1996	1995-1996
3	1996-1997	1996-1997
4	1997-1998	1997-1998
5	1998-1999	1998-1999
6	1999-2000	1999-2000
7	2000-2001	2000-2001
Filesize	1994-1995	1994-1995

TO: **THE MUSEUM**

PRIORITy:

FROM

TOT: 14247855

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF

TOP-DIM

卷之三

REF ID: A947

WISDOM READING

1. APPROPRIATE TO THE SERVICING OF THIS REQUEST. SEE NO OBJECTION TO PURCHASING DIRECT AS ONLY CONTRACTOR INVOLVED NOT AN ENTIRE WEAPON

THE OR LESSONS

EDL's Site

11-Chromo file
11-Originator
11-Subject
11-Stationary

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
APPROVED FOR RELEASE BY
CSE/HRC ON 12 JULY 1979

DATE : 6 JAN 54

~~SECRET~~

ROUTINE

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : []

ACTION: WH (1-2)

INFO :

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
C S I / H R G ON 5 JULY 95

FN 24
25

[]

] -

20382 6 JAN 54

ROUTINE
P R E C O D E N C E

TO: DIR

CITE: []

ATTN []

PBSUCCESS RYBAT

1. CONTACT TSS AND INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITY OBTAINING
20 SILENCERS FOR 22 CAL RIFLE AND ADAPTING THEM TO SINGLE SHOT
SECOND HAND RIFLES. IF MARCH 10 DEADLINE COULD BE MET, PROCEED
WITH DEVELOPMENT.

2. INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITY CONVERTING TO CRUDE FOLDING
STOCKS MADE FROM SPRING STEEL OR SIMILAR TO M3. IF STEADINESS
CAN BE INSURED, PROCEED WITH DEVELOPMENT.

3. PURCHASE ON MARKET 20 USED SINGLE SHOT 22 CAL RIFLES TO
IMPLEMENT ABOVE.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No. []

Cassette

REEL 17 -- Box 209 Folder 011

(at roughly 3055 on the ()

() talking:

"If you wait beyond February, I think you may have lost because if too many of these birds get out they will be back in about three years. So a very, very essential part of (unintelligible) campaign is a list of some 57-8 top men, (unintelligible) assassinated those first hours of the revolution as well as 22 (unintelligible). The idea is that to destroy this thing you've got to pull the roots out. And let's face it, in any population even this country you destroy the leadership and the mass are going to be effected.

(at roughly 3315)

() talking:

"....As far as I'm concerned, if any man escapes and gets to ()(unintelligible) earmarked and get him. Put assassimators (sic) in(), and they must be dealt with immediately as soon as possible. In other words, if one man gets to()but he's on that list..(unintelligible)...he's shot in()...(unintelligible)....If you wait a week and start killing people, public reaction's bad."

~~SECRET/RIBAT~~ROUTING
FORMDoc. No.: [Calligens]
Date: 2/2/54

Indicate title of person to take action and that of the originator. Place comments thereunder by numbered paragraphs. Initial in center of page and draw a line across the page and forward. Each recipient is to repeat above procedure until action completed and ready for filing. This coversheet must be retained with enclosure.

TO _____

FROM _____

DATE _____

C|

Note: a non-negative attitude will permeate the entire proceeding; however, these notes are to represent discussion points which are likely to come up and represent the basis of CPM prior concept. [. .]

Below this is who Rulus will want to know - are you here or understanding or techniques and we in agreement the rest should come along without too much trouble.

C1

et

file for

[]

[]

[]

[]

~~SECRET/RIBAT~~

PM

~~SECRET~~

3 February 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: [] - } CALIGARIS Briefing Notes

1. Attached are sterile notes from which [] intends to work in the coming meeting with CALIGARIS. Deviation to fit the situation will undoubtedly change the complex of control points, however these notes will be adhered to insomuch as possible.

[]

[]

[]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3 February 1954

SUBJECT: Briefing Notes

1. Former planning of Indigenous Commander will be utilized as fully as possible, the basis of which being to rearrange the plan to comply with unconventional warfare standards.

2. The major consideration in all alterations in the Indigenous Commander's plans will be to avoid a prolonged siege situation and to avoid placing many assets at the disposal of the tricks of the opposition. To accomplish this we must realize that all key points of resistance should come under our control immediately at H hour. The conditions under our control should be accomplished at each key point of resistance by one of or a combination of the following methods:

a. First Method: Seizure by outside force with mission of support being performed by an inner organization, organized by the Indigenous Commander's personnel from his personnel plus defections obtained through Psychological Warfare persuasion.

b. Second Method: Seizure by an inner organization such as above without the aid of outside forces.

c. Third Method: An inner organization as above to the point of capabilities of control and nullifying the positive action of any areas of resistance until success at other key areas is obtained and consolidated to the point of capability of supporting outside force on arrival to prevent a siege situation.

Note: Army unit personnel form priority target for defection.

d. Fourth Method: Blocking strong resistance points from the entire action by organizing strategic surrounding areas for their retarding and harassment, and blocking by specially placed Sab teams.

3. Unless the positive assurance of control of Guatemala City by one of the above first three methods is obtained, no overt move will be made. It is considered there are nine points of resistance at this time:

- a. Guatemala City: garrison, communications, and air facilities
- b. Puerto Barrios: garrison, communications, air facilities, and port facilities
- c. Jutiapa: garrison, communications, and air facilities
- d. Zacapa: garrison, communications, and air facilities
- e. Mazatenango: garrison, communications, and air facilities
- f. Quezaltenango: garrison, communications, and air facilities
- g. Quiche: garrison, communications, and air facilities
- h. Coban: garrison, communications, and air facilities
- i. San Jose: garrison, port facilities, and communications.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4. It is contemplated that during this first discussion certain portions of the Indigenous Commander's prior estimates of the situation and contemplated needs will arise. The theme to be used on each anticipated subject is to be as follows:

*The Key position
GUATEMALA CITY
FORCES REPRESENT
THROUGH THEIR
GEOGRAPHICAL
LOCATION, TOPOGRAPHICAL,
POSITION, SUPERIOR
STATE OF READINESS,
ORGANIZATION &
TRAINING, AND
NUMERICAL STRENGTH
FORCES USED CONSIDER
THIS THE KEY TARGET,
without control
of which we cannot
consider an OVERT type entry rather than that of regular forces placed along communica-
tions at the presentation routes. Techniques of partisan warfare will be applied to the
Indigenous Commander's prior planning and preparations in the best
manner to support more conventional military tactics. This technique
of combining two types of tactics has proven itself in military
history by reducing the number of personnel necessary, lessening
hog-tying logistical problems, and utilizing strike mobility,
surprise, and tactics making the opposition fight on your terms,
at your time and place for which you are better equipped, trained,
and mentally adapted to. By the same token infiltration entry by
small, light-traveling units avoiding possible military traps by
the opposition will negate the enemy's utilization of material
they possess concerning us, the extent of which is unknown to us.*

*THEREFORE AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE Key Position THE TIME CORPI
FORCES GUATEMALA CITY
OF THE INDIGENOUS COMMANDER'S PREDICTIONS FOR
THE INDIGENOUS COMMANDER WILL INQUIRE AS TO WHAT POSSIBLE
REASON COULD BE BEHIND THE THOUGHT OF A MILITARY CAMPAIGN NOT
EMPLOYING COMBAT AIRCRAFT: The utility of bombing and strafing
tactics to neutralize any strong point is being shied away from
even as a psychological factor by the Group in view of the fact
that the very concept of our movement, that of release of persons
from oppression, and all of our actions must allow this discontented
element to participate in the overthrow of oppression or at least
aid by sympathy or nonintervention. Our tactics should veer away
from terrorism of this faction and veer towards inviting their
participation. NOTE: Writer will employ non-rigidity in the above
in the presentation to allow for the following deviation:*

~~SECRET~~

(1) It is admitted that there is a psychological value to the appearance of aircraft. If strafing and bombing aircraft are made available by outside support ~~that is agreeable~~ to the Group, that they can be utilized if the Indigenous Commander's assurances of complete control of that support will be maintainable by Group and Indigenous Commander during operation to the point of not allowing one round to be fired or one bomb to be dropped unless prior Group-Indigenous Commander concurrence is pre-determined. Writer will call upon disastrous personal experiences to point out possible hazards of group air support even when air-ground liaison teams and air force have been strenuously trained and when operating under best conditions. (2) Writer will point out Group's yet-unfirm initial planning on preparations for reserve support under Plan Able or emergency support under Plan Baker and Plan Charlie by Group air facilities.

5. Communications: Indigenous Commander may query the Group's former claim to communications efficiency. The writer's position here will be that of pointing out difficulties experienced in utilization of varied radio trained tactical situations even of the comparatively small enormity if encountered in inter-company raider situations encountered in semi-conventional tactics. The proven reliability of the technical equipment being proposed and the security efficiency that can be maintained should aid in setting the basis of communications plan.

6. Logistical Support: The Indigenous Commander will query methods of getting material in the hands of recipients. Here the writer will outline basic concepts of the logistical support plan as prepared in the rough from which each was composed. Without going into the exact method of getting material to the staging site and without being dogmatic on the Choggi system as being the only method. Flame throwers will be dissuaded by pointing out lack of portability, wrong psychological effect, and availability. German bazookas will be mentioned as being sought. Special equipment such as silenced rifles, survival kits, Napalm, shaped charges, and canned grenades will be played up.

7. The entire basis of the writer's approach to this conference will be the realization that the Group must follow, both from their groups and our groups standpoint and that side from the known opposition tactics and precautionary measures, that we are coming up against and are faced with the third factor of opposition's trained Communist Tacticians in the field of security, stay behind, subversion, and intrigue which would make our employment of straight military tactics, alone, an issue of doubt. All of us involved must over plan and over prepare and be prepared to "drive the tack with a sledge hammer" in the event the sledge hammer turns out to be a railroad spike.

~~SECRET~~

8. In the event accord or mutual compromise is apparent at this point the Indigenous Commander will be queried in order to initiate the formation of such organizations we should start preparing specifications on the following:

a. The name and biographical data on the person or persons the Indigenous Commander considers to be the key man or men to be nucleus of the organization within the garrison. We should consider a strong executive officer (probably to be chosen by the key man himself if the Indigenous Commander considers feasible). We should choose personalities for Partisan Leaders around which organizations of the surrounding areas can be built. We should determine the personalities most suited for residence radio operators for each specific target. We should choose personalities for leaders of sabotage teams and move them the latter part of March to the staging area which has been selected for the particular area of interest so that graduates of the present training program can be assigned to instruct them. We should pin down the air fields near by the staging areas to which material can be sent to the staging area. The Indigenous Commander should ascertain at this time his ability to operate secure landing at these airfields from the head of the countries concerned, similar to the arrangements for the last similar flight made by the Group. The Indigenous Commander should inform the Group soonest on obtaining the answer to this query if such answer is not available at this conference.

9. The Indigenous Commander will be acquainted with at this point, if deemed feasible by writer, the proposed methods of initiating these first steps and at this time can comment on feasibility at specific instances. Contact of the selected key personality in each area of resistance by one of the graduates of present training, which contact to be instructional in nature, the security of which contact we will guarantee by the techniques of clandestine trade, which contact will be limited to one man in whom the Indigenous Commander has confidence. The reasoning here to be stressed is that the building of the new organization should be comparatively cautious to prevent the recent disclosures to the enemy from contaminating the new organization. This key figure will be instructed to work even within his garrison by using one strong assistant to provide the implementation of his organizing efforts thereby preventing exposure of himself through too much activity. The key figure will be instructed to organize within the garrison one man to form the necessary organization to negate air facilities (i.e. prevent opposition aircraft from entering the action); one man to form the necessary organization responsible for cutting communications; one man responsible for instructing and organizing special mission details (assassination, destruction or seizure of materials and stock piles, physical subversion of garrison troops, etc.); one man as a courier cutout with liaison with incoming resident radio operators; one man for possible courier contact (emergency with Indigenous Commander). In addition, personalities chosen to head area organizations in the surrounding area will be contacted by graduate trainees for instructional purposes to acquaint the area raiders with harassment and retardation tactics and organizational style.

~~SECRET~~

10. Discussion on reason for compartmentalization of staging training sites and specific locations will be handled.

11. Once Indigenous Commander's assignment February is determined, he will be asked to present financial estimate for discussion.

12. It is the purpose of this conference to reach an understanding with the Indigenous Commander and find personnel and geographical requirements which will initiate a positive forward move in the military field during his forthcoming trip to his home area.

~~SECRET~~

F N 25

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FOR RELEASE AS SHOWN ON
[REDACTED] JULY 1951

OUTGOING CABLE

[] STATION COPY

ROUTINE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
FILE

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: []

INFO:

PRIORITY: ROUTINE

TOT: 21 JAN 54 1534Z

TO: DIR

CITE: [] 192

RE: DIR 34976

PESUCCESS/RIBAT

1. CANNED DRY AND PACKED.

2. YES.

3. RIFLE USED TO 150 YDS MAX. REQUEST MAXIMUM DEGREE SILENCE ACCOMPLISHED
BY TSS WITH DELIVERY DATE WASH 20 FEB. OR DELIVERY DATE [] 1 APRIL.

END OF MESSAGE

Distr:

1-Chrone file
1-Originator
1-Subject
1-Station file

ORIGINATOR:

[] 3/lrx

APPROVED BY

[] J

1/11 DVDT DVDT

FN 25

27 September 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: - CHIEF,

SUBJECT: Cost of Support for PBSUCCESS

Items are listed approximate total cost only. This includes material, labor and overhead.

772 each Dead Drop Rods	170.00
Canning Project	2,240.00
20 each Silenced Weapons	1,835.00
Photo Copy of Maps	
5,000 Armbands)
150,000 Leaflets)
200,000 Leaflets) 915
200,000 Leaflets) man
175 Newspaper) hrs.
5,000 Posters)
1,000 Letterheads and Envelopes)
10,000 Pennants	-) 4,575.00
Glass Etchers	125.00
Total	\$8,945.00

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CST/HAC ON 03-02-95

Chief, TSS/Technical Operations

TSS/OCY

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CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

FN 26

POUCH MANIFEST

CARRIED BY

TO: [REDACTED] LINCOLN	Pouch No. 3
FROM: WH	DATE 8 January 1954

ITEM	DISPATCH NO.	SUBJECT AND ENCLOSURES
1.	[REDACTED]	Precautions being taken against anti-government activity by Guatemalan government
2.	[REDACTED]	Letter from Amb. Peurifoy to Ass't Secty of State Cabot dated 28 Dec 53
3.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
4.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
5.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
6.	[REDACTED]	Activities - Travel and Contacts Psychological Barometer Report [REDACTED]]26 Dec 53)
7.	[REDACTED]	Salama Prison Break
8.	[REDACTED]	Anti-Communist Propaganda - Exiled Groups
9.	[REDACTED]	Letter forwarded with [REDACTED]
10.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
11.	[REDACTED]	International Youth Meeting, Is annual, 8-15 Jan 54
12.	[REDACTED]	Progress Report 12 Feb-30 Nov 53 - ESCOM
13.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
14.	[REDACTED]	Biographic Data on Guatemalan Personalities
15.	[REDACTED]	Biographic Data on Guatemalan Personalities - [REDACTED]
16.	[REDACTED]	" " " " - [REDACTED]
17.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
18.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
19.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
20.	[REDACTED]	"Communism versus Progress in Guatemala" by Theodore Geiger
21.	[REDACTED]	"Utilization of CRIT for PROGRESS Purposes"
22.	[REDACTED]	Newspaper clipping
23.	[REDACTED]	Estatutos Del Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PDT)
24.	[REDACTED]	United, CGID Publication
25.	[REDACTED]	Press Digest
26.	[REDACTED]	Tribuna Popular
27.	[REDACTED]	Miscellaneous newspapers [REDACTED]
28.	[REDACTED]	Memo to [REDACTED] re: Clerical Personnel dated 8 Jan 54
29.	[REDACTED]	Memo to [REDACTED] re: Administrative Matters dated 8 Jan 54
30.	[REDACTED]	Memo to [REDACTED] in envelope marked "Personal - [REDACTED]" re: "Contem- plated purchases by Guatemalans"
31.	[REDACTED]	STATE CABLE NO. 176 dated 31 Dec 53
32.	[REDACTED]	Memo re [REDACTED] activities
33.	[REDACTED]	Envelope addressed to [REDACTED]
34.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

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HEADQUARTERS REGISTRY COPY

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(24)

FORM NO. 59-33 A ~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET~~

POUCH MANIFEST

TO: Headquarters, Resistance, Restricted Document LINCOLN		Pouch No. 3
FROM: WH		DATE 8 January 1954
ITEM	DISPATCH NO.	SUBJECT AND ENCLOSURES
35.		Envelope for []
36.		Envelope for []
37		Memo for record re PBSUCCESS based on [], memo dated 6 January 54
38.		Memo re [] concerning []
39/		Paper entitled "A Study of Assassination"
40.		Memo from Commo re: "Estimate of Costs, Communications, PBSUCCESS"
41.		Copy of []
42/		Copy of GUAT 801
43.		[]
44.		Envelope for []
45.		Envelope for []
46.		[]
47.		PP Material for []
48.		Envelope for [] via []
49.		[]
50.		X22
51.		[]
52.		[]
53.		[]
54.		Memo of 29 Dec 53 re Guatemala from Progress Report
55.		Memo for record on 9 Jan 54 re Processing of Personnel for [] and Sherwood
56.		Memo re Testing of TSS Caching Container
57.		[]
58.		[]
59.		[]
60.		[]
61.		[]
62.		[]
63.		[]
64.		Memo of 7 Jan 54 re Travel and Operational advances to []
65.		Assessment material for []
66/		Copy of TASS report of PRAVDA note re Guatemala
67.		WH FIELD MEMO NO. 138-53
68.		[]
69.		[]
70.		[]
71.		[]
72.		[]
73.		FBI'S No 252 and 232
		Copy of []
		Material for [] and []
		News Highlights for 7 Jan from [] for []
		AEROMARINA # 798,

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POUCH MANIFEST

TO: HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT, OVERSEAS AIR FORCE		Pouch No. 3
FROM: WH		DATE 8 January 1954
ITEM	DISPATCH NO.	SUBJECT AND ENCLOSURES
74.		AMEMB CIUDAD TRUJILLO # 575
75.		AMEMB FORT AU FRINCS # 309
76.		AMEMB NAMAGUA # 263
77.		AMEMB SAN SALVADOR # 257
78.		
79.		
80.		
81.		
82.		
83.		
84.		
85.		
86.		
87.		

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18 September 1952

THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
AND IS NOT TO BE DATED OR FILED.
IT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE
CIA AND IS TO BE RETURNED IMMEDIATELY
UPON FINISHING WITH IT.

TO : Chief, WH
FROM : []
SUBJECT : Manuel [] G.

Calligeris reports as follows on []:

1. [] does not have now, nor has he ever had, an active part in my plans for Guatemala.

2. I have never communicated to him any part of my military plans.

3. I last had correspondence with [] in February 1952. He wrote me a letter outlining the general situation in Guatemala and expressing the hope that something could be done. I answered him saying that I too hoped that in time something would be done. Since then we have had no further correspondence.

4. About three (3) months ago I instructed my men in Mexico - that [] was to be considered dangerous to our cause and, as such, was to be avoided.

5. Your [] information that [] is a paid agent of the present Guatemalan government is true. I am aware of it.

6. []'s present addresses are:

a. Home address: []

b. Business address: []

[]

7. Some weeks ago (20-22 August) you gave me information which showed that the present Guatemalan government had intercepted my letters to some of my men in Mexico. I had the matter investigated and now believe that [] received that information from conversation with my people. My men report they burn all my letters on reading them.

SICILY, 1952 ONLY

Distribution: Oriz. and 1. Headquarters

CO. INFORMACION

REUNIÓN DE
ESTUDIOS Y
DEBATS

O.L.N.
Organización de
Liberación
Nacional

INTITUL

INVESTIGACION
INVESTIGACIONES

INVESTIGACION

INVESTIGACIONES

COMANDOS

GRUPOS "K"

SABOTAJE

MEM

ME2

ME3

ME4

ME5

ME6

GRUPOS DE ASALTO
PARA LA CAPTURA
DE AUTORIDADES

GRUPOS ADJESIVOS
LOS PARA LA ELI-
MINACION DE LI-
DRES.

GRUPOS EQUIPADOS
LAS DISTRACCION
LOS ETC.

U N I T E D N A T I O N S O F I N D I A N A D M I N I S T R A T I O N

COASTAL POLICE
REGIMENT

RECRUITING
CENTRE

RECRUITING
OFFICE

RECRUIT

O U T / N
ORGANISATION

STAFF

INTELLIGENCE

INITIAL
CUT
WATER
WATER

DRAFT

FM CONFERENCE HELD AT LINCOLN 10 A.M. 15 FEBRUARY 1944

Those in attendance were:

FM

*File under []
[] Plans*

Mr. [] first explained [] as a complete assessment to determine factually the resources and capability of RUFUS to fulfill project requirements. If warranted, a cadre class of military leaders will be selected, to be screened for [] training []; if warranted, assets developed for [] force; if warranted, equipment will be moved to training site; and a 9-week training program implemented.

Mr. [] went on to say that [] were to keep a card file, and when a case officer sent a name through to be cleared, they should thereafter report every time that name cropped up -- [] be on the alert for any information or activities of that person.

Mr. [] continued by briefing the group as to what RUFUS is supposed to have gathered by 15 February:

1. The names of key civilian personnel which RUFUS considers pledged to himself in each major area of resistance.
2. The names of all personnel to be connected in any way with logistical movements that are expected to occur [] in late March -- that means truck drivers, the people who unload the plane, those who will be coming into the truck park -- anyone who is going to be connected with the logistical part.
3. The names of all personnel now in [] training for commo and RM.
4. The names of all persons connected with [] training sites in administrative and labor capacities.
5. The names of all personnel to be trained in the second [] Leadership class, to commence approximately 5 March.

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CSE/IHRG ON 3/15/74 BY

6. The name of the key man of each military garrison that we plan to
head up -- of particular interest to Chief of Station, Guatemala,
because this ^{key} man will be the first to know the details. We do
not know when these names will be available.

[] then asked if Lincoln would be able to tell him these names, and
[] replied that Chief of Station, Guatemala, would receive a check list
on which would be indicated the intended use for each of these men -- the 9
(actually 12) military personalities that come out of Guatemala.

A discussion ensued, in which [] requested that lateral
cables be sent to him regarding such names, so that he could also keep a watch
list. [] however, speaking for PM activities, said that no lateral
cables will be sent on garrison personnel. RUFUS has been assured that we would
confine very strictly this information. []

[] then discussed the Leadership Class:

On 19 January, 27 men commenced a 9-week training course designed to
produce 4 [] staff specialists for return to RUFUS' staff:

- 10 organizers
- 10 shock troop leaders
- 4 saboteur instructors
- 2 assassination specialists.

RUFUS had been asked by the Case Officer to produce 30 low-level
saboteurs. RUFUS indicated a desire to send his key men to the course. The
present training class was converted immediately to retrain 20 recruited
saboteurs, the retraining to begin 5 March. The remainder of the present class
will be used for courier services, logistical functions, etc.

[] stated that [] had been right about the caliber of the
people but he does have 10 qualified persons. A class is being assembled now

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C.S.I./KRC ON 03 JULY 75

by RUFUS and will begin movement [] about 1 March. [] is to keep [] informed. The ^{New} present class is due to graduate 25 April. Under the present plan, that should clear us out of [] RM activities. About 10 May will be graduation of the radio operators.

That completes []

[] then defined [] Staging Sites []. He stated we were to reconnoiter the border area [] to select suitable sites for basing RM teams. As a result of [] talk with [] the previous night, [] had suggested three sites which were agreed upon: Site A, Site B and Site C. [] is to get the information on the man at Site A, and send it up for clearance; when [] gives him the word, he is to have [] recruit the man.

[] stated that the man for Site C is cleared, but we do not have his name. It may be [] [] then directed [] to cultivate [] but not to make any commitments until headquarters gives the green light. When the men are recruited for A and B, then we will ask them to establish a cover story.

[] stated that [] would do that.

[] stated there would be no recruiting until RUFUS returns to confer with [] and discloses what he finds out. If headquarters sends the word, [] is to prod [] who is the man with whom RUFUS will negotiate.

[] then stated that [] does not have the full confidence of []

[]

[] directed that, in working with [] was to be

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C-5 4/1965
ON 03 JULY 1965

simply an advisor and contact, to furnish headquarters with advice. [] is to do the work in the PM field, and [] is to keep himself out of it. [] then informed [] that a cut-out has been selected -- [] businessman and ex-Air Force pilot. [] was instructed to get all data available on him at once, but to make no overt approach to him prior to receipt of []. [] is then to give him a good security lecture.

[] went on to describe an air strip [] -- a strip 2100 feet long now owned by [] and located [].

[] [] has been requested to arrange, by suitable cut-out, to extend the field to 400 feet. Expected maximum expenditure, \$500.00.

The new air strip relegates to secondary importance a field previously used by [] and possibly blown. The new field is also nearer to an intermediate Staging Area presently owned by RUFUS.

[] [] defined [] Training Base [] Utilize facilities of [] through RUFUS, establish and maintain a covert training school for 30 students; prepare training agenda, secure maneuver area apart from training site, prepare to accommodate a radio operator training class for 20 students, providing full assistance to [] instructor.

[] stated that, following the recent disclosure of the interest in RUFUS' activities, the PM training site has been moved at the order of [] to a point [] on one of [] fincas. A field crypto of [] has been assigned to this location. For

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CIA/CAC/NSC
ON 03/05/2002

Reasons previously stated, the Training Site was changed to graduate the present class and receive the new class. A total of only six radio operators was obtained for the commo training, due to a misunderstanding on the part of RUFUS as to the caliber that he was to produce. His attempt to produce only previously experienced radio operators in order to shorten the training period and conduct an operation in late February, had reduced the available personnel to considerably under the required 20. As a result of the Lincoln conference, the 20 radio operators are being recruited and will move [] prior to 25 February.

[] pointed out that the above is an evaluation of things we have done, and short-term plans we have made. Now we should go into anybody's idea on long-term plans. [] added that [] liaison [] would probably continue to be a problem; [] replied that he has very good liaison []

[] then stated that one long-term development was as follows:
[] are to develop to the point of recruitment [] PM will join the forces who are to utilize this man after C/S and FI have determined his usefulness and clearance -- after that, PM will come into the field and assign a man to be hired by []

It was agreed that the responsibility of the [] in all [] contacts is ^{LIMITED TO} that of spotter when assigned, producer of clearance date, and where practicable discreet preparation for recruitment.

[] then brought out that we should be prepared for the refugee problem which would result if the project blows up. [] agreed, stating that we are trying to get [] to throw up border controls

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C/S/NSC ON 03 JULY 1968

to prevent the escape of Communists; in the event of a blow-up, someone should be ready to engineer the elimination of these border controls, to permit the revolutionists to cross the borders.

44

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C.S.I.C./HLC ON 03 SEP 1975

DATE : 8 JUN 54

~~SECRET~~

FN 27

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LINCOLN

ACTION: WH (PBS) (1-3)

INFO : WH (4)

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
CST/HRC ON 5 JULY 95

LINC 3627 (IN 15656)

1932Z 8 JUN 54

ROUTINE

TO: SGUAT

INFO: DIR

PRECEDENCE
CITE: SLINC

[RYBAT] PBSUCCESS

FOLLOWING [] ACTIONS FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION:

A. SEND PKGS CONTAINING ALARM CLOCKS TO GOVT LEADERS,
REDS, TO SIMULATE TIME BOMB. INCLUDE NOTE "NEXT TIME, REAL
THING."

B. CALL COMMIE, GOVT LEADER IN AMERICAN-ACCENTED
SPANISH, SAY OTHER COMMIE, GOVT LEADER MUST COME TO CLANDESTINE
MTG WITH KNOWN "REACTIONARY", IE UFCO, IRCA REP, TEXAN MIL-
LIONAIRE, ETC. "KISS OF DEATH" TECHNIQUE.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

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DATE : 8 JUN 54

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
CSI/HRG ON 5 JULY 95

FROM : LINCOLN

ACTION: WH (PBS)(1-3)

EN 27

INFO : DCI (4), D/DCI (5), RD/P (L) (6), WH (7), SA/PC/DCI (8)

LINC 3631 (IN 15716)

2328Z 8 JUN 54

ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

TO: SGUAT

INFO: DIR

CITE: SLINC

[RYBAT] PBSUCCESS

RE: GUAT 773 (IN 15361)

FOR []

1. DESPITE COMPROMISE PBSUCCESS MOVING FORWARD APACE.
COMPROMISE COST ONLY TOP ECHELON AND PLANS THAT EVENTS HAVE
INVALIDATED ANYWAY. BUT MASS OF ORGANIZATION REMAINS INTACT
AND IN STATE OF NEAR-READINESS.

2. RO'S, ORGANIZERS, SAB LEADERS PRESENTLY BEING LAUNCHED.
THEY WILL CONTACT UNBURNED SECOND, THIRD ECHELON AND PROCEED AS
PLANNED.

3. NUMEROUS 5-MAN HARRASSMENT TEAMS BEING READIED FOR
LAUNCHING, WITH MISSION TO ATTACK COMMIES AND COMMIE PROPERTY,
BUT NOT ATTACK ARMY.

4. CAPACITY TO AIR SUPPLY FRIENDLY INTERNAL FORCES SHOULD
EXIST SOON.

5. SHOCK TROOPS MOVING TO [] STAGING SITES. HIGH
DEGRES OF READINESS, BOTH IN PROFICIENCY AND SPIRIT.

SECRET

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